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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Steele (Tosh's Factor) Petitioner [1912] ScotLR 148 (28 November 1912)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1912/50SLR0148.html
Cite as: [1912] ScotLR 148, [1912] SLR 148

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 148

Court of Session Inner House First Division

Bill Chamber.

Thursday, November 28 1912.

50 SLR 148

Steele (Tosh's Factor) Petitioner

Subject_1Judicial Factor
Subject_2Powers
Subject_3Lease
Subject_4Urban Subjects.
Facts:

A judicial factor presented a note craving special power to grant a lease for ten years of urban subjects forming part of the factory estate.

The Court remitted to the Junior Lord Ordinary to grant the prayer of the note, but expressed the opinion that where, as here, the circumstances were in no way complicated, and the Accountant of Court was satisfied that the course proposed by the factor was beneficial for the trust estate, the application for special power was unnecesssary, the letting of urban property being within the ordinary powers of a factor.

Headnote:

On 11th July 1912 H. M. Steele, C.A., Glasgow, judicial factor on the trust estate constituted by minute of agreement between Mrs Jane Lauder or Tosh, widow of Henry Tosh, ironmonger, Glasgow, of the first part, her children of the second part, and others of the third part, presented a note to the Court for authority to grant a lease for ten years of certain heritable property in Buchanan Street, Glasgow, belonging to the trust estate.

The purposes of the trust were to hold the estate for Mrs Tosh in liferent and her children in fee. At the date of the note two of the beneficiaries—the issue of a predeceasing child—were in pupillarity.

On 11th April 1912 the judicial factor lodged with the Accountant of Court a report setting forth the circumstances in which he craved special power to grant the lease in question.

On 8th July 1912 the Accountant issued the following opinion:—“The estate under the factor's management includes, inter alia, the heritable subjects of Nos. 197 to 201 Buchanan Street, Glasgow, having an assessed rental of £380. This property, which is burdened with a bond and disposition in security for £6000, was at the time of the factor's appointment in a bad state of repair, and in consequence for the most part unlet, as is shown by the report dated 18th January 1911 of Messrs Thomas D. Smellie & Fraser, valuators, Glasgow, of which a copy is produced. By applying the proceeds of one of the other properties belonging to the estate, which he sold under powers obtained from the Court, the factor has had the Buchanan Street property put into a lettable condition, and has already secured tenants for various portions of the subjects. The bondholders are pressing for reduction of the amount of their loan, and it is important that the subjects should be fully let when they come to be realised, either to satisfy the claims of the bondholders or

Page: 149

for division among the beneficiaries after the death of the liferentrix. The factor has now received an offer, which he desires to accept, from the Mission to the Outdoor Blind for Glasgow and the West of Scotland to lease another part of the buildings, viz., the premises comprising the shop, saloon, and basement, No. 197 Buchanan Street, and the whole first flat of the property entering by close No. 201 Buchanan Street, and that for a period of ten years from and after Whitsunday 1913, at a rent for the first five years of £190, rising thereafter to £200, with a break in favour of the tenants at Whitsunday 1819 on their giving six months' previous notice.

“In this connection the factor at a meeting with the Accountant raised once again a question which, although it crops up repeatedly in the course of factorial management, has never been judicially decided. Can a factor as part of his ordinary administration grant a valid lease of urban subjects, or can he not do so without first obtaining powers from the Court? The point was discussed in the case of Carnochan (1894, 2 S.L.T. No. 89), where, on authority being asked to grant a five years' lease of urban premises, the Lord Ordinary ‘suggested that the curator had power to grant the lease without authority from the Court and that the note was unnecessary,’ but after hearing counsel intimated that ‘In view of the doubt which appeared to exist as to the power of the curator bonis to grant the lease without the intervention of the Court he would grant the authority craved.’

The statutory powers of a factor in regard to granting leases would appear to be as follows—( a) By the Act of Sederunt of 1730 he can ‘grant tacks or leases to continue during all the time that the estate set in tack shall remain under the inspection of the said Lords of Session and for one year further.’ ( b) By the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1867, section 2, trustees have power to ‘grant leases of the heritable estate of a duration not exceeding twenty-one years for agricultural lands and thirty-one years for minerals.’ ( c) By the Trusts (Scotland) Amendment Act 1884 ‘trustee’ is defined to include tutor, curator, and judicial factor, ( d) By the Judicial Factors (Scotland) Act 1889, section 19, factors are given power to make abatements or reductions of rent.

By the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1867, section 3, trustees have to petition the Court before they can grant ‘feus or long leases’ and it does seem anomalous that a factor should have extensive powers of granting leases of agricultural and mineral subjects, and yet be unable to let a house or shop for a period of five to ten years without on each occasion putting the estate under his charge to the expense of an application to the Court. But unless he does so, he cannot at present let that class of property to advantage. A tenant is often at considerable expense in fitting up premises to suit the requirements of his business, and naturally he is not willing to enter on a lease which, through no fault of his own, may be brought to an end at any time on comparatively short notice.

Section 2 of the 1867 Act above quoted being somewhat ambiguous in its terms, the Accountant for his future guidance reports the matter to the Court. In the present case, if powers are considered necessary, they may, in his opinion, be granted as craved.”

On 25th July 1912 the Lord Ordinary officiating on the Bills ( Kinnear) reported the note to the First Division.

Opinion—“This case is reported on the motion of the judicial factor. I should have granted the powers craved in accordance with the opinion of the Accountant, but it appears that there are other subjects within the factory with reference to which a similar question may arise, and the factor considers it to be for the interest of the estate that he should have a general power to let urban property subject to the supervision of the Accountant without incurring the expense of an application for special powers in each particular case. It is said to be an open question whether the granting of such leases falls within the general powers of administration conferred upon a judicial factor by his appointment or whether it is a special power to be given or withheld by the Court with reference to the circumstances, and it is desirable that this should be definitely settled by an authoritative judgment.”

Argued for the judicial factor—The question whether a factor could grant a lease of urban subjects without the authority of the Court was still open. In the case of Proctor v. Gordon, January 31, 1824, 2 S. 659 (553), an application for power to do so had been refused as unnecessary. On the other hand.acontrary opinion had been expressed in Smith v. Smith, March 20, 1862, 24 D. 838, per Lord Deas at p. 843, where it was pointed out that a judicial factor did not possess the discretionary powers vested in trustees. A judicial factor was now, however, a “trustee”—Trusts (Scotland) Amendment Act 1884 (47 and 48 Vict. cap. 63), sec. 2—and the petitioner accordingly submitted that he was entitled to grant the lease in question, it being in his opinion expedient to do so— Noble's Trustees, Petitioners, July 10, 1912, 49 S.L.R. 888.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—This case was reported by Lord Kinnear when officiating on the Bills in vacation, and raises a question as to granting special powers to a judicial factor. The factor on this trust estate has under his charge heritable property consisting of urban subjects in Glasgow, and he approached the Accountant of Court to ask whether he would be entitled to grant a lease of a certain portion of these urban subjects under circumstances which I need not detail but which leave no doubt whatsoever—and that is also the Accountant's view—that it was very desirable that the lease should be granted. But the factor, as the Accountant of Court says in a note now before the Court, “raised

Page: 150

once again the question which, although it crops up repeatedly in the course of factorial management, has never been judicially decided—Can a factor, as part of his ordinary administration, grant a valid lease of urban subjects, or can he not do so without first obtaining powers from the Court?” In order to bring the matter to a head the factor accordingly applied for special powers, and the application coming to depend before Lord Kinnear on the Bills, his Lordship reported the matter to the Court. The Accountant of Court brings before the notice of the Court the various provisions in Acts of Sederunt and statutes which deal with this matter. By the Trusts Act of 1867, sec. 2, trustees have power to grant leases of heritable estate of a duration not exceeding twenty-one years for agricultural lands and thirty-one years for minerals, and by the subsequent amending Act of 1884 “trustee” is defined to include “judicial factor.” I am of opinion that the section does not directly apply. I think it is limited in its terms to heritable estate of the class of agricultural lands and minerals, but, on the other hand, I do not look upon the Trusts Act of 1867 as giving the only powers which trustees have got. In that matter it is probably more a declaratory Act than an enacting Act, and I am far from adopting the proposition that before the Act trustees had no power in regard to leases. I do think that there is sometimes a little confusion in the minds of those who apply for them as to what special powers are. The Court has not ex nobili officio to validate anything which it allows the applicant to do. It can only do so if that right resides in it either in respect of the common law or in respect of some special powers given to it by statute. These applications for special powers might, I think, more accurately be called applications for special directions, because what the Court is asked to do is to give a special direction to its own officer, namely, the factor. In a case like the present there is so far as I see no necessity for a special direction. In other words, it seems to me to be part of the duty of the factor to deal with urban property by letting it. Whether he is to let it for a term of years depends upon several considerations. It depends first of all upon the practical consideration whether the lease is a good lease for the trust estate or whether he could get better terms elsewhere. That is for the determination of the judicial factor, with of course the assistance that he gets from the Accountant of Court, to whom he must go. But there is also a set of considerations which depend upon the particular circumstances of each trust. Where a trust is likely to continue for some time, and where a beneficial return to the trust estate can be got by a lease for a term of years which could not be otherwise got, then obviously the course is expedient. On the other hand, if a trust is of such a character that in all probability there will be an early distribution of the trust estate, it is quite conceivable that even although the factor might get a better return of income for, say, the next year by granting a lease, this advantage would be more than paid for by the hampering effect of the lease upon the distribution. One cannot lay down a rule, because each case depends on its own circumstances. I only say that it is a question which the factor must consider, and in which he must also be guided by the Accountant of Court, to whom he has to refer all such matters. The result at which I come generally is that the letting of urban property is within the ordinary powers of a factor, and that it is only necessary to go beyond the Accountant to the Court for special powers where there is some special circumstances. I can figure a case where the circumstances might be so balanced as to make the proper duty of the factor a question of great difficulty, and that would be a case for coming to the Court for further direction. But where there is no complication and the Accountant is satisfied that the course proposed by the factor is beneficial for the trust estate in both senses I have mentioned, then there is no reason to come to Court for special powers. I think that as the case is here, there will be no harm in granting the special powers, but it follows from the opinion that I have just given that had it not been the absence of authoritative pronouncement upon this matter there would have been no need for the factor to come to the Court.

Lord Kinnear—I concur.

Lord Johnston—In this case the difficulty that I felt arose from the Pupils Protection Act 1849, which, while it clearly recognises that factors had no power to make leases for a period of years, makes, by section 7, a special provision for them applying for special powers to that end. Had it not been for that I do not think there would have been any difficulty. But then comes the Trust Act of 1867, which I quite agree is a declaratory Act, and which declares the powers of trustees to make leases of ordinary duration of agricultural or mineral subjects. The Trusts (Scotland) Amendment Act of 1884 follows and declares that the term “trustee” in the Trusts Acts shall for the future apply to judicial factors. That would have got over the difficulty created by the Pupils Protection Act 1849 if it had not been for the limited nature of the subjects to which the Trusts Act of 1867 expressly applies. But I think that on reading the two Acts of 1867 and 1884 together one may conclude that these Acts indicate by implication that trustees and factors have and are to have similar powers with regard to all classes of heritage. But that does not quite solve the whole matter, because, as your Lordship has pointed out, there are two circumstances in which leases have to be considered by a factor—one in deciding whether it is within the scope of the trust which he is administering, and the other in deciding whether it is a beneficial and proper lease to be entered into. On the former subject I

Page: 151

think he is quite entitled to direction from the Court, but on the latter that it is his duty to act on his own discretion. Accordingly I agree with your Lordship.

Lord Mackenzie—I am of the same opinion.

The Court remitted to the Junior Lord Ordinary to grant the prayer of the note and to find the judicial factor entitled to the expenses thereof and incidental thereto out of the factory estate.

Counsel:

Counsel for Judicial Factor—Lippe. Agents— Dove, Lockhart, & Smart, S.S.C.

1912


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