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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Murdoch's Trustees v. Murdoch and Others [1918] ScotLR 664 (20 June 1918)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1918/55SLR0664.html
Cite as: [1918] ScotLR 664, [1918] SLR 664

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 664

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Thursday, June 20. 1918.

55 SLR 664

Murdoch's Trustees

v.

Murdoch and Others.

Subject_1Succession
Subject_2Trust
Subject_3Construction
Subject_4“Free Revenue” — Incidence of Income Tax as between Trust and Annuitant.
Facts:

By his will a testator left his widow the free revenue and proceeds of the free residue of his estate. By a codicil he provided that “in the event of the income of the free residue of my estate exceeding in any year the sum of £2000, my trustees shall restrict the payment to my wife out of the said income to the sum of £2000.” For a number of years after the testator's death the trustees paid the widow (the income of the residue always exceeding £2000) £2000 less income tax. Held, in a Special Case, that the widow was entitled to £2000 per annum without deduction of income tax if the income of the free residue permitted, and that she was entitled to recover the tax which had been deducted, with interest, less the income tax on the interest.

Headnote:

Mrs Catherine Hutchison or Murdoch, widow of Alexander Murdoch, wine and spirit broker, Glasgow, and others, his testamentary trustees, first parties, the said Mrs Catherine Hutchison or Murdoch, second party, and Alexander Norman Murdoch and others, the testator's children, third parties, brought a Special Case for the determination of questions with regard to the incidence of income tax upon provisions made by the testator in favour of the second party.

The trust-disposition and settlement conveyed the whole estate to the first parties for various purposes, which included—“( Fifth) I direct my said trustees to hold the whole of the free residue and remainder of my estate for behoof of my said wife in liferent for her liferent alimentary use only, and to pay to her the free revenue and proceeds thereof so long as she remains my widow and unmarried, burdened always with the maintenance and education of our children in a manner suitable to their station in life while they continue to reside in family with her and are unable to support themselves.”

A codicil dated 21st September 1899 provided, inter alia—“And ( Second) I direct that in the event of the income of the free

Page: 665

residue of my estate, which in terms of the fifth article of my said trust-disposition and settlement is to be paid to my wife so long as she remains my widow and unmarried, for the support of herself and our children as therein specified, exceeding in any year the sum of Two thousand pounds, my trustees shall restrict the payment to my wife out of said income to the sum of Two thousand pounds per annum, and as regards any surplus income they shall accumulate and invest the same along with and as part of the capital of the trust estate, and it shall be dealt with in the same manner as I have directed with reference to the capital of the trust estate.”

The Case set forth—“1. Alexander Murdoch died at Glasgow on 11th July 1900 survived by his wife and by five children…. All of the said children, except Alan Murdoch, have attained the age of twenty-five. The said Alan Murdoch has attained majority. 2…. By the sixth purpose the trustees were directed to hold the residue of the testator's estate for such of his children as should attain the age of twenty-five, all as set forth in the said purpose. … 4. The free income of the trust estate, after meeting all expenses of the trust and after deduction of income tax from the gross income of the trust estate, has always largely exceeded the sum of £2000. Since the testator's death his trustees, of whom the second party was one, have regularly paid to the second party in monthly instalments the said sum of £2000 per annum, less income tax, for which she has regularly granted receipts in similar terms to the following receipt for the monthly instalment due for June 1917:—‘Received from the trustees of the late Alexander Murdoch, Esquire, per Wilson, Stirling, & Company, their factors, the sum of One hundred and twenty-five pounds sterling, being my annuity for June less income tax. Catherine Murdoch.’ The parties hereto are agreed that the total deductions in respect of income tax up to 11th July 1917, including the appropriate interest thereon to said date, are to be taken as amounting as at said date to the sum of £2634, 9s. 2d. The sums so deducted as income tax from the second party have been invested as surplus income of the trust estate and accumulated by the first parties. 5. When the said payments were made to the second party no question was ever raised as to the deduction in respect of income tax, and in accepting the said payments and granting receipts therefor in the aboverecited terms she was unaware that there was any possibility of question regarding the legality of the said deductions. She was not separately advised with regard to her rights. She has, however, recently been separately advised to the effect that the aforesaid deductions were unwarrantable, and that according to the true import of the testator's directions in the said will and codicil the first parties were in the circumstances bound to pay to her the full sum of £2000 per annum.”

The second party contended—“That in each year in which the free income of the trust estate, after deduction of expenses and income tax, exceeds £2000, and the payment to her falls to be restricted, in terms of the said codicil, she is entitled (while she remains unmarried) to payment of the sum of £2000 in full without any deduction in respect of income tax; that the first parties were not entitled to make the said deductions from the payments to her in the past and are now bound to pay to her in respect of the said past deductions and interest thereon the agreed-on sum of £2634, 9s. 2d., with interest thereon from 11th July 1917 till payment, less tax, and that she is not barred from recovering the amount of the said deductions.”

The third parties contended—“That on a sound construction of the testator's said testamentary deeds the amount payable to the second party in each year in which the income of the free residue of the testator's estate exceeds the sum of £2000, and she remains unmarried, is the sum of £2000 less the amount of income tax payable in respect of that sum, and that the second party is not entitled to recover the amount of the past deductions. Separatim, quoad the past the third parties maintain that by the said receipts the second party has discharged all right competent to her to recover payment of the aforesaid deductions, and that they are binding on her.”

The questions of law were—“1. Is the second party, in each year in which the payment to her from the testator's estate falls, in terms of his said codicil, to be restricted to the sum of £2000, and she remains unmarried, entitled to payment of that sum in full without deduction in respect of income tax? 2. Is the second party in each such year entitled to payment only of the amount remaining after deduction from the said sum of £2000 of the income tax payable in respect thereof? (3) Are the first parties bound to pay to the second party the said sum of £2634, 9s. 2d., with interest thereon at 5 per cent. from 11th July 1917, less the income tax on such interest? or (4) Is the second party now barred from demanding payment of the amount of the said deductions and interest?”

Argued for the second party—Correctly read the provision of the trust-disposition and settlement and the codicil imported a gift to the widow of a minimum sum of £2000. Free revenue meant the revenue of the trust after all charges had been met, including income tax. The codicil did not affect the quality of the bequest in the settlement, but merely set a limit to the amount of the free revenue that was to be paid to the widow. The testator's intention was that his trustees should pay the income tax on the revenue so that his widow in a question with the Crown should be in a position to say that income tax had been paid upon her liferent. If the third parties were right the widow would receives less than £2000. Brooke v. Price, [1916] 2 Ch. 345, per Warrington, L.J., at p. 350, [1917] A.C. 115, per Lord Finlay, L.C., at p. 121, and Lord Wrenbury at p. 125; and in re Musgrave, [1916] 2 Ch. 417, were referred to.

Page: 666

Argued for the third parties—Income tax had to be paid by the recipient of the income, but it was collected at the source. A company or trustees therefore paid it, and then paid the dividend or liferent less income tax to the person entitled thereto. If a testator intended to include in his gift a gift of income tax he must do so in express terms. Here the terms used were free revenue. That meant the income of the trust estate after the annual deductions, not income tax, had been met— Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 1902, 4 F. 545, per Lord Adam at p. 549, 39 S.L.R. 348; Gleadow v. Leetham (1882), L.R., 22 Ch. D. 269, per Kay, J., at p. 271; in re Saillard [1917], 2 Ch. 401. Further, if the second party was right £2600 would be required to produce an income of £2000 after the income tax had been paid. But the tax on income up to £2000 was at 3s. 8d. per £1, while on incomes above that figure the tax was at 5s. The trustees would pay at 5s., and when the second party claimed repayment of one-fourth of the tax the Crown would be entitled to say that her income was £2600. The sums which had been deducted could not be recovered, for they had been paid under an error in law. Ashton Gas Company v. Attorney-General, [1906] AC 10, per Lord Halsbury, L.C., at p. 12 was referred to.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—The contention advanced by the second party in this Special Case is in my judgment sound and ought to receive effect. By the 5th purpose of his trust-disposition and settlement the testator directed his trustees to pay to his widow the free revenue of the free residue of his estate. Had that direction remained unaltered the question now in controversy would never have arisen. The trustees would in the ordinary course have paid the income tax out of the estate of the truster which they were directed to hold in their hands, and the second party would have received the free revenue. But by his codicil the testator made an alteration upon the 5th purpose. By the codicil he directs his trustees in the event of the free revenue of the free residue of his estate exceeding in any year the sum of £2000 to restrict the payment to his wife to the sum of £2000 per annum.

The question is—Did that alteration upon the 5th purpose of the settlement affect the incidence of the income tax? In my opinion it had no such effect, and obviously it was not intended to have such an effect. The sole result of the codicil was in my opinion to add a proviso to the 5th purpose of the truest-disposition and settlement, which now reads thus—“I direct my trustees to pay to my widow the free revenue of the free residue of my estate provided it does not exceed £2000, but if it does exceed that amount then they are to pay to my widow only the £2000 and to dispose of the surplus as directed.” If that be, as I think it is, the correct reading of the 5th purpose of the settlement combined with the alteration made by the codicil, then it follows as a matter of course that the widow shall receive her £2000 free from any deduction on account of income tax..

I propose therefore that we should answer the questions put to us as follows:—The first question in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and it follows, counsel were agreed, that the third question should be answered in the affirmative and the fourth in the negative.

Lord Johnston—[Read by the Lord President]—I think that the first question in the case should be answered in the affirmative and the second in the negative. The fourth is, I understand, withdrawn.

By his settlement Mr Murdoch directed his trustees to hold “the whole of the free residue and remainder” of his estate for behoof of his wife in liferent allenarly, and “to pay to her the free revenue and proceeds thereof.” On this footing her interest must have suffered deduction of income tax, for there was no other source whence it could be paid, and till it was paid the free revenue and proceeds could not be ascertained.

But his estate having increased, by codicil Mr Murdoch altered this—not, indeed, in very happily chosen words, but with, I think, a clear enough intention—to the effect that his widow should be restricted to a round sum of £2000, but that she should receive this without deduction. He has his eye fixed on what is to be paid to his wife, and says that if the income of the free residue of his estate, which is to be paid to her, exceeds £2000 in any year his trustees are to restrict the payment to her out of said income to £2000 per annum. There was to be paid to her under the settlement, not the taxable income, but the income from which tax had been deducted. If that exceeded £2000 the trustees were under the codicil to pay her, not £2000 of taxable income, but £2000 out of the income which would remain in their hands after the tax had been deducted.

Lord Mackenzie—I am of the same opinion. I am quite unable to assent to the contention put forward by the parties of the third part that when the testator directed his trustees to restrict the payment to “my wife out of the said income to the sum of £2000 per annum” he meant that in the present state of the income tax the trustees were to pay his wife only £1400 per annum. I think the fallacy arises from supposing that there is anything in the nature of a bequest in the codicil. The bequest is in the will, and in the will what the testator leaves is the whole—I introduce the word “whole,” because that is plainly what is meant—the whole free revenue of the free residue of his estate. It is the trustees who are accountable for the income tax; and what they hand over to the widow is the whole of what remains in their hands after they have satisfied the claims of the Inland Revenue. When in the codicil there is a limitation of that bequest I think it plainly means the same thing as was meant in the will itself, and refers to a de facto payment and not to a de jure right. Accordingly I am of opinion that the answers should be as your Lordship proposes.

Page: 667

Lord Skerrington—By his will the testator gave to his widow the whole free income of the residue of his estate. By his codicil he revoked that to a certain extent, and there is a question whether the revocation was intended to operate in the more limited sense for which the widow contends, or in the more drastic sense which is contended for by the third parties. I have come to the conclusion that your Lordships are right in thinking that the revocation was intended to operate to the more limited extent only.

The Court answered the first and third questions of law in the affirmative and the second and fourth in the negative.

Counsel:

Counsel for the First and Second Parties— Chree, K.C.— Mitchell. Agents— Graham, Johnston, & Fleming, W.S.

Counsel for the Third Parties— Blackburn, K.C.— W. T. Watson. Agents— A. & W. M. Urquhart, S.S.C.

1918


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1918/55SLR0664.html