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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Boylan v. Hunter [1921] ScotLR 92 (03 December 1921) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1921/59SLR0092.html Cite as: [1921] SLR 92, [1921] ScotLR 92 |
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Page: 92↓
In an action of damages at the instance of a widow and two pupil children of a man who lost his life in a motor accident, the jury awarded the widow £300 and the children £200 each. At the trial circumstances were disclosed which established the unfitness of the widow to administer the money awarded to the children, and the jury recommended “that the money for the children be put in trust for them if possible.” On the motion to apply the verdict the consent of the widow to the appointment by the Court of a factor to administer the children's money was vouched by minute, and the Court was asked verbally to make the appointment de plano. The Court (after consultation with the Second Division) granted the motion, and appointed as factor loco tutoris the person suggested in the minute.
Observations (per the Lord President) on the incompetency of superseding legal guardians by the appointment of a trustee, and as to the circumstances in which the appointment of a factor loco tutoris may be made de plano.
Mrs Rose Ann Watson or Boylan, Craigneuk, near Wishaw, as an individual and as tutrix and administratrix-in-law for her pupil children Thomas and Sarah Boylan, brought an action against Thomas Hunter, carriage hirer, Wishaw, concluding for payment of £1000 to herself and £300 to each of the children as damages for the death of her husband John Boylan.
The action was tried before the Lord President and a jury, and a verdict returned as follows—“The jury … unanimously find for the pursuer, and assess the damages to the pursuer as an individual at (£300) Three hundred pounds, for Thomas Boylan at (£200) Two hundred pounds, and for Sarah Boylan at (£200) Two hundred pounds; and they recommend that the money for the children be put in trust for them if possible.”
The pursuer thereafter lodged a minute in which it was stated that she “as tutrix and administrator-in-law foresaid, in view of the recommendation of the jury in their finding dated 22nd July 1921 in this action, that the damages assessed by them to the
Page: 93↓
said Thomas Boylan at £200 and to the said Sarah Boylan at £200 should be put in trust for them, hereby consents to the said sums, less their proportion of the extra-judicial expenses of said action, being so put in trust for them; and she further consents to the Court appointing John M'Callum, writer, Glasgow, or such other person as the Court may appoint to be judicial factor upon said fund, with power to administer the same for behoof of said children.” When the case appeared in the Single Bills on the motion to apply the verdict counsel for the pursuer also moved the Court to appoint a factor loco tutoris to the pupil children. Counsel referred to the unsuitability of the pursuer as disclosed in the evidence to administer the money awarded to the children, to the recommendation of the jury, to the minute lodged by the pursuer, and to the following cases:— Collins v. Eglinton Iron Company, 1882, 9 R. 500, 19 S.L.R. 440; M'Avoy v. Young's Paraffin Light and Mineral Oil Company, 1882, 19 S.L.R. 441; Anderson v. Muirhead, 1884. 11 R. 870, 21 S.L.R. 597; Sharp v. Pathhead Spinning Company, Limited, 1885, 12 R. 574, 22 S.L.R. 368.
At advising—
In circumstances more or less similar to those of the present case, a factor loco tutoris was appointed de plano in Collins, (1882) 9 R. 500, and in M'Avoy, (1882) 16 S. L. R. 441 (both in the Second Division). But this course seems never to have been taken since the decision (in the First Division) of Anderson, (1884) 11 R. 870. In one later reported case, however—that namely of Sharp, (1885) 12 R. 574—the Second Division made a de plano appointment of a “trustee' for the pupils' money. I have consulted the Accountant of Court and it appears that there have been no appointments of factors such as we are now asked to make since 1882. But I understand that occasionally trusts have been set up in the Outer House in circumstances more or less similar to the present on application of the verdict. The trustees appointed in this way are under no supervision, find no caution, and are not officers of Court. As it appears to be desirable to regulate the practice in this matter for the future, we have consulted with our brethren of the Second Division.
Supersession of the natural guardian, (either generally or quoad a particular fund belonging to the ward) by the appointment of a trustee is not competent even with the consent of the legal guardian. The right which the law accords to the father or mother to the guardianship of their children is exclusive of any right on their part to transfer their powers as guardian, either in whole or in part, to others; and the appointment of a trustee by the Court, unless competent in itself, is in no way fortified by the legal guardian's consent. The Court can remove any guardian, including a legal guardian, on certain grounds, but this power does not make it competent for the Court to supersede (in relation to the whole or any part of the ward's property) the person entitled by law to the guardianship, by the appointment of a trustee. The alternative and competent course is the appointment of a judicial factor loco tutoris. Where the adoption of this course is called for by circumstances affecting the capacity or suitability of the legal guadian, the ordinary procedure is by petition in this Court or in the Sheriff Court; and the propriety of adherence to that procedure in the general case is strongly emphasised by the judgment delivered in Anderson, ( supra). The question, therefore, is whether in such cases as the present a departure from the ordinary procedure—open as that procedure always is to the parties for their adoption—is expedient and permissible. I think it is on certain conditions. A de plano appointment on application of the verdict has the great advantage of economy, and in this case it is supported by the established unfitness of the legal guardian, and her duly vouched consent to the appointment—two conditions which must anyhow concur before an application for a de plano appointment could be entertained. A recommendation by the jury is not essential, provided the unfitness of the legal guardian is disclosed at the trial so as to satisfy the presiding Judge that it exists. If, however, these two conditions concur, as they do here, there is no doubt that the powers of the Court of Session warrant a de plano appointment. The factor when appointed will have to find caution in the usual way, and his administration will be under the supervision of the Accountant of Court in the same way as if he had been appointed on petition either in this Court or in the Sheriff Court. When the ordinary procedure is followed, the general practice is to make intimation to the next of kin on both sides of the house. It will be for the discretion of the Court in each case in which a de plano appointment is moved for to decide whether such intimation should or should not be ordered. There appears to be no reason for ordering it in the present case.
The
The Court in respect of the minute of consent appointed the person suggested in the minute to be factor loco tutoris for the pursuer's pupil children in so far as regards the sums awarded to each of them by the verdict, with the usual powers, he always finding caution before extract; decerned against the defender for payment to the said factor loco tutoris of the said sums; and remitted to the junior Lord Ordinary to proceed in the factory.
Counsel for the Pursuer— Duffes. Agents— J. Douglas Gardiner & Mill, S.S.C.