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MacPherson v. City Edinburgh Council & Ors [2003] ScotCS 36 (18 February 2003)

OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
P1591/02	OPINION OF LORD CARLOWAY in Petition of GORDON MACPHERSON, Petitioner against (FIRST) THE CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL, and (SECOND) VODAFONE UK LTD., Respondents for Judicial Review of a decision of the First Respondents dated 14 March 2002 granting the Second Respondents planning permission for the erection of a telephone mast ________________

Petitioner: O'Carroll; Gillespie Macandrew W.S.

First Respondents: I. F. Maclean; City of Edinburgh Council

Second Respondents: Artis; Wright Johnston & Mackenzie

18 February 2003

1. Legislation
1. Section 34 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 (c 8) provides that a development order may provide that planning applications be notified to prescribed persons and be accompanied by a certificate confirming that such notification has taken place. It continues:

"(5) A planning authority shall not entertain any application for planning permission unless any requirements imposed by virtue of this section have been satisfied."

2. In terms of article 9 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) (Scotland) Order 1992 (SI No 224) (the GDPO), an applicant for planning permission is obliged to notify his application to "persons holding an interest in neighbouring land". The article defines such persons as:

"(2)(a) in the case of lands and heritages entered in the valuation roll at the date of the application, the persons appearing in the valuation roll in force at that time as being the owners, lessees and occupiers of those lands and heritages; and

(b) in the case of lands and heritages not entered in the valuation roll at the date of the application, the owners and occupiers of those lands and heritages."

So far as the form of the notification is concerned, the article continues:

"(3)(a) The notification...of a person...in terms of paragraph (2)(a)

(i) in each case where the name and address of the owner, lessee or occupier can be ascertained from the valuation roll, shall be sent to such person at his address as entered in the valuation roll;

(ii) where information as to the owner, lessee or occupier of neighbouring land or of any premises contained or included in neighbouring land cannot be ascertained from the valuation roll, shall be sent to "the Owner" at such land or premises, where the name of the owner cannot be ascertained, to "the Lessee" at such land or premises where the name of the lessee cannot be ascertained and to "the Occupier" at such land or premises where the name of the occupier cannot be ascertained;

(b) The notification... of a person...in terms of paragraph (2)(b) shall be sent addressed in each case to "the Owner", and "the Occupier" at each address of the premises contained or included in the neighbouring land."

"Neighbouring land" is defined in article 2 as:

"land which is conterminous with or within 4 metres of the boundary of land for which the development is proposed but only if any part of such land is within 90 metres of any part of the development in question".

3. Quite apart from the requirements on applicants, the GDPO imposes certain obligations upon local planning authorities in receipt of applications. Thus, article 12 provides:

"(5)(b) where the application relates to development of one or more of the classes of development specified in Schedule 7 (bad neighbour development)...

the planning authority shall publish a notice...in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which the neighbouring land is situated, as soon as practicable after the date when the application for planning permission was received by them."

Schedule 7 includes "the construction of a building to a height exceeding 20 metres" (see also the General Permitted Development (Scotland) Order 1992 (SI No 223) (the GPDO) schedule 2 para 1(7)). "Building" is not specifically defined in the GDPO but section 277 of the 1997 Act says that:

" 'building' includes any structure or erection, and any part of a building, as so defined, but does not include plant or machinery comprised in a building."

Article 2(1) of the GPDO states that "building" does not include "plant or machinery" and that:

" 'satellite antenna' means apparatus designed for transmitting radio energy...and includes any mountings or brackets attached to such apparatus."

 

2. Facts

4. The facts had a tendency to emerge slowly during the course of the First Hearing rather than be elucidated in advance in the written pleadings. In the petition, the petitioner is said to be the owner of industrial property at Bonnington Mill on Bonnington Road and five offices within a development known as the Matrix at 62-66 Newhaven Road, Edinburgh. However, Bonnington Mill is not on Bonnington Road at all but forms number 72, Newhaven Road. It is a triangular piece of ground bounded on its west side by Newhaven Road, on the north by the Water of Leith, where that river flows upstream from Bonnington Bridge, and on the south by that strip of ground formerly occupied by a disused mill stream.
5. Number 72 is owned by the petitioner. It is leased by him in small units to a large number of small commercial and light industrial concerns. The buildings housing these units are grouped towards the Road (or west) side of the Mill, with the eastern portion of the site of the Mill being taken up primarily with car parking, used by all the tenants. Extending southwards from the Mill is further property again let out, in part, in small commercial or light industrial units. According to the Ordnance Survey map of this area [Pro 6/1 p 7], the part of this property on Newhaven Road, moving south from number 72, consists of numbers 66, 64 and 62 Newhaven Road. There is an alley before number 58 and, continuing southwards, a building marked as housing number 56 and, curiously, also number 60. In fact, the situation on the ground is that numbers 66 and 64 are numbered 66A and 64A and behind them, running eastwards are a series of numbered units, mostly being numbered 64B. Further to the east, and bounding with number 72 on its north side, where the disused mill stream was, is a large area which, according to the petitioner, is numbered 60 (and possibly also partly 62) Newhaven Road. This too is owned by the petitioner and is let to a firm called Stevenson & Cheyne. It is in active use.
6. The Matrix consists of buildings fronting Newhaven Road at numbers 66, 64 and 62. It does not appear to be proximate to the planning site (see below). A number of the units at the Matrix, including Units 6 and 7 (but not numbers 1 or 4), are owned by the petitioner. Units 6 and 7 are tenanted respectively by Rocket Visuals Ltd and a charity called Reforesting Scotland. The nature and location of the various sites and their boundaries are shown in a bundle of two plans, an aerial photograph and "location statistics" lodged, somewhat belatedly, by the petitioner. The planning site (infra) is marked with a large red dot on the photograph.
7. On the Valuation Roll for number 60 Newhaven Road (attached to an affidavit of the petitioner [Pro 6/6]), Stevenson & Cheyne (1983) Limited are shown as tenants/occupiers and the petitioner is shown as the owner with an address given as Bonnington Mills Business Centre, 72 Newhaven Road, Edinburgh EH6 5QG (apparently the correct postcode). The petitioner maintains that he has a mailbox at this address. On the Valuation Roll for offices at number 72, the petitioner is also described by name as the owner (see an extract produced for the Friends of the Earth office at number 72/1). On the Valuation Roll for at least some of the Matrix units, the petitioner is shown by name as the owner and his personal address of 21 Coates Crescent, Edinburgh is given (see the extract produced for the Office at 64B/3 with John G Hardie & Son (Property Development) as tenants/occupiers).
8. The second respondents propose to locate a mast in a wedge of ground to the south of the eastern extremity of number 72 and to the east of number 60. This area of ground appears to be bounded by, and thus conterminous with, both numbers 72 and number 60. It has the address 15 Bonnington Road Lane. The second respondents' initial proposals were contained in their Application for Planning Permission [Pro 6/1] lodged by their agents, James Barr Consultants Limited, and dated 28 November 2001. The development is described as: "Installation of 18m slimline lattice mast, 6 no. antennas, 3 no. microwave dishes and 1 no. equipment cabin". The report to the first respondents' Development Quality Sub-Committee of the Planning Committee [Pro 6/2] mentions that, in addition to the 18 metre height, there were six antennae with a further height of 2.5 metres. Revised plans attached to the application [Pro 7/2] show the antennae. These are not simply aerials but fairly substantial panels. Accompanying the application was a "Supporting Statement" [Pro 7/5] which set out certain general information about the second respondents, the nature of the installation and how it might fit in with National Planning Policy Guideline 19, Planning Advice Note 62, Lothian Structure Plan strategic policy (ENV 54) and the first respondents' non statutory policy on telecommunications. It dealt with alternative sites, sharing facilities, the need for this particular facility and its compliance with the frequency regulations specified by the International Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) before concluding that the site presented the best practical option for telecommunications development in the locality.
9. Attached to the planning application was the certificate under the GDPO relative to neighbour notification. This purports to certify that notification was sent to:

"Unit 6-7, 64A Newhaven Rd, EH6 5QB

Unit 4 64B Newhaven Rd, EH6 5QB

Unit 1 64B Steenson Varming Mulcahy & Partners EH6 5QB, Newhaven Rd

66A Newhaven Rd, Vector Offshore, EH6 5QB

72 Newhaven Rd, Pocket (sic) Visuals, Bonnington Mill, EH6 5QC".

An annotation on the certificate, the date of which is not known, states that one letter was sent to each of the "owner", "lessee" and "occupier", presumably at each of these "addresses". A letter from the second respondents' agents to the first respondents dated 29 November 2002, clarifies what this means in relation to the petitioner's interests. This is that a letter had been sent to "The Owner, Rocket Visuals, Bonnington Mill, 72 Newhaven Rd". Presumably, letters may also have been sent to "The Owner" of Units 6-7, 64A and Units 1 and 4 at 64B Newhaven Road. A Neighbourhood Notification Plan attached to the certificate [Pro 6/1 p 7] makes it tolerably clear that there was no notification to anyone east of the Matrix, notably anyone connected with the land immediately to the west of the planning site (i.e. number 60 or 62). Any notification to persons connected with number 72 was presumably restricted to "The Owner, Rocket Visuals etc." as described in the letter (supra), although it seems that Rocket Visuals' address is not at number 72.

10. The planning sub-committee report (supra) said that neighbours had been notified on 28 November 2001 and that objections had been received from a nearby resident, Pilrig Residents Association and the Leith-Bonnington Community Council on the grounds that:

"the proposal will be obtrusive and detract from views from Pilrig Park and the wider area. A number of masts have already been approved in the area. Health concerns are also raised."

The first respondents' Head of Planning and Strategy noted the height of the mast and antennae at 21 metres, but considered the visual impact acceptable. The site was some distance from residential properties and would have no detrimental impact on the amenity of the occupiers of any nearby developments. Alternative sites had been considered. The second respondents had certified that the development complied with ICNIRP guidelines in accordance with government planning policy (NPPG 19) which covered public safety. Having considered (Lothian Structure Plan) strategic policies E25, ED4(?), E32 and E33, he recommended approval. Planning consent was given on 14 March 2002 [Pro 6/3].

11. The petitioner avers that he received no notification of the application for planning permission. He maintains that, if he had been notified, then he would have lodged objections which the planning sub-committee would have been bound to take into account. The nature of these objections would have been similar to the ones the petitioner did lodge when, on or about 13 September 2002, he was notified of a second application by the second respondents. This second application [Pro 6/4] was for a substitute: "Installation of an 18 m high 3400 lattice tower with 9 no. antennas, 4 no. transmission dishes and 2 no. equipment cabins". In this connection, the first planning consent has not been acted upon and no mast has yet been erected.
12. The petitioner's objections to the second application [Pro 6/5] begin with a general statement that the proposal:

"will have a detrimental effect on the character and appearance of the area particularly as viewed from his premises and from the Water of Leith Walkway. The proposal will also stifle any potential redevelopment of the site in the future."

They then refer to National Planning Policy Guideline No 19, notably that part referring to the desirability of telecommunications equipment being unobtrusive, and to Planning Advice Note 62 and its reference to the opportunities available to install such equipment sensitively. The objections cover the terms of the strategic Lothian Structure Plan (Policy ENV54) and the North East Edinburgh Local Plan (Policy E32), both stressing the need to minimise environmental impact. There are six detailed objections. The first three relate to defects in procedure. The fourth complains about lack of evidence on the consideration of alternative sites. The next two are:

"(v) The Site which is immediately adjacent to an existing business centre and the Water of Leith Walkway is totally inappropriate as it will result in a visual intrusion in the area resulting in substantially reduced amenity levels; and

(vi) The proposal will significantly reduce both the marketability of the Business Centre for any existing or proposed use and the attractiveness of the Water of Leith Walkway."

3. Submissions

13. At the outset of the First Hearing, the second respondents moved that the Hearing be continued for a period of three weeks in order to make further enquiries into the exact nature of the neighbour notification made. There were certain potential discrepancies in certain affidavits being prepared for the second respondents. The first respondents had not lodged answers and did not oppose this motion. The petitioner did oppose the motion. It was explained that the petitioner had intimated his concerns about lack of notification in October 2002. The case had called before the court on 13 December 2002 on the petitioner's motion for interim orders. The second respondents had been represented at that time. I refused the motion for a continuation. It was clear from the second respondents' agents' letter of 29 November 2002 (supra) that they had been made aware of the petitioner's concerns by the first respondents in the early part of November 2002. They had intimation of the petition by the time of the hearing on 13 December 2002 at which they appeared, following upon the honouring of their caveat, and at which they had given certain undertakings. In these circumstances, the second respondents had had ample time in which to research the relatively straightforward issue of neighbour notification and to make such submissions upon it as they deemed fit. I should add also that both the petitioner and the second respondents produced affidavits concerning the notification. Although the content of these did not add to what could have been, and was, said ex parte, it should be noted that the court had not appointed parties to lodge any such affidavits.
14. On the merits of the application, the petitioner spent some time attempting to explain the situation on the ground, with limited success, upon the information initially available. The explanation became more accurate and comprehensible once maps, photographs and other documents were made available. Ultimately, the submission was straightforward. In terms of the GDPO, the petitioner ought to have been notified by name, as the owner specified on the Valuation Roll of the lands at both number 72 and number 60 (and 62) Newhaven Road and perhaps relative to certain units in the Matrix also. He had not been so notified. The first respondents ought therefore not to have entertained the application. The procedural defect had deprived the petitioner of an opportunity, afforded by statute, to object and because of this, the planning consent should be reduced (Wordie Property Co v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT 345; McDaid v Clydebank District Council 1984 SLT 162, Lord Cameron at 167; Lochore v Moray District Council 1992 SLT 16, Lord Cullen at 20; London & Clydeside Estates v Aberdeen District Council 1980 SC (HL) 1, Hailsham LC at 30; McCowan v Secretary of State for Scotland 1972 SC 93). Furthermore, this was a "bad neighbour development" since the total height of the "building" exceeded twenty metres once the antennae were added to the mast height. It ought therefore to have been advertised as required by the GDPO. It had not been. Curiously, the averment in the petition was that the mast was over thirty metres high and therefore needed advertisement, but the petitioner moved to amend the averred height exceeded to only twenty metres.
15. The second respondents again sought further time in which to deal with the matters of fact which had been emerging during the Hearing. However, many, if not all, of the uncertainties, such as the content of the Valuation Roll for number 72, were resolved during the course of the Hearing. However, in so far as they were not resolved, the second respondents submitted that, although the petition appeared to have been complaining about a lack of notification to numbers 62-66 Newhaven Road, that no longer appeared to be the main ground of complaint. Rather the premises at number 60 appeared to be of importance and they were not mentioned in the petition. Also it was now clear that Bonnington Mill was not on Bonnington Road but at number 72, Newhaven Road. In any event, the deficiencies in identifying the correct properties in the petition rendered it irrelevant. It was accepted that, in terms of the GDPO, it was the owner specified on the Valuation Roll that required to be notified and that, when his name was known, this had to be done by name and not simply by addressing a notice to "The Owner". However, the petitioner, as "The Owner" of number 72 appeared to have had notice in terms of the certificate, although the precise details of what was sent were not known and needed clarification. There was no obligation upon the second respondents to notify the neighbours in any particular manner or to ensure receipt. Even if the petitioner had not received notification, that did not mean that none had been sent to him. The second respondents had recently attempted to check the Valuation Roll to see what entry there was for "Bonnington Mill", but had been informed that there was no entry for an address of that description. Enquiries had now been made for numbers 62 to 66. Numbers 62 A and B had shown a company called Ridgestar as owners and one Alex Quinn as a tenant. Number 64 B had a company called Sum as the owners of unit 1. However, the petitioner was shown by name as the owner of units 2, 3, 4 and 5 of number 64 B with tenants called McKinstry in units 2 and 3. Numbers 66 A and B showed certain other third parties as owners. It was difficult to reconcile the content of the Valuation Roll with what was on the ground.
16. Even if there had been a procedural irregularity, it remained a matter for the court whether to grant the remedy sought. The irregularity did not render the consent void but merely voidable (London & Clydeside Estates v Aberdeen District Council (supra) followed in Main v Swansea City Council (1984) 49 P & CR 26, Parker LJ at 37-8). Looking at the objections to the merits of the second planning application, these concerned planning policy and advice notes, all of which would have been before the first respondents' sub-committee. They touched upon alternative sites but these had been dealt with in the report to the sub-committee. The issue of visual amenity would have been at the forefront of the sub-committee's thoughts. There had been similar objections on the amenity issue. The petitioner's objection, in so far as it related to the marketability of his property, was not a relevant one. The first respondents were not required to look behind the certificate of notification. They had no reason to do so and were entitled to entertain the application and grant planning consent. The second respondents would suffer prejudice, if the consent were reduced, even although they had not implemented it. Although they had applied for a second consent, they might still revert to the first one. If it were reduced, the second respondents would have to go through the procedures again, including an enhanced amount of neighbour notification that they now, as a practice, carry out. The petitioner had failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice, given that the issues he wished to raise had largely been canvassed before the sub-committee (Walker v City of Aberdeen Council 1998 SLT 427 Lord Macfadyen at 432).
17. The first respondents submitted first that, if there had been a flaw in the notification procedure, the decision ought to be reduced. In short, they did not seek to defend a decision taken without adequate neighbour notification. Lochore v Moray District Council (supra) was authority strictly only for the proposition that the decision would fall if a deficiency was brought to the attention of the planning authority prior to the decision and this followed from the mandatory terms of section 34(5) of the 1997 Act (supra). There was no obligation on the authority otherwise to go behind the certificate tendered. But the onus was firmly on the applicant to comply with the notification requirements and the existence of criminal sanctions fencing declarations in such certificates stressed this.
18. Secondly, the first respondents addressed the issue of whether the development was a "bad neighbour" one requiring advertisement. The petitioner had originally averred in the petition that the mast was over thirty metres high and hence needed such advertisement. It was clearly not over thirty metres and the complaint, as set out in the petition, was plainly wrong in fact and law. What was now being maintained was that it was over twenty metres high and that was because the antennae added to the eighteen metre mast height by two and a half metres. There had been no notice of that stance in the petition and the first respondents wished further time to consider it, since it was a point of general importance. Technical issues might arise and the first respondents might wish to lodge answers and affidavits on the point. In any event, the definition in section 277 did not assist the petitioner since it excluded plant or machinery and the antennae were, on the face of things, simply plant or machinery attached to the structure. This seemed to accord with the GDPO definition of antennae as "apparatus" since the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of plant included: "The fixtures, implements, machinery and apparatus used in carrying on any industrial process".

4. Decision

19. Where statute lays down procedural rules to be followed before a certain decision can be taken, the failure to follow these rules will provide a ground for reduction of that decision if the failure caused material prejudice; that is to say if the rules been complied with, a different decision, namely one more favourable to the person alleging prejudice, might have resulted (McCowan v Secretary of State for Scotland (supra); London & Clydeside Estates v Aberdeen District Council (supra) Lord Fraser at 35; McDaid v Clydebank District Council (supra) Lord Cameron at 166; Walker v City of Aberdeen Council (supra)). The decision will normally stand until challenged successfully and, in that sense, is voidable and not void. Furthermore, even where a decision is shown to be voidable, the court retains a residual discretion to withhold the equitable remedy of reduction where circumstances merit that course of action.
20. In this case, the GDPO required the second respondents to notify the owners of conterminous land of their planning application. If the names of the owners were ascertainable from the Valuation Roll, then the second respondents were bound to notify them using the names on the Roll and at the addresses appearing on the Roll. It follows from these obligations under the GDPO that applicants for permission, such as the second respondents, must ascertain the addresses or descriptions of all conterminous land to enable them to make the appropriate search of the Valuation Roll. In this case, the necessary steps involved not only a consideration of the local Ordnance Survey map but enquiries on the ground. These would have revealed that the conterminous land included number 72 Newhaven Road (the Bonnington Mill) and the ground occupied by Stevenson & Cheyne at number 60(/62). The second respondents also considered that they required to notify persons at number 64 and 66 Newhaven Road. It follows also from the obligations under the GDPO that, having ascertained the addresses, the applicant must actually consult the Valuation Roll in order to find out whom he is to notify as owner and at what address to notify him. Had that been done in this case then, from the extracts produced from the Roll, the petitioner would have been ascertained as the named owner of numbers 72, 60 and several parts of numbers 64. It is clear from the GDPO that it is not normally sufficient simply to notify "The Owner" of the conterminous land. That only suffices where either the land does not appear on the Roll or the owner's name cannot be ascertained from it.
21. The lack of proper notification in terms of the rules will render any subsequent planning consent susceptible to challenge. That is the case here and the petitioner's averments, although in part erroneous as to the relevant properties, are sufficient to cover the failures ultimately alleged. There was, even taking the second respondents' documents at face value, no notification at all to the petitioner by name and that renders the ultimate consent voidable. Of course, had it been shown, or had the second respondents offered to prove by relevant and sufficient averments, that the petitioner had received notification, by whatever means, that fact might have been capable of curing any deficiency in formal notification. But from the terms of the second respondents' answers (which do include a general averment of notification to the petitioner) and what was said at the Hearing, it is clear that the second respondents are not in a position to demonstrate anything of that nature. The fact that they posted a letter addressed to "The Owner, Rocket Visuals, Bonnington Mill, 72 Newhaven Rd" or, indeed, to "The Owner" of certain units, will certainly not do. Quite apart from anything else, the petitioner is not the owner of Rocket Visuals and it would be impossible to infer from the posting of such letters that it was even likely that any had reached the petitioner. The second respondents do not attempt to aver, nor at the Hearing were they able to present, any other facts or circumstances which would permit such an inference to be made. In these circumstances, it being clear that the notification was not in proper form and there being no material upon which it could be inferred that the petitioner nevertheless received notification, I hold that there has been a material procedural irregularity in the neighbour notification to him.
22. The next question is whether the procedural irregularity has prejudiced the petitioner (Lochore v Moray District Council (supra)). There is certainly a prima facie case that he has been (McCowan v Secretary of State for Scotland (supra), Lord Cameron at 104). However, the submission made by the second respondents was essentially that, at the time of the grant of the consent, the first respondents would have had in mind all the objections now presented by the petitioner. I do not consider that that is so. The report to the sub-committee from the first respondents' Head of Planning and Strategic Studies noted that there had been objections from, basically, residents about the obtrusiveness of the mast to people in Pilrig Park and beyond. The report covered certain planning policies and guidelines but did not suggest that there might be a conflict between the proposal and these policies and guidelines. It also stated that, in the writer's opinion, there would be no detrimental impact on the amenity of the occupiers of nearby developments. The petitioner's objections come from a different standpoint, notably that of a business perspective, and argue that there will be such a detrimental impact and that the amenity of the occupiers of his property will be affected, so much so that the economics of his property as a business site would suffer. They contradict much of what the Head of Planning and Strategic Studies writes in his report. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that, had the petitioner's objections been tendered timeously, either the report would not have taken a different form and made a different recommendation or, perhaps more significant, the first respondents' sub-committee might not have reached a different conclusion. In these circumstances, it would appear that the petitioner has been actually prejudiced in being prevented from presenting his case, that case being one which may have had a material effect on the outcome of the first respondents' decision to grant consent.
23. In these circumstances, it is perhaps not strictly necessary to reach a

concluded view on whether advertisement ought also to have been carried out. Suffice it to say, since it has been shown that the petitioner did not receive the proper notification, it matters not, from his standpoint, whether there ought also to have been advertisement. Of course, for that lack of advertisement to be material to the petitioner's case, he would have to have been in a position to show that, had advertisement taken place, the application would have come to his attention in time for him to lodge objections. I am not sure that the petitioner was prepared to go that far. In relation to the merits of the submissions, however, on balance I am of the view that the "building" in this case does consist of the mast structure and not the additional antennae. That is not to say that this will be the result in every case. It must be a matter of fact and circumstances whether antennae should be regarded as "part of" a building (that is to say an integral element of the structure) as distinct from plant placed upon or in it. Although the antennae here are fairly large panels placed on top of the mast, from the plans produced, they are not part of that structure but separate items of plant ("apparatus") attached to it. Had I been required to do so, I would have rejected the petitioner's argument on this aspect.

24. Finally, there is the issue of whether, despite the irregularity in procedure and the prejudice to the petitioner, the court should still refuse to grant the remedy of reduction. Especially where, as here, the consent has not been implemented, I am unable to see any substantial basis upon which the court could decline to provide the petitioner with the remedy he seeks. Matters remain entire other than the existence of the consent. If that consent is reduced, the question of whether it should be granted can be revisited after proper notification has been made. I very much doubt whether that will cause the second respondents any material difficulty or expense and the first respondents do not dispute that flawed notification should result in reduction.
25. I will accordingly repel the second respondents' first, second and third pleas-in-law. I will sustain the petitioner's first plea-in-law (adding the words "Town & Country Planning (Scotland) Act" prior to "1997" and substituting for the casual "GDPO" the words "Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) (Scotland) Order 1992". I will reduce the decision of the first respondents dated 14 March 2002 granting the second respondents planning permission for the erection of a telephone mast at 15 Bonnington Road Lane, Edinburgh. The remaining pleas and parts of the prayer will be redundant accordingly.