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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Bell & Anor v. East Renfrewshire Council & Anor [2006] ScotCS CSOH_9 (19 January 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2006/CSOH_9.html
Cite as: [2006] ScotCS CSOH_9, [2006] CSOH 9

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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

 

[2006] CSOH 009

 

A155/03

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OPINION (No 2) OF

R F MACDONALD QC

(Sitting as a Temporary Judge)

 

in the application to the Court of Session under section 238 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997

 

by

 

ASHLEY BELL

 

Applicant

 

against

 

EAST RENFREWSHIRE COUNCIL

 

First Respondent

 

and

 

GEORGE WIMPEY UK LIMITED

 

Second Respondent

 

and

 

CARVILL (SCOTLAND) LIMITED

 

Third Respondent

ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________

 

 

 

Applicant: Sir Crispin Agnew of Lochnaw QC; Morton Fraser

First Respondent: P J D Simpson; Shepherd & Wedderburn

Second and Third Respondents: A L Stewart; Aitken Nairn

 

9 December 2005

[1] My opinion on the merits of this application was issued on 22 November 2005: see [2005] CSOH 159.

[2] On 12 December 2005 I dealt with the question of expenses. I found the applicant liable to the first respondent in the whole expenses of process. The motion by the first respondent for the expenses of process was not opposed by the applicant except in relation to the appearance on the motion roll on 9 December 2005. I found the applicant liable to the second and third respondents in the expenses of the application up to and including 30 January 2004 only. The latter finding has now been reclaimed by the second and third respondents, who had sought in the motion which they had enrolled the whole expenses of the application.

[3] In opposing the motion by the second and third respondents for the expenses of the application Sir Crispin Agnew of Lochnaw, on behalf of the applicant, submitted that the second and third respondents had no separate interest in the application from the first respondent and that there were no separate points involving them. The second and third respondents had adopted the first respondent's submission and made a few points in amplification. It was accepted that the application had been formally intimated to the second and third respondents and conceded that they were entitled to expenses up to and including the lodging of their answers. Once it was clear that the second and third respondents had no separate interest from the first respondent, they should have conjoined in representation. Reference was made to the following passage in MacLaren on Expenses at page 160:

"In an early case (Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co v Arthur 1858 20D 677), it was held that where several defenders have the same ground of defence, but have not combined in a joint defence, the unsuccessful pursuer will only be found liable in the expense of a single defence and of a consultation between the defenders at the beginning of the litigation. This rule was somewhat modified in a later case (Stott v Fender & Crombie 1878 16 SLR 5), where in somewhat similar circumstances the court held that two successful defenders were only entitled to one account of expenses, with a modified sum added as watching expenses for the second defender. This latter method of dealing with the expenses of separate defenders was again modified (Anderson v McCracken Bros 1900 2F 780), and it was laid down as a general rule, and the practice now is, that where a pursuer convenes more than one defender and fails in his action, with a liability for expenses, each defender is entitle to his expenses down to the closing of the record; but if it appears from the closed record that the interest of the defenders is identical, the pursuer is only liable in full expenses for a single defence, with watching fees for the other defenders."

 

In the last case mentioned in the above passage, Anderson v McCracken Bros, the Lord Justice Clerk stated at pages 791-2:

"In this case the defenders have been successful. The question now to be decided is whether the two sets of defenders are to be allowed their full expenses as for a separate appearance for each of them. The practice is, I think, well established that in such a case as this the unsuccessful party is not to be called upon to pay two sets of expenses, and that he should only be made liable in one, he being also liable to a watching fee to the second party. In the discussion this was admitted to be the practice. Of course if the two defenders choose they may appear separately at proof and debate. But the question whether they can be allowed to do so, so as to double the expenses which their opponent may be called on to pay on non-success, is a different matter, and the practice is against it. I am in favour of granting a finding of expenses in this case in accordance with the practice as applicable to the expenses incurred since the closing of the record."

 

At pages 793-4 Lord Trayner stated as follows:

"I understand the rule and practice of the Court in giving expenses against an unsuccessful pursuer who has convened more than one defender to be this - each defender is entitled to lodge separate defences under the assistance and advice of his own agent and counsel. When the record has been closed, and it appears that the defenders have not any different interest, and that as regards both the same question is raised, then the Court regards it as the reasonable course that the defenders should combine, and by arrangement be represented by the same agent and counsel. If they do not do so the pursuer is only found liable to the defenders in the expenses as for one appearance. Full expenses are allowed as for one defender, and only a watching fee is allowed as for the other, the Court regarding it in the circumstances as unnecessary that there should be separate agents and counsel to represent what is practically one interest, and refusing to lay the burden of such unnecessary expense upon the pursuer. The correctness of this view of the practice of the Court was admitted by all the counsel at the bar. I do not enter upon the question whether the practice is a good practice. It is enough for the present case to say that it is the practice, and that one Division of the Court should not at its own hand alter a recognised and established practice."

 

[4] Sir Crispin went on to submit that the principal party who had to respond to the present application was the planning authority, the first respondent. The second and third respondents had obtained outline planning permission in the course of the present application and, as developers, had an interest in the present application. All respondents had made exactly the same points and it was unnecessary for the second and third respondents to be represented separately from the first respondent. The question of costs in a planning appeal to the court where there was multiple representation was considered by the House of Lords in Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and Others [1995] 1 WLR 1176. At page 1178F Lord Lloyd of Berwick stated:

"What then is the proper approach? As in all questions to do with costs, the fundamental rule is that there are no rules. Costs are always in the discretion of the court, and a practice, however widespread and longstanding, must never be allowed to harden into a rule."

 

Nevertheless, his Lordship stated earlier at page 1178B:

 

"The House will be astute to ensure that unnecessary costs are not incurred. Where there is multiple representation, the losing party will not normally be required to pay more than one set of costs, unless the recovery of further costs is justified in the circumstances of the particular case."

 

His Lordship also set out four propositions at page 1178F-1179A, the second of which stated as follows:

"The developer will not normally be entitled to his costs unless he can show that there was likely to be a separate issue on which he was entitled to be heard, that is to say an issue not covered by counsel for the Secretary of State; or unless he has an interest which requires separate representation. The mere fact that he is the developer will not of itself justify a second set of costs in every case."

 

Sir Crispin submitted that nothing had been said by counsel for the second and third respondents in the present application that had not been said in the answers or at the hearing on behalf of the planning authority.

[5] In a brief reply on behalf of the second and third respondents Mr Stewart referred to the terms of the record and of my opinion. He referred in particular to paragraph 27 of my opinion, which, he pointed out, dealt with matters not mentioned by counsel for the first respondent. The second and third respondents had done more than merely "polish up" the submission for the first respondent. The Bolton case was only a practice note. Mr Stewart had been unable to find any practice in the Court of Session dealing with the present situation.

[6] Having considered the competing submissions, I reached the view that the applicant should not be liable in expenses to the second and third respondents after they had lodged their answers. I therefore awarded the second and third respondents their expenses only up to and including the date on which their answers had been lodged. It seemed to me that in the present form of process the lodging of answers fell to be regarded as the equivalent of the closing of the record in an ordinary action. The one issue which fell to be determined in the application was the validity of Policy T7 adopted in the local plan by the first respondent as planning authority. It was accordingly for the first respondent as planning authority to respond to the challenge to the validity of that policy. The second and third respondents as potential developers had, of course, an interest to see that the policy was defended, but, once answers were lodged, it was evident that the planning authority was intent upon defending its policy. I think that in the present application it would have been inappropriate for all three respondents to have had conjoined representation as that would have involved the association of the planning authority and two potential developers. The second and third respondents were entitled to be separately represented and to appear at the hearing of the application, but it did not in my view follow that the unsuccessful applicant had to pay their expenses. In reaching my decision I sought to follow and apply in the context of the present application the principles set out in the passage from MacLaren on Expenses and the cases cited by Sir Crispin. Although the circumstances of the appeal to the House of Lords in the Bolton case were different from the present application, I thought that the propositions set out by Lord Lloyd of Berwick which I have quoted above provided helpful guidance in the circumstances of this case. The mere fact that the second and third respondents were potential developers did not of itself justify the applicant being found liable for a second set of expenses. I did not think that there was anything in the circumstances of the present application which justified the applicant being found liable not only for the expenses of the first respondent but also for the expenses of the second and third respondents. Paragraph 27 of my opinion merely narrated certain facts drawn to my attention on behalf of the second and third respondents. These facts did not affect my decision. I therefore awarded the second and third respondents expenses up to and including the date of the lodging of their answers only.

 

 


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