D McLAUGHLIN & SONS LTD AGAINST EAST AYRSHIRE COUNCIL [2020] ScotCS CSOH

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> D McLAUGHLIN & SONS LTD AGAINST EAST AYRSHIRE COUNCIL [2020] ScotCS CSOH_109 (30 December 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2020/2020_CSOH_109.html Cite as: [2020] ScotCS CSOH_109, 2021 SLT 1427, [2020] CSOH 109, 2021 GWD 2-20

[1] Under a building contract the pursuer was the contractor, employed by the defender.

The works involved the construction of a new single storey extension at Hurlford Primary

School, East Ayrshire. A dispute was referred to adjudication. The pursuer seeks to enforce

the award of the adjudicator. The defender challenges the adjudicator’s decision.

[2] The terms of the contract included the Standard Building Contract with Quantities

for use in Scotland (SBC/Q/Scot) 2011 edition, as amended by the Preliminaries (“the

Standard Conditions”). The works commenced in 2016. A dispute arose between the

parties regarding sums claimed by the pursuer to be due from the defender under the

construction contract. The pursuer raised an action in the sheriff court on 12 September 2019

seeking payment of the balance said to be due. On about 17 March 2020, the pursuer issued

a Notice of Adjudication. The adjudicator found in favour of the pursuer. The defender

refused to make payment and the pursuer raised the present action for enforcement of the

adjudicator’s decision. In its defences, the defender challenges the adjudicator’s decision,

not on any grounds regarding jurisdiction or breach of natural justice, but concerning

alleged errors by the adjudicator. The defender also enrolled a motion to lodge a

counterclaim in this action. The motion was unopposed by the pursuer. The counterclaim

seeks declarators which would have the effect that the award by the adjudicator is not

enforced and also seeks payment by the pursuer of the adjudicator’s fees paid by the

defender. In August 2020, the action which had been raised in the sheriff court was remitted

to the Court of Session. In order to distinguish those proceedings from the current

enforcement action I shall continue to refer to them as the sheriff court action. At a

preliminary hearing, it was agreed that this case and the remitted sheriff court action should

call for debate, with 1 day allocated for each case. At the debate hearing I was informed that

the parties had agreed that the remitted sheriff court action should not be the subject of

debate and should be sisted. I shall shortly explain, in brief terms, the dispute, the

adjudication process and the points raised in the court actions, but it is important to note at

the outset that this case involves not only an action for enforcement of an adjudicator’s

decision but also a counterclaim by the defender, and that there is a previously raised sheriff

court action by the pursuer seeking what could be described as final determination of the

[3] The defender’s Final Certificate valued the works in the sum of £3,343,223.82. In the

sheriff court action, the pursuer seeks declarator that the true value of the Final Certificate

contract sum should have been £3,711,242.80 and seeks decree for the balance said to be due,

that is, £441,622.78. The pursuer avers inter alia that the Final Certificate failed to

acknowledge the pursuer’s full and proper entitlement in respect of the valuation of

variations and the measured works. The figures relied upon by the pursuer are based upon

worksheets submitted by it to the defender on 21 May 2019. The differences in the parties’

respective valuations of the adjusted contract sum, relating to the valuation of the variations

and measured works, were stated in the worksheets. The pursuer accepts that all sums

certified by the contract administrator have been paid by the defender, but the pursuer

denies that the Final Certificate incorporated all 27 interim certificates issued under the

contract by the contract administrator. The pursuer’s clamed gross value of the contract

sum that should have been stated in the Final Certificate is n ot advanced on the basis of the

Interim Payment Certificate relied upon in the adjudication, discussed below. However, the

sheriff court action concerns the overarching issue of the amount claimed to be due to the

[4] One of the due dates for an interim payment under the contract was 27 July 2017.

The defender’s architect did not issue an Interim Certificate stating the sums he considered

to be, or have been, due within 5 days after 27 July 2017 in accordance with clause 4.10.1 of

the Standard Conditions. On 10 August 2017, the pursuer issued an Interim Payment Notice

to the defender’s quantity surveyor in terms of clause 4.11.2.2 of the Standard Conditions in

the contract. The Interim Payment Notice stated that the pursuer considered the sum

of £949,556.50 was due to it as at 27 July 2017. Following service of the Interim Payment

Notice, the defender’s architect did not issue a Pay Less Notice in terms of clause 4.12.5

and 4.13 of the Standard Conditions. Accordingly, in terms of clause 4.12.3 of the Standard

Conditions, the pursuer contended that the defender was obliged to make payment of the

whole sum in the Interim Payment Notice. The defender refused to do so. Between

August 2017 and July 2019 interim certificates were issued and the defender made various

payments to the pursuer under the contract. Between November 2019 and January 2020, the

parties corresponded about the pursuer’s entitlement to be paid the balance said to be due.

The defender refused to make payment of the sums claimed by the pursuer.

[5] As noted, on or around 17 March 2020, the pursuer issued a Notice of Adjudication

in terms of clause 9.2 of the Standard Conditions and Rule 1 of Part 1 of the Schedule to the

Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/657) (as amended)

(“the Scheme”) in respect of this dispute. On 20 March 2020, Mr Donny MacKinnon,

Chartered Surveyor, was appointed as the adjudicator. On 23 March 2020, the pursuer

served a Notice of Referral, to which, on 1 April 2020, the defender produced a Response.

On 6 April 2020, the pursuer served a Reply and on 10 April 2020 the defender produced a

Rejoinder. On 14 April 2020, the pursuer served a Surrejoinder and on 17 April 2020, the

[6] In the adjudication, the pursuer valued its entitlement to payment based on a gross

valuation of £3,802,614.87, some £91,372.07 more than the sum of £3,711,242.80 relied upon

in the sheriff court action. In summary, the defender sought to resist payment on the basis

that: (a) the Interim Payment Notice was invalid because: (i) the sum due had been

calculated to the wrong due date (27 July 2018 as opposed to 28 July 2018); (ii) it had failed

to stipulate the relevant clause in the contract under which the notice was being issued,

leading to ambiguity; and (iii) it had been defectively served because it was not copied to

the architect/contract administrator and the defender; (b) in any event, the Final Certificate

issued by the defender on 17 July 2019 was conclusive evidence of sums due to the pursuer

under the contract and, on that basis, the adjudicator was obliged to make a nil award; and

Interim Payment Notice between the defender’s quantity surveyor and the pursuer’s

Mr Hill. In summary, the pursuer’s position on these issues was: (a) the Interim Payment

Notice was valid because: (i) it had been calculated to the correct due date of 27 July 2017;

(ii) there was no requirement to stipulate the relevant clause under which the Interim

Payment Notice was being issued and its terms were sufficient to meet the reasonable

recipient test for such notices; (iii) it had been correctly served as clause 4.11.2.2 only

required notice to be given to the quantity surveyor and the agreed method of service of

electronic communication had been used; (b) on a proper construction of the contract, the

Final Certificate did not preclude enforcement of the pursuer’s pre-existing right to payment

in respect of the Interim Payment Application; and (c) there had been no oral settlement

[7] On 6 May 2020, the adjudicator issued his decision and then on 11 May 2020 issued a

corrected version. In summary, the adjudicator decided that: (a) the Interim Payment

Notice was valid because: (i) the relevant due date was 27 July 2017; (ii) it gave reasonable

notice to the defender’s quantity surveyor of what it was; and (iii) it was served in

compliance with the contract; (b) the Final Certificate did not did not affect the dispute as

regards the Interim Payment Application and he was not obliged to issue a nil award; and

any agreement reached was only in respect of delaying commencement of adjudication.

[8] In consequence, the adjudicator found the defender was liable to make payment to

the pursuer of £427,578.75, plus VAT, giving a total sum of £513,094.50. The adjudicator also

found the defender was liable to make payment of interest in the amount of £78,361.18 up to

the date of his decision, increasing in the daily amount of £61.46 until payment is made. The

adjudicator also found that the defender, as the unsuccessful party, was liable for his fees in

[9] In this action, the pursuer seeks enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision. In its

defences and counterclaim the defender identifies two grounds for contesting enforcement.

The first relates to the Final Certificate being conclusive evidence in the adjudication and the

adjudicator having erred in not treating it as such. The second relates to the validity of the

Interim Payment Notice dated 10 August 2017. At the hearing, senior counsel for the

defender accepted that the second issue would require some evidence to be led and that it

could not be dealt with at this stage. On the Final Certificate matter, the key points made by

“The Final Certificate was conclusive evidence in the Adjudication, as provided in

Standard Condition 1.9, because the Adjudication was not commenced wit hin

60 days of the Final Certificate. Reference is made to Answer 13. The defender has

paid all sums due to the pursuer in terms of the Final Certificate. As a result no sum

is due to the pursuer in respect of the 10 August 2017 Notice (described by the

pursuer as an Interim Payment Notice and which was essentially provisional in

nature), which formed the sole basis of the pursuer’s claim to payment in the

Adjudication. The adjudicator should have awarded a nil amount. This issue of the

conclusive evidential nature of the Final Certificate, and its consequences, is a short

and self-contained point. It was raised in the Adjudication. Reference is made in

particular to Paragraphs 1.iii, 61 to 68, 70 and 74 of the Response. The point requires

no oral evidence or other elaboration beyond that which is capable of being provided

during a relatively short hearing, devoid of oral evidence, taking place no later than

any hearing to be held in respect of the pursuer’s pleas-in-law and conclusions.

Without prejudice to that generality, the point does not engage any consideration or

determination of the issue of when the works commenced. In the circumstances it

would be unconscionable for the Court to ignore the point, and the defender is

entitled to have the point decided by way of the decrees of declarator first and third

concluded for in the defender’s Counterclaim, arising as the point does in connection

with the enforcement of the decision of the Adjudicator in terms of Article 8 of the

These points are reflected in the counterclaim. The pursuer’s position in response is pled as

“…Explained and averred that the final certificate was not accorded the status of

conclusive evidence in the adjudication by virtue of clause 1.9 of t he Standard form

of building contract. The final certificate had been challenged by the pursuer

timeously (i.e., within sixty days from the date of issue thereof) in the said action in

Kilmarnock sheriff court. Accordingly, in respect of any matter which came to be

challenged in that action - such as the sums truly payable to the pursuer by the

defender under certificates issued pursuant to the Contract - the final certificate

never achieved the status of conclusive evidence, whether in the proceedings in

Kilmarnock or anywhere else. Irrespective of the procedure required to decide the

point about the status of the final certificate in the adjudication, it is not

unconscionable for the Court to decline so to do. That status is a matter of law

arising in the adjudication upon which the adjudicator has arrived at a decision.

Whether his decision on the point of law be right or wrong, it is not a basis in law for

refusing to comply with the contractual obligation to give effect to the decision of the

adjudicator or for the court to refuse an order - such as is here concluded for - to

enforce the prompt implement by the defender of its said contractual obligation. To

do otherwise would be to undermine the policy of the adjudication system…”

In the counterclaim, the defender also seeks recovery of the adjudicator’s fees paid by the

[10] It is well-established in the authorities (discussed shortly) that in an action for

enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision the grounds upon which enforcemen t can be

challenged are limited, in effect to matters of jurisdiction and natural justice, and that errors

of law or fact by the adjudicator do not permit a challenge to enforcement. However, as is

explained below, senior counsel for the defender sought t o argue that there was authority in

England to the effect that there was an exception to these general principles, allowing in

certain limited circumstances an error by the adjudicator to be founded upon in the

challenge to enforcement. He argued that this exception should be recognised and followed

by the courts in Scotland and that the defender’s position fell within that exception. The

pursuer resisted that argument. That is the major issue in this case.

[11] The subsidiary issue, which arises only if the defender succeeds, is whether the

[12] The defences were unusual in an action for enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision.

There was no question of any jurisdictional error or natural justice or any other matter

falling within the grounds of challenge in an enforcement action. The adjudicator’s decision

was being attacked because it is wrong. That did not warrant a defence to enforcement of

the adjudicator’s decision. It was simply a complaint about an error of fact or law within his

jurisdiction. The Final Certificate point argued by the defender was in fact also about

evidence and the weight the adjudicator thought should be given to the evidence and was

therefore even less available for complaint. It was plainly within the bounds of what the

adjudicator was entitled to do. Reference was made to Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport

Royal Dockyard Ltd [2006] BLR 15 (at para [84]). If the adjudicator put the wrong level of

weight to particular evidence, that was the misfortune of the losing party. So, whether or

not senior counsel for the defender was correct about the conclusive evidence point it did

not get the defender anywhere. Reference was also made to Amey Wye Valley Ltd v County of

Herefordshire District Council [2016] BLR 698 (at para [30]) and Gillies Ramsay Diamond v PJW

Enterprises Limited 2004 SC 430 (at paras [35] and [36]), and [40]-[43]). In the latter case,

Lord Gill had been fairly forthright about the nature of the errors of law made by the

adjudicator. The view taken by the court was that it was not appropriate to seek to overturn

the decision because it was disfigured by errors of fact or law. Judicial review of the

adjudicator’s decision was not available for intra vires errors of law. That case made it clear

that there is no possible defence based on the decision being wrong.

[13] When an adjudicator’s decision is issued that ipso facto creates liability. There is a

way of recovery: the losing party pays and can then raise an action under section 108 of the

Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, which might be called an

unwinding action. That is the sole method of dealing with an error of law. The reference to

recovery in Gillies Ramsay Diamond (at para [43]) must mean that the loser has to pay in the

meantime. As the sole method of sorting an adjudicator’s decision that is erroneous is to sue

to get your money back there is a duty to pay and the person found liable can not create a

defence by saying the decision is erroneous. Whatever may be the position in England, one

could not square that with the decision in Gillies Ramsay Diamond, which disallows a defence

based on actual legal error. The defence was one that is not open because it is

fundamentally inconsistent with the statute, the Scheme and the policy of parliament. That

was all to the effect that the adjudicator’s decision shall be binding until subsequent

litigation declares otherwise. The reason why there are adjudicator’s decisions which cannot

be enforced because of such things as jurisdictional or natural justice errors is that in these

cases there is no proper decision and there is an ultra vires nullity.

[14] In relation to Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd [2017] BLR 344,

the case heavily relied upon by the defender, it refers to a claim for declaration, which is

about the need to sue separately for money to be repaid. It is not a defence to an

adjudication enforcement case to say the adjudicator has made even a farcically obvious

error, such as the very blatant error as in Gillies Ramsay Diamond. If what had been issued in

the present case was not an Interim Payment Notice but was a copy of a Shakespeare sonnet,

that would not have been challengeable. The legal ground under section 108 is the implied

term referred to therein. Castle Inns (Stirling) Ltd v Clark Contracts Ltd [2005] CSOH 178 was

an example of how errors are resolved. An unwinding litigation could not be raised until

the losing party complied with the obligation to pay out. Doing it as a counterclaim

involves erecting a defence by another name. The defender could not create a defence in

practice by the kind of procedural arrangement being sought to be followed here.

[15] In Hutton Construction Ltd, it was not all clear where the exceptions identified by

Coulson J came from. In the present case, there was no common ground that the defender’s

position should be dealt with at this hearing. However, in Hutton Construction Ltd (from

para [14]) Coulson J deals with circumstances in which the court will hear the points even

where there is no agreement. Anything said there that is inconsistent with the decision in

Gillies Ramsay Diamond should be rejected. It was unclear from Hutton Construction Ltd

whether or not payment under the adjudicator’s award had been made. Reference was

made to Fenice Investments Ltd v Jerram Falkus Construction Ltd [2009] EWHC 3272 (TCC) (at

para [48]). The idea of sorting cash flow problems by quick decisions would be subverted if

Hutton Construction Ltd were to be followed by this court. The approach in Hutton

Construction Ltd failed badly as an attempt to protect the statutory scheme. If speedy

enforcement can be stopped by means of a counterclaim then we would be heading back to

the old days of various assorted manoeuvres to avoid payment. The reference in Hutton

Construction Ltd to unconscionability was inadequate. For these reasons the points raised by

[16] If that was wrong then turning to the Final Certificate point, a provision about

conclusive evidence falls to be construed strictly as in Autoridad del Canal de Panama v Sacyr

SA [2017] 1 AER (Comm) 916 (at para [81], sub-paragraph 6). Clause 1.9.1 refers to

conclusive evidence about the contract sum. The claim here was not about that; rather, it

was about work on account. It was not about a matter on which the Final Certificate is given

any standing by clause 1.9.1. The claim was about how much the pursuer should get paid

for each particular month. So on that short basis the whole argument for conclusive

evidence fell down. The Final Certificate had nothing to do with interim payment.

[17] If that was incorrect, one needed to pay attention to the exceptions stated in

clause 1.9.3. The sheriff court action canvassed the issue of how much the pursuer was to be

paid. On a proper construction of the provisions, that would knock out the things on which

the Final Certificate would be conclusive. The removal of the conclusive evidence rule

operated for all purposes, not just for the sheriff court action but also to the adjudication

proceedings. The barrier having been broken by the court, the subsequent adjudication was

not affected by the conclusive effect of the certificate just because no adjudication was raised

within 60 days. Trustees of the Marc Gilbard 2009 Settlement Trust v OD Developments and

Projects Ltd [2015] BLR 213, relied upon by the defender, was incorrectly decided on the

matter of interpretation of the clause. The commentary about that case disagreed with the

decision. The judge had not given appropriate weight to the fact that these clauses have to

be construed strictly. But in any event the case was distinguishable on its facts. The literal

language of the provision says it is not conclusive regarding the matters raised in the

litigation. If Coulson J was correct in Trustees of the Marc Gilbard 2009 Settlement Trust, then

how could one sensibly choose to raise proceedings and later go to adjudication? Similarly,

on Coulson J’s approach, if adjudication happened within 60 days then in subsequent

proceedings about the same issue it must be the case that the Final Certificate would be

conclusive. The adjudication would be bound to be self-defeating, which is absurd. That

result was avoided if the conclusive evidence rule remains broken for subsequent

proceedings. It has to be the case that after 60 days the certificate is no more conclusive than

[18] As to the defender’s final point raised in the counterclaim, seeking repayment of the

adjudicator’s fees, it was not open to the court in an action on the merits of the dispute to

order payment to the ultimately successful losing party in the adjudication. Authority for

that could be found in Castle Inns (Stirling) Ltd v Clark Contracts Ltd, referred to in Halsbury

Homes Ltd v Adam Architecture Ltd [2016] BLR 419 (at paras [50]-[59] and [63]-[64]).

Lord Drummond Young made clear that the allocation of the adjudicator’s fees is incidental

[19] In summary, notwithstanding the basic nature of the adjudication enforcement

policy captured by the concept of “pay now and argue later” there was an ex ception to those

principles. That exception was founded upon the two authorities of Caledonian Modular

Ltd v Mar City Developments Ltd [2015] EWHC 1855 (TCC) and Hutton Construction Ltd v

Wilson Properties (London) Ltd and there was no authority to say these were wrongly decided.

Both cases readily acknowledged the “pay now argue later” proposition and case law such

as Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd (and by implication

Gillies Ramsay Diamond v PJW Enterprises Limited), but indicate that there is an exception.

The submission in the note of argument for the pursuer that in fact one still had to make

payment of the sum awarded by the adjudicator to come within the exception was obviously

wrong. There could not be an exception any more if one has paid. It was not correct that in

either of the two cases quoted payment was required. Hutton Construction Ltd was an

enforcement case. Reference was made to Fenice Investments Ltd v Jerram Falkus Construction

Ltd (at paras [48] and [49]). The present case fell within the exception.

[20] On the question of the conclusive nature of the Final Certificate the adjudicator was

manifestly wrong. This was supported by Trustees of the Marc Gilbard 2009 Settlement Trust v

OD Developments and Projects Ltd. The sum finally certified here had been paid by the

defender what the pursuer was seeking to do was go back to years before and say the

balance due at that stage was not paid and the pursuer is entitled to it. The suggestion of a

disconnect between interim and final payments was unsound and ignored the contractual

relationship. Each interim certificate superseded the previous one: Scottish Equitable Plc v

Miller Construction Ltd 2002 SCLR 10 (at 20B). One then comes to the Final Certificate which

states the amount the contractor is to be paid. While in Hutton Construction Ltd the judge

had explained the scope of the second exception, that related to the factual circumstances of

the previous case, Caledonian Modular Ltd v Mar City Developments Ltd, and when one read

the rest of his judgement the exception was not limited to those issues. The judge referred to

a matter of construction being beyond rational justification. The test was whether there is a

short and self-contained issue which can be dealt with in a short hearing and it would be

unconscionable (that is, unreasonable) to ignore it. It would be enough if the adjudicator’s

decision is demonstrably wrong and manifestly wrong. The principles put forward in these

cases should be accommodated within the strictures of cases such as Carillion Construction

Ltd and Gillies Ramsay Diamond v PJW Enterprises Limited. The law had moved on and

exceptions to the general principles have been identified. If one proceeds on the basis of the

exception as explained in Hutton Construction Ltd none of that cuts across the essential “pay

now and argue later” principles of adjudication. Indeed, to the contrary, the policy one

would expect would be support the existence of such a narrow or limited exception, not

least to avoid unnecessary proliferation of litigation. Accordingly, in light of that exception,

[21] The proper interpretation of clause 1.9 of the contract was as decided by Coulson J in

Trustees of the Marc Gilbard 2009 Settlement Trust v OD Developments and Projects Ltd. The

reasoning in that case was manifestly correct. It recognised and gave effect to the purpose of

the conclusivity clause. The judge correctly decided that the extent to which the conclusive

status is lost is in the action timeously raised. This adjudication was a “smash and grab one”

saying that because no Pay Less notice was issued the interim certificate requires payment.

That was not a matter raised in the sheriff court action and therefore the conclusive evidence

point raised there was different in substance. When the adjudication raised something not

raised before, it was caught by the conclusive evidence point. Accordingly, Coulson J was

manifestly correct (at para [22]) regarding the poin t that the proper interpretation of the

clause does not allow proceedings to be issued later, relying on the Final Certificate not

being conclusive evidence. So, the position was that the issue before the adjudicator was

one on which he reached the manifestly wrong decision which can be demonstrated wholly

in accord with the conditions identified in Hutton Construction Ltd (para [17]), which

represents an exception that the court should recognise and give effect to. One would need

a brief evidential hearing on the Interim Payment Notice argument but that still fell within

[22] The defender was also entitled to recover the fees it had paid to the adjudicator. The

defender avers, by reference to email correspondence involving its solicitors, that payment

was made by the defender and that the adjudicator has confirmed full payment having been

made by the defender. It was a necessary legal consequence of adjudication provisions,

which are consistent with the provisions of the 1996 Act, that parties must have a directly

enforceable right to recover any overpayment to which an adjudicator’s decision can be

shown to have led. The right arises by way of an implied term to that effect in the

construction contract: Aspect Contracts Ltd v Higgins Construction plc [2015] 1 WLR 2961;

[2015] UKSC 38 (para [23]). Such a right arises out of restitutionary considerations

(para [24]). On the same underlying principles and analysis the same right arises in respect

of any payment of adjudicator’s fees which would not have been due or paid had it not been

for an error by the adjudicator which is capable of being addressed by way of a defence to,

and a counterclaim in response to, an enforcement action. The defender ought t o have a

directly enforceable right to recover the fees which were essen tially overpaid on that

[23] Aspect Contracts Ltd v Higgins Construction plc concerned payment made under the

dispute and did not address incidental questions regarding fees and interest as in Castle Inns

(Stirling) Ltd v Clark Contracts Ltd and Halsbury Homes Ltd v Adam Architecture Ltd. These

first instance cases were more in point. In relation to Trustees of the Marc Gilbard 2009

Settlement Trust v OD Developments and Projects Ltd the criticisms made by the commentators,

narrated at the beginning of the case report, were adopted, although the pursuer had its own

criticisms. Clause 1.9.3 states that the conclusive effect is lost save in respect of the matt ers

to which those proceedings relate. It was the subject matter that was important. So, as the

sheriff court action discussed what was to be paid in the contract sum, if that was a question

at issue and included the Interim Payment Notice from 2017 and the adjudication, then the

conclusive evidence rule had been removed by the sheriff court litigation for the

adjudication as well. The Scottish Equitable Plc case, referred to by senior counsel for the

pursuer, was beside the point. The issue here was what should have been paid in 2017. The

decision in Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd had not been the subject

of any subsequent English authority. The exceptions it referred to were an invention and

not justified by appellate decisions or what the statutory regime states. To that extent, it was

contrary to appellate authority, particularly in Gillies Ramsay Diamond v PJW Enterprises

Limited. The decision in S & T (UK) Ltd v Grove Developments Ltd [2019] BLR 1 was in some

respects inconsistent with Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd. The court

held that it was a precondition of raising a true value adjudication that the sum in the

“smash and grab” adjudication was paid in advance. In England the courts have been

troubled by a number of cases despite it being said that the exception only applies in very

rare circumstances. Many parties have tried to fit their cases into that category. This served

to reflect that the purpose of the statute was that such exceptions do not exist. Even if they

do exist, the guidelines in Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd did not

include scope for an argument such as that of the defender in this case about the conclusive

evidence clause. The class of case covered by the exception would, for example, be one

[24] Paragraph 23(2) of the schedule to the Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland)

Regulations 1998 (as amended), which reflects the terms of section 108(3) of the Housing

Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, and applies here, states:

“(2) The decision of the adjudicator shall be binding on the parties, and they shall

comply with it, until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by

arbitration (if the contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to

There are two decisions of the Supreme Court which contain, for present purposes, helpful

observations about these terms, although the issues involved do not relate directly to those

in this case. In Aspect Contracts Ltd v Higgins Construction plc [2015] 1 WLR 2961,

[2015] UKSC 38, Lord Mance (with whom Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed and

“14. By providing that the decision of an adjudicator is binding and that the parties

shall ‘comply with it’, paragraph 23(2) of the Scheme makes the decision enforceable

for the time being. It is enforceable by action founded on the contractual obligation

to comply with the decision combined, in a normal case, with an application for

summary judgment. The limitation period for enforcement will be six years from the

adjudicator’s decision. But the decision is only binding and the obligation to comply

with it only lasts ‘until the dispute is finally determined’ in one of the ways

identified. By use of the word ‘until’, paragraph 23(2) appears to contemplate that

there will necessarily be such a determination. The short time limits provided by

paragraph 19(1) also indicate that adjudication was envisaged as a speedy

provisional measure, pending such a determination. But there is nothing to prevent

adjudication being requested long after a dispute has arisen and without the

commencement of any proceedings. Further, it seems improbable that the Scheme

imposes on either party any sort of obligation to start court or arbitration

proceedings in order to confirm its entitlement. Either or both of the parties might

17. Without the ability to recover such a payment, the Scheme makes no sense.

Adjudication is conceived as a provisional measure. At a cash flow level, Higgins

remains entitled to the payment unless and until the outcome of legal proceedings,

arbitration or negotiations, leads to a contrary conclusion. But at the deeper level of

the substantive dispute between the parties, the parties have rights and liabilities,

which may differ from those identified by the adjudication decision, and on which

the party making a payment under an adjudication decision must be entitled to rely

in legal proceedings, arbitration or negotiations, in order to make good a claim to

19. I have no difficulty in accepting that Aspect could at any time, from at least the

development in early 2005 of the original dispute, have asked the court to declare

that it had not committed any breach of contract or incurred any tortious liability to

Higgins, and that the court would have regarded proceedings of this nature for a

29. …What the Scheme contemplates is the final determination of the dispute

referred to the adjudicator, because it is that which determines whet her or not the

adjudicator was justified in his or her assessment of what was due under the

32. …In finally determining the dispute between Aspect and Higgins…the court

must be able to look at the whole dispute. Higgins will not be confined to the points

which the adjudicator in his or her reasons decided in its favour. It will be able to

rely on all aspects of its claim for £822,482 plus interest. That follows from the fact

that the adjudicator’s actual reasoning has no legal or evidential weight. All that

matters is that a payment was ordered and made, the justification for which can and

[25] In Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in liquidation) v Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical) Ltd

[2020] UKSC 25, Lord Briggs (with whom Lord Reed, Lord Kitchin, Lord Hamblen and Lord Leggatt

“12. A very important underlying objective, both of adjudication and of other

recommendations which were eventually implemented in the 1996 Act, was the

improvement of cash flow to fund ongoing works on construction projects. A

particular concern was that a dispute between (say) a sub-contractor and a

sub-sub-contractor which could only be resolved by litigation or arbitration could

in the meantime disrupt the entire project while a refusal of interim payment led to

the cessation of significant works. The motto which has come to summarise the

recommended approach is ‘pay now, argue later’. Adjudication was one of five

reforms introduced by Part II of the 1996 Act designed to facilitate the realisation of

the cash flow aspiration behind that motto… It is achieved by rigorous time limits

for the conduct of the adjudication, the provisionally binding nature of the

adjudicator’s decision and the readiness of the courts (and in particular the TCC) to

grant speedy summary judgment by way of enforcement, leaving any continuing

disagreement about the merits of the underlying dispute to be resolved at a later

13. But solving the cash flow problem should not be regarded as the sole objective of

adjudication. It was designed to be, and more importantly has proved to be, a

mainstream dispute resolution mechanism in its own right, producing de facto final

resolution of most of the disputes which are referred to an adjudicator. Furthermore

the availability of adjudication as of right has meant that many disputes are speedily

settled between the parties without even the need to invoke the adjudication process.

This is in part because Parliament chose to confer the right to adjudicate ‘at any

time’, so that it can be and is used to resolve disputes eg about final accounts

between the parties after practical completion, rather than merely at the interim

stage: see Connex South Eastern Ltd v MJ Building Services Group plc [2005] EWCA

Civ 193; [2005] 1 WLR 3323, paras 34-38 per Dyson LJ, who concluded that in

section 108: ‘The phrase ‘at any time’ means exactly what it says.’

14. There is a chorus of observations, from experienced TCC judges and textbook

writers to the effect that adjudication does, in most cases, achieve a resolution of the

underlying dispute which becomes final because it is not thereafter challenged.

15….the overall picture of most adjudication decisions achieving de facto final

26. Finally, when compared with arbitration and litigation, speed and economy come

at an inevitable price in terms of reliability. There is no formal avenue of appeal

against an adjudicator’s decision, and the court will in general summarily enforce it,

regardless whether it is correct on the merits, provided that the adjudicator acted

independently and within their jurisdiction. But a dissatisfied party can insist on

having the dispute redetermined de novo in court or by arbitration (if available) even

though the adjudicator’s decision will continue to bind in the meantime.”

[26] For present purposes, I can draw certain clear points from these observations.

Firstly, the common practice will be for the dispute to be referred to adjudication. The

parties do not normally bring litigation to seek final determination of the dispute. Rather,

much more often they simply adhere to the adjudicator’s decision or perhaps use that as a

factor in reaching agreement to settle their dispute. However, final determination by the

court (or by arbitration, if agreed) remains built-in as an available option. Secondly, if the

losing party refuses to comply with the adjudicator’s decision, the other party will seek

enforcement. This speedy mechanism will commonly make it difficult for litigation (or

arbitration) for final determination of the dispute to have reached a stage where it can be

dealt with at or around the time of the enforcement proceedings. But, thirdly, while it is

very commonly the case that no litigation (or arbitration) is raised in respect of the dispute

prior to the adjudication or the enforcement proceedings, that is obviously not ruled out,

and parties have their ordinary rights to bring the dispute to the court at any time, whether

before, during or after the adjudication. This is consistent with the parties’ ability also to

refer a dispute to adjudication “at any time”. Thus, there may, albeit very rarely, be a route

towards final determination of the dispute currently in place at the time of the adjudication

or by the time enforcement proceedings come to be dealt with. As a consequence, in such

rare circumstances, if the court is able to finally determine the dispute prior to making an

enforcement order then there will be no requirement to comply with the adjudicator’s

decision. Fourthly, in seeking final determination, as Lord Mance made clear, the parties

may rely upon rights and obligations not ventilated in the adjudication but nonetheless

[27] The decision of Coulson J (as he then was) in Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson

Properties (London) Ltd is of central significance to the arguments in the present case and it is

therefore necessary to set out the key passages in some detail. Coulson J stated:

“3. The starting point, of course, is that, if the adjudicator has decided the issue that

was referred to him, and he has broadly acted in accordance with the rules of

natural justice, his decision will be enforced: see Macob Civil Engineering Ltd v

Morrison Construction Ltd [1999] CLC 739; [1999] BLR 93. Adjudication decisions

have been upheld on that basis, even where the adjudicator has been shown to

have made an error: see Bouygues (UK) Limited v Dahl-Jensen (UK) Ltd

[2001] CLC 927; [2000] BLR 522. Chadwick LJ summarised the principal reason for this

in Carillion Construction Limited v Devonport Royal Dockyard Limited [2006] BLR 15:

‘the need to have the 'right' answer has been subordinated to the need to have an

4. There are two narrow exceptions to this rule. The first, exemplified by Geoffrey

Osborne v Atkins Rail Limited [2010] BLR 363, involves an admitted error. In that

case the calculation error was raised by the defendant in a separate Part 8 claim.

Because the error was admitted by everyone, including the adjudicator, and

because there was no arbitration clause, which meant that the court had the

jurisdiction to make a final decision on the point, there were no reasons why, in

5. The second exception concerns the proper timing, categorisation or description

of the relevant application for payment, payment notice or payless notice, and

could be said to date from Caledonian Modular Ltd v Mar City Developments Ltd…

In that case, the defendant had raised one simple issue, in a detailed defence and

counterclaim served at the outset, to the effect that a small group of documents

could not have constituted a claim for or notice of a sum due for payment. If that

argument was right, it was agreed that the claimant was not entitled to summary

judgment. At paragraph 11 of my judgment in that case, I reiterated the general

principle that it was not open to a defendant to seek to avoid payment of a sum

found due by an adjudicator by raising the very issue on which the adjudicator

‘12. That is, of course, the general rule and it will apply in 99 cases out of 100.

But there is an exception. If the issue is a short and self-contained point, which

requires no oral evidence or any other elaboration than that which is capable of

being provided during a relatively short interlocutory hearing, then the

defendant may be entitled to have the point decided by way of a claim for a

declaration. That is what happened, for example, in Geoffrey Osborne v Atkins

Rail Ltd [2010] BLR 363. It is envisaged at paragraph 9.4.3 of the TCC Guide

that separate Part 8 proceedings will not always be required in order for such

13. It needs to be emphasized that this procedure will rarely be used …..’”

Coulson J then focused upon the second exception referred to in para [5] of his judgment

“8. The authorities since Caledonian Modular demonstrate that, very often, the point

taken by the defendant is a straightforward argument to the effect that the

adjudicator was wrong and that, either with regard to its timing, or its content, the

relevant payment notice was invalid and/or that the pay less notice was valid and

prevented payment. In those circumstances, the defendant has issued Part 8

proceedings seeking a declaration to that effect. The claimant may issue its own

enforcement claim or, as the cases show, the parties may agree that, if the

defendant loses its Part 8 claim, it will pay the sums awarded by the adjudicator in

He then referred to decisions in five cases after Caledonian Modular and went on to say:

“10. These cases all involved a significant degree of agreement between the parties.

In particular, they all involved CPR Part 8 claims issued by the defendant

challenging the decision of the adjudicator, and seeking a final determination by

way of court declarations. They all involved a tacit understanding that the parties'

rights and liabilities turned on the decision as to whether or not the particular

notice had been served in time and/or was a valid application for payment or

11. Furthermore, the issue of a separate Part 8 claim in those circumstances was not

simply a matter of form. It was important in two respects. First, it provided a

vehicle whereby the defendant could set out in detail its challenge to the

adjudicator's decision. This meant that the claimant could see and understand the

precise basis of the challenge and the consequential declarations sought.

12. Secondly, the existence of a separate Part 8 claim meant that the TCC knew

from the outset what was going to be involved at any subsequent hearing…

13. In my view, the practice which has grown up around challenges of this sort has

worked relatively well, but only where there has been a large measure of consent

between the parties from the outset. The problems in the present case, and in

many other recent cases, have arisen because there has been no such consent.

14. Many defendants consider that the adjudicator got it wrong. As I said in

Caledonian Modular, in 99 cases out of 100, that will be irrelevant to any enforcement

application. If the decision was within the adjudicator's jurisdiction, and the

adjudicator broadly acted in accordance with the rules of natural justice, such

defendants must pay now and argue later. If the degree of consent noted in the

authorities set out in Section 3 above is not forthcoming, then the following

15. The first requirement is that the defendant must issue a CPR Part 8 claim setting

out the declarations it seeks or, at the very least, indicate in a detailed defence and

counterclaim to the enforcement claim what it seeks by way of final declarations.

For the reasons already explained, I believe a prompt Part 8 claim is the best

17. On this hypothesis, there is a dispute between th e parties as to whether or not

the defendant is entitled to resist summary judgment on the basis of its Part 8

claim. In those circumstances, the defendant must be able to demonstrate that:

(a) there is a short and self-contained issue which arose in the adjudication and

(b) that issue requires no oral evidence, or any other elaboration beyond that which

is capable of being provided during the interlocutory hearing set aside for the

18. What that means in practice is, for example, that the adjudicator's construction

of a contract clause is beyond any rational justification, or that the adjudicator's

calculation of the relevant time periods is obviously wrong, or that the

adjudicator's categorisation of a document as, say, a payment notice when, on any

view, it was not capable of being described as such a document. In a disputed case,

anything less would be contrary to the principles in Macob, Bouygues and Carillion.

19. It is axiomatic that such an issue could still only be considered by the court

on enforcement if the consequences of the issue raised by the defendant were

clear-cut. In Caledonian Modular, it was agreed that, if the document was not a

payment notice - and it plainly was not - then the claimant's case failed. If the

effect of the issue that the defendant wishes to raise is disputed, it will be most

unlikely for the court to take it into account on enforcement. Any arguable

inter-leafing of issues would almost certainly be fatal to a suggestion by the

defendant that their challenge falls within this limited exception.

20. The dispute between the parties as to whether or not the issue should be dealt

with on enforcement would have to be dealt with shortly at the enforcement

hearing itself. The inevitable time constraints of such a hearing will mean that it

will be rare for the court to decide that, although the issue and its effect is disputed,

21. In my view, many of the applications which are currently being made on this

basis by disgruntled defendants (and which are not the subject of the consensual

process noted above) are an abuse of the court process. The TCC works hard to

ensure that there is an enforcement hearing within about 28 days of

commencement of proceedings. The court does not have the resources to allow

defendants to re-run large parts of an adjudication at a disputed enforcement

hearing particularly in circumstances where the adjudication may have taken

28 days or 42 days, whilst the judge might have available no more than two hours

pre-reading and a two-hour hearing in which to dispose of the dispute.”

[28] In considering the approach taken in England, I do so with some diffidence because I

am not sufficiently au fait with the procedure, but on my basic understanding the

development of the court’s approach can be traced as follows. In Fenice Investments Inc v

“I am in no doubt that an adjudicator's decision is binding on the parties and, save in

exceptional circumstances, it must be complied with, no matter how quick or slow

the Pt 8 procedure to challenge that decision. A losing party who makes a challenge

to the decision by using the CPR Pt 8 procedure can do so, but in the ordinary case

Thereafter, in Caledonian Modular Limited v Mar City Developments Limited Coulson J

indicated the exceptional circumstances which might allow a challenge in respect of an

error, not involving jurisdiction or natural justice. That appears to have led to a number of

situations in which parties in English proceedings have sought to challenge the enforcement

of an adjudicator’s decision on the basis of an error. As quoted above, in Hutton Construction

Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd Coulson J referred to many such applications by

disgruntled defendants being an abuse of the court process. Accordingly, Coulson J then

sought to take a more restrictive approach, identifying the limited circumstances in which

an application challenging enforcement on the grounds of an error could be entertained. By

way of example, that approach was subsequently applied in ISG Construction Ltd v Platform

Interior Solutions Ltd [2020] EWHC 1120 (TCC) in which a few days after having granted

summary judgment in favour the defendant in enforcement proceedings, the judge then

heard the claimant’s case, brought under Part 8 seeking declarations including that the

decision of the adjudicator was wrong and beyond rational justification. The judge

concluded that the test in Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd was not

met, firstly because the point raised by the plaintiff was not raised in the adjudication and

secondly because the issue raised went beyond a short point of construction and required

[29] In understanding the exception which Coulson J identifies, it is of crucial

importance to note that he is referring to situations in which an application for final

determination has been made and is capable of being dealt with at or around the same

time as the enforcement action (see eg paras [10] and [15] of his judgment). This was

encapsulated by Mr Jonathan Davies QC in his judgment in Bouygues (UK) Limited v Febrey

Structures Limited [2016] EWHC 1333 (TCC) (a case referred to by Coulson J Hutton

Construction Ltd) who noted that there were two sets of proceedings listed for hearing

before the court. The first was the defendant’s application for summary judgment in

respect of the enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision and the second was the claimant’s

proceedings under Part 8 as to the interpretation of the parties’ contract. The judge stated

“This case is an illustration of the practice of parties seeking to upset an

Adjudicator's Decision by way of the swift final determination of the dispute.”

He then made reference to Caledonian Modular Limited v Mar City Developments Limited.

[30] While the approach is described as an exception, I do not view it as an exception in

the ordinary sense to the general principles of law as to how enforcement can be challenged.

Rather, it is an exception in the sense that an application for final determination is ready to

be heard and is sufficiently short and focused to be dealt with at or around the time of the

enforcement application. However, it might equally be said that this is not an exception at

all, but instead is simply an application of the basic principles of section 108(3) and

paragraph 23(2) of the Scheme as to final determination. So, in the vast majority of

situations a final determination issue will not be capable of being considered at the same

time as an enforcement application, but the exception allows that to occur in very limited

circumstances where final determination can swiftly be dealt with. Put slightly differently,

final determination by the court involves consideration of the dispute rather than merely a

challenge to the adjudicator’s decision, but commonly it will incidentally involve a challenge

to the adjudicator’s decision in the sense that the contention is that, in reaching the final

determination, what the court should decide differs from the adjudicator’s decision because

[31] In this jurisdiction, there is of course no Part 8 procedure. However, as I have noted,

either party may raise proceedings for final determination of the dispute at any time. One

possibility (used in the present case) is to seek to lodge a counterclaim in the commercial

action in which enforcement is sought. A counterclaim can of course relate to a matter

forming part of, or arising out of the grounds of, the action by the pursuer or it can seek a

decision which is necessary for the determination of the question in controversy between the

parties. In an ordinary action, a counterclaim can simply be lodged. In a commercial action,

a motion to lodge a counterclaim is required and the authority of the commercial judge is

required to permit it (Rule of Court 47.7(1)). The approach taken by that rule acknowledges

that a counterclaim can delay the resolution of the primary action.

[32] The preliminary question that arises in this case is whether the court should follow

the principle behind Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd which, as I have

said, I interpret as allowing an application for final determination, if that is suitable for swift

disposal, to be dealt with at or around the time of the enforcement hearing. I see no real

difficulty with that principle. The law is clear that the decision of the adjudicator is binding

(subject to the limited areas of challenge) until final determination and as I have noted there

may, at least potentially, be circumstances in which, in the interests of justice, final

determination can properly be made at or around the time of the enforcement proceedings.

For practical reasons, however, those cases are likely to be very few and far between.

Commonly, no proceedings will have been raised prior to the referral to the adjudicator.

Enforcement proceedings will normally be raised shortly after the adjudicator’s decision, if

payment is not received. There is therefore in most situations a limited time for the losing

party to raise final determination proceedings (whether in a separate action or a

counterclaim) which can be ready for determination at the enforcement hearing. Any such

proceedings will require pleadings, sufficient time for adjustment, and discussion of the

appropriate procedural way forward. Whether in any particular case there is a means of

achieving final determination at or around the time of the enforcement hearing, and it is

appropriate to have that heard, will be a matter for the commercial judge dealing with the

[33] That leads on to the question of whether the details of the approach of Coulson J in

Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd should be used as identifying when

it will be appropriate to allow the final determination matter to be heard in the context of

there also being an enforcement action. I broadly accept the approach he takes, but the

precise scope of what he describes as the exception may not be entirely clear. As quoted

above, at para [5] he describes the second exception as concerning the proper timing,

categorisation or description of the relevant application for payment, payment notice or

payless notice. However, having described the conditions for allowing the application to be

heard he refers, in para [18], again quoted above, to examples including whether that the

adjudicator's construction of a contract clause is beyond any rational justification, or that the

adjudicator's calculation of the relevant time periods is obviously wrong, or that the

adjudicator's categorisation of a document is of that nature. It may be the case that the

descriptions in these two paragraphs are indeed linked and that the reference to

construction of a contract clause is in the context of, for example, the categorisation of the

relevant document. But in understanding the boundaries of what is described as an

exception of this important nature, it would be preferable if a bright line could be drawn.

[34] Nonetheless, in my view, Coulson J’s approach should be treated with respect and as

a broadly helpful indication of the circumstances in which final determination can be

reached in the context of there also being en forcement proceedings. However, I go no

further than repeating that in this jurisdiction it will be a matter for the judge dealing with

the case to decide if that can occur. It will often be very unusual for the final determination

matter to be, as it were, “oven ready” at the time of the enforcement hearing and the use of a

counterclaim or action to try to stymie enforcement without the justification that it can

suitably be dealt with at the hearing is to be strongly discouraged.

[35] In the present action, however, the procedural circumstances are indeed rather

unusual. As I have noted, the sheriff court action was raised by the pursuer in 2019. If, as

seems clear, it is to be viewed as seeking resolution of the final sums to be paid to the

pursuer by the defender, it is an action for final determination of their dispute. The

adjudicator’s final decision was issued on 11 May 2020 and proceedings to enforce it were

raised on 8 June 2020. A motion was enrolled on 14 July 2020 by the defender to lodge a

counterclaim. The motion was not opposed and was granted. The pursuer was given time

to respond to the counterclaim. The pleadings in the summons, defence, counterclaim and

answers were then adjusted, with adjustments completed on 18 August 2020. A substantive

hearing, in the form of a 2 day diet of debate, on both the remitted sheriff court action and

the enforcement proceedings was then fixed for 19 and 20 November 2020. The pursuer did

not in the ordinary sense, and as described by Coulson J in Hutton Construction Ltd in his

reference to a number of other English cases, consent to the issues being dealt with at the

same hearing. But, as I have said, the pursuer did not oppose the motion to lodge the

counterclaim and in this case adequate time has been available to the parties to refine their

[36] If I were to apply the approach taken in Hutton Construction Ltd, I would conclude

that the counterclaim does not fall within the criteria set out therein. Firstly, the issue raised

is not (as I understood senior counsel for the defender to accept) about the proper timing,

categorisation or description of the relevant application for payment, payment notice or

payless notice. Secondly, (taking for the moment para [18] in Hutton Construction Ltd as

expressing a wider test) it is not possible to conclude that the adjudicator’s decision is

“beyond rationally justifiable”. The relevant contractual provisions state:

“1.9.1 Except as provided in clauses … 1.9.3 … the Final Certificate shall have effect

in any proceedings under or arising out of or in connection with this Contract

(whether by adjudication, arbitration or legal proceedings) as: …

.2 conclusive evidence that any necessary effect has been given to all the terms of

the Contract which require that an amount be added to or deducted from the

Contract Sum or that an adjustment be made to the Contract Sum… ;

.3 conclusive evidence that all and only such extensions of time, if any, as are due

.4 conclusive evidence that the reimbursement of direct loss and/or expense, if

any, to the Contractor [i.e. the pursuer] pursuant to clause 4.23 is in final

settlement of all and any claims which the Contractor has or may have arising

out of the occurrence of any of the Relevant Matters, whether such claim be for

… [1.9].3 If adjudication, arbitration or other proceedings are commenced by either

party within 60 days after the Final Certificate has been issued, the Final Certificate

shall have effect as conclusive evidence as provided in clause 1.9.1 save only in

In Trustees of the Marc Gilbard 2009 Settlement Trust v OD Developments and Projects Ltd

Coulson J held that the Final Certificate did not have effect as conclusive evidence in the

proceedings actually raised within the specified period but it constituted conclusive

evidence in any proceedings not raised within that period. Senior counsel for the pursuer

submitted that an alternative interpretation made more commercial sense: as long as at least

one set of proceedings was raised timeously, the Final Certificate would not, in terms of

clause 1.9.3, as strictly construed, have conclusive effect in any later claims in respect of the

matters to which the first set of proceedings relate. The arguments presented by senior

counsel for the pursuer in relation to the issue of construction of clause 1.9, read along with

the points made by the commentators in the case report, demonstrate that there are

legitimate and properly arguable reasons why the interpretation reached in Trustees of the

Marc Gilbard 2009 Settlement Trust v OD Developments and Projects Ltd may not be correct.

That plainly suffices to indicate that the test of the adjudicator’s interpretation being

“beyond any rational justification” is not met. All of that said, in this case the pursuer did

not oppose the lodgement of the counterclaim and did not seek immediate enforcement of

the adjudicator’s decision. As the issue in the present case called for a debate after a

reasonable period of adjustment of the pleadings, and by implication the pursuer permitted

the defender, no doubt for pragmatic reasons, to develop its challenge in full, it might be

open to argument that it is not necessary for this court to take the same restricted approach

[37] However, there is a much more central point in this case: does the counterclaim seek

final determination of the dispute between the parties? In my opinion, it clearly does not.

As I have noted, the question of validity of the Interim Payment Notice raised in the

counterclaim was reserved for later determination. The Final Certificate point in the

counterclaim is presented as a challenge to the adjudicator’s decision. It is something that

arises from the adjudication and proceeds upon the basis that the adjudication occurred

outwith the 60 day period. If successful, it will show the adjudicator’s decision to be

incorrect. But it does not give rise to the final determination of the full dispute between the

parties. That will be highly likely to involve the earlier payment notices, interim certificates

and the Final Certificate. There are extant proceedings raised originally in the sheriff court

and now before this court about the overarching issue of the sums said to be due to the

pursuer based upon at least some of that documentation. It was not suggested that these

extant proceedings can somehow be ignored for the purposes of final determination of the

parties’ dispute or that the contention in the counterclaim about conclusive evidence would

itself allow final determination of the dispute. On the contrary, the extant proceedings

plainly cannot be disregarded as they deal with the dispute about what sum, if any, remains

due. If I were to decide at this juncture on the conclusive evidence point in the adjudication

that decision would not deal with the extant proceedings. Importantly, it is not clear

whether, in those proceedings, the conclusive evidence point will require to be considered

and decided upon. The defender may, for example, wish to use it to seek to demonstrate

that the adjudicator’s decision was incorrect and to seek to argue (as was raised here) that as

the issues before the adjudicator differed from those in the sheriff court action the conclusive

evidence rule applied. Given that the conclusive evidence issue could potentially be a

matter raised in that action, it would not be appropriate for me to reach a decision upon it.

In short, the matter of final determination is not before the court at this point.

[38] I conclude that while there may be unusual and very limited circumstances in which

a judge might allow final determination to be dealt with at or around the time of the

enforcement proceedings, this case does not fall into that category because the issue of final

determination remains at large and is not addressed in the counterclaim. The challenge to

enforcement, based as it is on an alleged error by the adjudicator, must therefore fail: see

eg Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd; Gillies Ramsay Diamond v PJW

Enterprises Limited. In these circumstances, the point made by the defender about recovery

[39] I shall sustain the pleas-in-law for the pursuer in the principal action, repel the

pleas-in-law for the defender in that action, and grant decree as concluded for by the

pursuer. In relation to the counterclaim I require to hear from parties as to whether, in light

of the decision I have reached, it, or any part of it, should remain in play. In the meantime, I

reserve all questions of expenses.

Scottish Court of Session Decisions