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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> Walls v. Procurator Fiscal, Kilmarnock [2009] ScotHC HCJAC_59 (19 June 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2009/2009HCJAC59.html Cite as: 2009 GWD 23-370, 2009 SCCR 711, 2009 JC 375, 2009 SLT 774, [2009] HCJAC 59, [2009] ScotHC HCJAC_59, 2009 SCL 973 |
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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lord Carloway Sheriff Principal Dunlop QC Sheriff Principal Lockhart
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[2009] HCJAC 59Appeal No: XJ230/09
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD CARLOWAY
in the appeal by stated case
WILLIAM WALLS
Appellant; against
THE PROCURATOR FISCAL, KILMARNOCK,
Respondent:
_______
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19 June 2009
1. Proceedings before the Sheriff
[1] On 26 November 2008, the appellant appeared
for trial at Kilmarnock
Sheriff Court on a summary complaint which libelled that:
"on 9 November 2008 at Rugby park ... Kilmarnock you ... did conduct yourself in a disorderly manner, shout, swear, sing sectarian songs, shout remarks of a religious and racial nature and commit a breach of the peace; you ... did commit this offence while on bail, ... and it will be proved in terms of section 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 that the aforesaid offence was aggravated by religious prejudice and it will be proved in terms of section 96 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 that the aforesaid offence was racially aggravated".
[2] The respondent adduced evidence from three
principal witnesses. The first was a Superintendent of Police, who was the
match commander at what was a Kilmarnock against Rangers game attended by some 10,000 people. He
gave evidence that sectarian and bigoted chants could have an impact on the
behaviour of parts of a football crowd, were they to take offence. He referred
to "the Famine Song", which he regarded as racist; explaining that it referred
to the Irish Famine and to people of Irish descent, who lived in the West of
Scotland. The song carried the refrain "the famine's over, why don't you go
home". The Superintendent knew the rest of the words, as would most football
fans, and found them offensive.
[3] Although the lyrics of the song were agreed
at the trial by joint minute, they do not feature in the stated case prepared
by the Sheriff and she makes no findings in fact relating to their precise
terms.
[4] The second witness was a female steward,
employed by Rangers, who policed the Rangers' section of the crowd. She too
knew the refrain of the song, the singing of which was prohibited by Rangers
under pain of suspension from attending Rangers' matches. The steward spoke to
the appellant being part of the Rangers' section. The Sheriff records her
evidence as follows:
"She saw [the appellant] repeatedly standing up singing the song, waving his arms in the air. She saw and heard him singing the refrain from the famine song. She heard him sing and say 'fenian bastards' or 'f*** the Pope' on two or three occasions. The [appellant] was warned a number of times and on one occasion he was asked to sit down. He refused to sit down. The [appellant] persisted in standing up 'conducting' the crowd. He stood in the aisles on occasions, which is a safety issue. ... once the majority had stopped singing, he would stand up with his hands in the air and get them to sing another few lines".
The witness had been concerned about the effect of the appellant's behaviour on the crowd, although there was no actual effect as she saw it.
[5] The third witness was another Rangers'
steward, this time a male. As reported by the Sheriff, he spoke to the
appellant having his hands raised and singing "the famine is over", "fenian
bastard" and "f*** the Pope" on a number of occasions. He clearly sang the Famine
Song refrain and was shouting abusive language. The appellant was gesturing to
the Kilmarnock support. He stood in the
aisle on many occasions. He had been asked to sit down by other stewards, but
had refused to do so. He was concerned about the appellant's behaviour, which
"bothered" him.
[6] At the conclusion of the crown case, the
appellant made a "no case to answer" submission on the basis that there was
insufficient evidence of a breach of the peace. There had been no evidence of fear
and alarm or distress. The respondent countered under reference to dicta
in Smith v Donnelly 2002 JC 65, Wilson v Brown 1982 SCCR 49, Allison
v Higson 2004 SCCR 720 and Dyer v Hutchison 2006 SCCR 377, that it
was sufficient that the conduct be likely to cause fear or alarm to a reasonable
person in the vicinity.
[7] The Sheriff repelled the submission. In
doing so, she applied herself to the test, contained in Smith v
Donnelly (supra at para [17]), of whether the conduct
complained of was "severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary people and threaten
serious disturbance to the community". The conduct must be "genuinely alarming
and disturbing, in its context, to any reasonable person". She referred also
to Raffaelli v Heatly 1949 JC 101, where it was said that it was enough
if the "conduct ... causes reasonable apprehension ... and ... that some mischief may
result to the public peace". The Sheriff held that, taking the crown case at
its highest:
"the [appellant] behaved in the way described in the charge and that in the circumstances in which it took place in the context of a football match, that that conduct was, or was likely to be, genuinely alarming and seriously disturbing to the ordinary reasonable person".
She regarded the appellant's conduct as "flagrant", in terms of Young v Heatly 1959 JC 66, and likely to provoke violence even within the Rangers' section of the stadium.
[8] The appellant did not give evidence. He
did lead evidence from two of his friends and co-supporters at the match, who
denied that the appellant either sang any part of the Famine Song or referred
to the Pope or Fenians. Their evidence was ultimately rejected by the Sheriff.
[9] When it came to closing submissions, the
appellant conceded that the words "f*** the Pope" and "Fenian bastards" had a
religious aspect in terms of section 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. However, he
argued that there was no racial element involved in the appellant's conduct,
especially in relation to the Famine Song, in terms of section 96 of the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998. The submission included the proposition that, even if
the appellant had been singing the refrain from the song, it could not be
inferred that he knew the rest of the words. The song consisted of "banter"
between supporters of Rangers and Celtic and did not involve any racist
element.
[10] The Sheriff convicted the appellant of the
charge as libelled. She considered, for the same reasons as merited the
rejection of the "no case to answer submission", that the conduct did amount to
a breach of the peace. In relation to section 74, she held that singing "f***
the Pope" and "Fenian bastards" displayed malice and ill will towards a
religious group, presumably Roman Catholics. In relation to section 96, she
held that singing the refrain from the Famine Song, which referred to people of
Irish descent being asked to return home, was clearly racist. The appellant
was placed on probation for eighteen months and made the subject of a Football
Banning Order for two years.
2. The Appeal
[11] The Stated Case poses four questions:
"1. In the light of the evidence led, did I err in law in rejecting the
submission of no case to answer?
2. In the light of the evidence led, was I entitled to make the finding in
fact 12 and hold that the Appellant's conduct amounted to a breach of the peace?
3. In the light of the evidence led, was I entitled to find that the
Appellant's conduct was racially aggravated?
4. On the facts stated, was I entitled to convict as libelled?"
There were no adjustments proposed by the appellant to these questions or to the findings in fact, which were as follows:
[12] The appellant first requested an adjournment
to allow him to raise a Devolution Issue concerning the compatibility of the complaint,
notably the aggravations, with articles 8 (right to private and family life)
and 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. It was accepted that neither article had been raised
before the Sheriff either at the trial or in the application for a Stated
Case. Indeed, the appellant had conceded the religious prejudice aspect of
some of the remarks made, even although that concession was not now considered
to have been correctly made.
[13] The Advocate Depute's submission was simply
that he found it difficult to take a position in the absence of a written
Notice of the Devolution Issue.
[14] It is neither practicable nor possible to
consider a Devolution Issue within the context of a stated case which raises
four specific questions, none of which touch upon that Issue. A Devolution Issue
does not have an existence separate from the process in which it is taken. If
a Devolution Issue arises then the point requires to be raised at the
appropriate time. In the context of an appeal against a summary conviction, it
required, in a case such as this, to be raised at the latest in the course of
the application for, and adjustment of, the stated case (see Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995, sections 176(1)(b) and (3), 182(3)). This is simply
because the stated case procedure is designed to focus questions for the Court
to answer. It does not allow an appeal at large. Leave to appeal is granted
only on the basis of the questions raised (1995 Act, section 180(1) and (2)). Of
course, the Court could conceivably remit the case to the Sheriff to be
restated having regard to the proposed Devolution Issue (1995 Act, section
182(6)) but it would be reluctant to do so where the Issue has not been raised
at all during the past proceedings. In all these circumstances, the Court
refused to adjourn the hearing.
[15] The appellant's submission on the merits
focussed upon the singing of the Famine Song. He attempted to lay before the
Court the actual words of the song as agreed in the Joint Minute, but it was
pointed out that the Court would not normally go outwith the four corners of
the Stated Case. There were no findings in fact about the precise wording of
the lyrics; nor had the Sheriff rehearsed these words or referred to the Joint
Minute in her Note on the evidence. The Court Minutes do record the lodging of
a Joint Minute at the trial diet, but apparently at the end of the proceedings.
[16] The appellant maintained that the Famine Song did not
contain racist elements. In particular, the refrain "the famine is over, why
don't you go home" was not racist. It was just an expression of political
opinion permitted by the general right of freedom of speech contained in article
10 of the European Convention (supra). It was no more racist than some of the
lines in "Flower of Scotland", which bid King Edward to return to England to think again, or "God
Save the Queen", which referred to "crushing" "rebellious Scots". The latter
could be sung with impunity at any time and on any occasion (see also Owens
v Procurator Fiscal, Hamilton, unreported, High Court on Appeal, 14 June 2005). The reference to
Fenians was also a political one. "Fenians" was a reference to the Fenian Brotherhood,
a political society, set up originally in America in the 1850s, to bring about the
independence of Ireland. If the references were seen in their proper context, given that there
was no evidence of any alarm or distress, the appellant's conduct could not be
seen as amounting to a breach of the peace or to having a racially aggravated
element. In the context of football matches, an exchange of abuse between
supporters was part and parcel of going to a game. Shouting and swearing was
commonplace. The fact that a song might cause offence was not enough. Something
said which was true might cause offence. All that the appellant had done was
sing the refrain element and knowledge of the remainder of the song could not
be imputed to him.
[17] Under reference to Smith v Donnelly (supra)
and Dyer v Hutchison (supra) the Advocate Depute submitted that
there was sufficient evidence from the Superintendent and the stewards to
entitle the Sheriff make the findings in fact. The religious aspect had been
conceded and there was also sufficient evidence of racial prejudice.
3. Decision
[18] In analysing the evidence, the Sheriff
applied herself to the correct test, which is that set out in Smith v
Donnelly (supra at para [17]). A breach of the peace may occur
where the conduct complained of is "severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary
people and threaten serious disturbance to the community". The conduct must be
"genuinely alarming and disturbing, in its context, to any reasonable person".
The Court has no doubt that the conduct of the appellant did amount to a breach
of the peace, even in the context of a football match where at least shouting
and singing, or hearing shouting and signing, are undoubtedly part of the match
experience expected by all attending the stadium. As a generality, a complaint
of someone shouting and singing could not ground a complaint of breach of the
peace at a football match, as it might at other locations. Equally, occasional
standing up and even leading communal singing are unlikely to amount to conduct
severe enough to threaten serious disturbance. However, presence inside a
football stadium does not give a spectator a free hand to behave as he
pleases. There are limits and the appellant's conduct went well beyond those
limits.
[19] First, he was repeatedly shouting religious
abuse in the form of "f***" the Pope". Whatever relevance the appellant
thought this expression had to a match between Kilmarnock and Rangers, it is conduct which
some, perhaps many, attending a football match are likely to find offensive. Secondly,
the appellant was repeatedly shouting "Fenian bastards". The Court does not
accept that the appellant was referring to members of the American brotherhood
formed in the 1850s. It is within judicial knowledge that the term "Fenian" is
used by a certain section of the population to describe a person either of
Irish ancestry or even a person of the Roman Catholic faith, whether of Irish
ancestry or not. Coupled with the derogatory term "bastard", this is either an
expression of religious prejudice or racial bigotry or both. Again, some,
perhaps many, persons at a football match are likely to find it offensive. Thirdly,
the appellant was singing the refrain from the Famine Song. It is slightly
unfortunate that the Sheriff did not make any findings on the precise terms of
the lyrics of the song, but she has adequately set out that the witnesses
described the song as offensive and referring to the "Irish Famine", presumably
the potato famine of the 1840s. The song calls upon persons of Irish descent,
who are living in Scotland, to go back to the land of their ancestors, namely Ireland. The Court does not
consider that the lyrics of this refrain bear any reasonable comparison to
those of "Flower of Scotland" or indeed "God Save the Queen". Rather they are
racist in calling upon people native to Scotland to leave the country because of
their racial origins. This is a sentiment which, once more, many persons will
find offensive.
[20] Thus far, therefore, the appellant was repeatedly
using offensive and abusive language. That in itself may be sufficient to
merit a conviction for a breach of the peace since, even in the context of a
football match, such conduct may be so flagrant that it can be regarded as
severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary people and to threaten serious
disturbance to the community. It may be "genuinely alarming and disturbing, in
its context, to any reasonable person", given that there are many spectators at
football matches who actually want to watch the game rather than spend their
time abusing the opposition support. In that connection, the next thing that
the appellant was observed doing was repeatedly (not just occasionally)
standing up. Coupled with this, however, is the fact that those charged with
control of the crowd at the match have repeatedly asked the appellant to stop
behaving as he was doing. But he repeatedly refused to do so. Once more,
where that is occurring, it is a legitimate inference that persons in the crowd
are likely to be alarmed and disturbed by such behaviour and that it does have
the potential to cause or threaten serious disturbance. In all these circumstances, the
Sheriff was entitled to repel the "no case to answer" submission, to make
finding in fact 12 and to convict the appellant of a breach of the peace.
[21] In relation to the aggravations, section
74(2) of the 2003 Act (supra) provides, in part, that :
"(2) ... an offence is aggravated by religious prejudice if-
...
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will
towards members of a religious group, or of a social or cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation, based on their membership of that group".
For the reasons given above, the Court has no difficulty in accepting the Sheriff's conclusion that the use of words such as "f*** the Pope" and "Fenian bastards" display malice and ill will towards those of the Roman Catholic faith.
[22] Section
96(2) of the 1998 Act (supra) provides, in part, that:
"An offence is racially aggravated ... if-
...
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will
towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that
group".
For the reasons given above, the Court also has no difficulty in accepting the Sheriff's conclusion that singing the refrain from the "Famine Song" and referring to persons as "Fenian Bastards" displays malice and ill-will towards people of Irish descent living in Scotland. In the context of a football fanatic, such as the appellant, who has presumably attended other Rangers' matches where this song has been sung, even if he did not know all the words to all the verses, he would be well acquainted with their general import and sentiment.
[23] The Court will answer the first question in
the negative and the second, third and fourth questions in the affirmative. The
appeal is therefore refused.