Courtney Patterson against City of Edinburgh Council (Upper Tribunal - General Regulatory Chamber) [2025] UT 16 (12 March 2025)

Introduction

Courtney Paterson (hereinafter referred to as "the appellant") has appealed against a

decision of the First-tier Tribunal of the General Regulatory Chamber (hereinafter referred to

as `the Tribunal') dated 7 May 2024 refusing her appeal against the imposition of a Penalty

Charge relating to a parking contravention involving vehicle registration number SN20WBV

on 6 September 2023 at 14.13 in Chalmers Street, Edinburgh. In support of this Appeal the

appellant has lodged:

Form UTS-1

Legal Member's decision

Decision of First-tier Tribunal refusing Permission to Appeal

Background

As indicated above, the appellant was issued with a Penalty Charge Notice

(hereinafter referred to as the `PCN') in relation to an alleged parking contravention

involving the vehicle registration number SN20WBV on 6 September 2023 at 14.13 in

Chalmers Street, Edinburgh. The nature of the alleged contravention was that the appellant

was parked in a public parking bay when parking ticket had not been purchased.

The matter was originally considered by the First-tier Tribunal at a Hearing within

George House, George Street, Edinburgh on 25 April 2024, when the appellant and her

husband were present and unrepresented. Edinburgh City Council (hereinafter referred to

as "the Council") were not present or represented at that Hearing. The Legal Member heard

submissions, and the appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. The reasons for this

refusal are fully set out in detail in the written decision of the Legal Member dated 7 May

2024. The appellant sought a review of this decision in terms of Rule 17 of the First-tier

Tribunal for Scotland General Regulatory Chamber Parking and Bus Lane Appeals (Rules of

Procedure) Regulations 2020, which was ultimately refused as having no merit by another

Legal Member. The appellant thereafter sought permission to appeal against the original

decision of the Legal Member in terms of section 46 of the Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014, and

in terms of Rule 18 of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland General Regulatory Chamber

Parking and Bus Rules of Procedure 2020 (contained in the Schedule of the Chamber

Procedure Regulations 2020 (SSI No 98) ("the Procedure Rules"). This application was

refused by a Legal Member of the First-tier Tribunal on 8 September 2024.

The terms of section 46(1) the Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 ("the 2014 Act") provide

that the Upper Tribunal for Scotland may only hears Appeals in cases where permission to

appeal has been granted either by the First-tier Tribunal or by the Upper Tribunal itself.

Permission can only be granted in accordance with section 46(2)(b) of the 2014 Act if the

Appellant identifies an arguable error on a point of law in the decision of the First-tier

Tribunal which he wishes to Appeal. The appellant subsequently sought permission to

appeal from the Upper Tribunal, and on 24 October 2024 restricted permission to appeal was

granted on one ground, namely in relation to the question of the identification of the

registered keeper of the vehicle.

Since that date no further representations have been received from the appellant or

from the Council, both parties expressing their wishes that they wished the substantive

appeal be determined according to their previously submitted representations.

Discussion

The Parking and Bus Lane jurisdiction was brought within the integrated structure of

Scottish Tribunals within the General Regulatory Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal for

Scotland as part of its rolling programme of reform on 1 April 2020. Prior to that date there

was no statutory right to seek permission to Appeal decisions of adjudicators to the Upper

Tribunal for Scotland. On that date the Adjudicators of the Parking and Bus-Lane Tribunal for

Scotland became Legal Members of the General Regulatory Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal

for Scotland. In the present application there is a statutory right to seek permission to Appeal

to the Upper Tribunal for Scotland in relation to this matter.

The appellant has been granted restricted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

The procedural history of this appeal is as set out above.

In terms of the relevant law, Section 46 of the Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 (hereinafter

referred to as "the 2014 Act") provides:

46.

Appeal from the Tribunal

(1) A decision of the First-tier Tribunal in any matter in a case before the Tribunal may be

Appealed to the Upper Tribunal.

(2) An Appeal under this section is to be made--

(a) by a party in the case,

(b) on a point of law only.

(3) An Appeal under this section requires the permission of--

(a) the First-tier Tribunal, or

(b) if the First-tier Tribunal refuses its permission, the Upper Tribunal.

Accordingly, from an application of the foregoing Section 46 of the 2014 Act, it is

apparent that the Appellant may only Appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a point of law (section

46(2)(b) of the 2014 Act). It is not an error of law simply because an appellant disagrees with

a finding made by a Legal Member. The Legal Member also remains at all times the principal

finder of fact.

10.

An appeal can only be successful if there has been an error of law, such as:

(i) an error of general law;

(ii) and error in the application of the law to the facts;

(iii) making findings for which there is no evidence, or which is inconsistent with the

evidence of contradictory of it: or

(iv) a fundamental error in approach to the case; for example, by asking the wrong

question, or by taking account of manifestly irrelevant considerations or by arriving at

a decision that no reasonable tribunal could properly reach (see Advocate General for

Scotland v Murray Group Holdings 2016 SC 201.)

11.

In the present appeal the only matter to be determined is whether the PCN was issued

against the wrong person. It has been submitted that the appellant was not and never has

been the registered keeper of the vehicle and as such the appeal was addressed against the

wrong person. The appellant states that the fact that her husband was the registered keeper

of the vehicle against whom the original decision should have been registered was raised at

the original hearing. I do not understand that this position is now disputed by any parties,

and it is accepted that the registered keeper of the vehicle was David Paterson and not the

appellant. Notwithstanding this, a finding in fact was made by the Legal Member at

paragraph 10(a) to the effect that the appellant was the driver and the registered keeper of the

vehicle, which appears on the face of it to be a finding for which there is no evidence, or which

is inconsistent with the evidence or contradictory of it.

12.

Thereafter the Tribunal which considered the initial decision refusing permission to

appeal appears to have conceded this point and stated that the original decision should be

amended in terms of Rule 21 of the First-tier Tribunal or Scotland General Regulatory

Chamber Parking and Bus Lane Appeals Rules of Procedure 2020 to show that the appellant

should be David Paterson and not the appellant given that the error appears to have

originated from an administrative error when data was inputted into the case management

system.

13.

The terms of Rule 21 of the First-tier Tribunal or Scotland General Regulatory Chamber

Parking and Bus Lane Appeals Rules of Procedure 2020 state:

Correction of clerical mistakes or accidental slips or omissions

21. The First-tier Tribunal may at any time correct any clerical mistake or other accidental slip

or omission contained in a decision, order or any other document of the First-tier Tribunal, or

any document produced by it, by--

(a) sending notification of the amended decision or order, or a copy of the amended document,

to all parties, and

(b) making any necessary amendment to any information published in relation to the decision,

order or document

14.

The issues to be determined therefore are whether the First-tier Tribunal were entitled

to amend the original decision, and if not, whether there has been an error in law resulting

from a finding in fact for which there was no evidence, or which is inconsistent with the

evidence of contradictory of it.

15.

At the outset it is worth considering that clerical or administrative errors are a fact of

life in any system, which is why there are court and tribunal rules to facilitate the correction

of such errors in an expeditious and proportionate manner. In the context of appeals to the

General Regulatory Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland the aforementioned Rule

21 specifically allows for such rectification. There is no doubt that such rules therefore have

an important role to play in any system of adjudication. They must however always operate

within defined boundaries and cannot simply be used as a "catch-all" to cure all errors.

16.

In the present instance the Tribunal sought to change the name of the person against

whom proceedings have been instituted, changing this from one named individual to another.

This cannot therefore be said to simply be a clerical error capable of being rectified

administratively. This was not a case of simply wrongly designing an individual, but rather

the procedure sought to change a finding in fact which specifically involved the identification

of entirely the wrong person against whom a decision had been made.

17.

It is also worth noting that this power to amend allows for accidental errors to be

amended. It does not however allow a subsequent tribunal to make changes to matters which

were not accidental. In the present case whilst the original identification of the appellant as

the person against whom proceedings should be instituted may have been accidental, the

subsequent finding in fact to the effect that she was the registered keeper after a hearing where

evidence was lead about this matter was clearly a conscious and not an accidental decision. It

was also a decision which appears not to have been justified on the basis of the evidence

presented. It is difficult to understand how a finding in fact could be made to the effect that

the wrong individual was the registered keeper of the vehicle, but that appears to have been

the case in the present instance. Having made such a finding in fact, it is not possible to

conclude that this is a matter that can be said to have been a clerical mistake or other accidental

slip or omission in the decision. Notwithstanding any inputting error, the issue of the

registered keeper was raised at the hearing, and this was not corrected at that time, and a

positive finding in fact was made after hearing this evidence.

18.

Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the terms of Rule 21 of the Schedule to The First-

tier Tribunal for Scotland General Regulatory Chamber Parking and Bus Lane Appeals (Rules

of Procedure) Regulations 2020 were applicable in the present case, and it was not competent

to change the name of the appellant in the present proceedings from Courtney Paterson to

David Paterson.

19.

That being the case I am satisfied that the original decision to the Tribunal was clearly

flawed. For whatever reason the decision was issued against the appellant when it should not

have been given that she was not the registered keeper of the vehicle. Accordingly, there

occurred an error of law in the present case given that the Tribunal clearly made a finding in

fact for which there was no evidence, or which was inconsistent with the evidence or

contradictory of it, namely that appellant was the registered keeper of the vehicle. This was

not an incidental or ancillary finding but rather was one which lay at the heart of this matter.

It is the registered keeper who is responsible for the PCN. As the appellant was not the

registered keeper of the vehicle the original decision cannot stand.

Decision

20. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the original decision is quashed. Given the

fundamental nullity of the original decision it is not appropriate to make any further order.

Parties Aggrieved by Decision

21.

A party to this case who is aggrieved by this decision may seek permission to appeal

to the Court of Session on a point of law only. A party who wishes to appeal must seek

permission to do so from the Upper Tribunal within 30 days of the date on which this

decision was sent to him or her. Any such request for permission must be in writing and

must (a) identify the decision of the Upper Tribunal to which it relates, (b) identify the

alleged error or errors of law in the decision and (c) state in terms of section 50(4) of the

Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 what important point of principle or practice would be raised

or what other compelling reason there is for allowing a further appeal to proceed.

Sheriff Colin Dunipace

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Scotland Upper Tribunal Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scotland Upper Tribunal Decisions >> Courtney Patterson against City of Edinburgh Council (Upper Tribunal - General Regulatory Chamber) [2025] UT 16 (12 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotUT/2025/2025ut16.html Cite as: [2025] UT 16

Scotland Upper Tribunal Decisions