



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: PA/06703/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
On: 10 November 2017

Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On: 28 November 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHANA

Between

MOHAMMED ALI SHAHAJADA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the appellant: Mr Z Malik of Counsel

For the respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a national of Bangladesh born on 20 September 1987, appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the decision of the respondent dated 15 June 2016 refusing his claim for asylum and humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom. First-tier Tribunal Judge Davey dismissed the appellant's appeal in a decision promulgated on 12 June 2017.

2. Permission to appeal was at first refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Landis on 6 July 2017 but subsequently granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Gleeson in a decision dated 15 September 2017 stating that it is arguable that the Judge did not take into account the significant amount of country evidence which is not analysed in the First-tier Tribunal's decision as to the risk to a former Chatra Shibir (CS) student leader, which has been accepted by the respondent, given the change of circumstances in Bangladesh and the Awami League's hostility to Jamiat-e-Islami.
3. The First-tier Tribunal Judge in his decision made the following findings, which I summarise. The appellant claims that if returned to Bangladesh, he would face mistreatment due to his political opinions as a result of his activity working with the CS the student wing of the Jamiat-e Islami. The appellant claimed that in his role working as a sub branch of CS he would face adverse attention from the Awami League, in particularly their student wing Chatra League (CL). He claims that there were three incidents which arose before he left Bangladesh which give rise to his fear of ill-treatment on return in that country.
4. The appellant claims that he left Bangladesh in 2010 because he found it difficult to study in Bangladesh and because of the political atmosphere at the time. The appellant hoped that by the end of his studies, there would have been a change of government and that the Awami League would no longer be in power. The Awami League however took power in about February 2009 for a five-year term and in disputed elections, they were re-elected for a second term on 5 January 2014.
5. The respondent accepted that the appellant is a Bangladeshi national who had been politically involved with the CS the party in Bangladesh. It was not accepted however that the appellant had received threats from the Awami League. It was also accepted by the respondent that the appellant had continued his political activities in the UK essentially in opposition to the Awami League, although it does not appear specifically on behalf of the CS.
6. The appellant's claimed problems with the Awami League were before the appellant left Bangladesh and said to have taken place in 2009. The appellant claimed that he had been working towards having a cricket tournament which the Awami League or CL prevented. Further the appellant claimed to have been threatened by two CL members who told him to leave Bangladesh in about July 2009. He further claims that he and others were involved in distributing leaflets in support of CS members involved themselves in a fracas. This occurred sometime after his exams in 2009. The appellant claimed that he was not physically ill treated himself, but CL were vigorous in their opposition to CS.

7. The appellant disputes his reply to question 38 of his asylum interview, where he was asked whether he had any evidence of any threats from the CL to him, to which he replied, "I personally did not get any threats from the Chatra League, but my other members did". The appellant says that this answer he gave is not correct and that threats were made to him.
8. The appellant confirmed that he has not been arrested or detained and apart from making a reference to the issue in his asylum interview, he relied upon a false claim by way of an FIR or an arrest warrant which he claims had been filed against him. He said that his parents had been told about this from people in his organisation. However, the police never interviewed his parents or made enquiries from them as to the appellant's whereabouts or notified anyone as to the nature of the allegations. The appellant says he thinks that the police did not attend his home because "others" would have known of his absence from Bangladesh. Therefore, there was no purpose served in the police asking about his whereabouts. This explanation does not actually square with the claim that the police acting for and at the behest of the Awami League would take no action or make appropriate enquiries about the appellant. Nor does it avoid, even if it was a false claim, the matter proceeding on that basis in his absence.
9. There is no documentation to support the claim of police activities investigating the appellant and nothing to show that there is an outstanding warrant for his arrest nor any process through the courts engaged against him. It has been put for the appellant that his credibility is supported by his lack of explicit reliance upon these claimed threats because of the absence of evidence of support. This argument cannot be given significant weight in assessing credibility for the reasons set out above. The appellant claims he would be at risk on return because of his political activities in the past, as well as whilst in the UK, evidencing his continued political opinion interests.
10. The Secretary of State accepts that the appellant has had a continuing interest in his political activities in the United Kingdom. The issue is whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution because of his political activities and opinions on return to Bangladesh at the hands of the authorities, such that he cannot have recourse to domestic protection nor whether internal relocation a reasonable option. The appellant claims in the alternative to be in need of humanitarian protection and in this respect, he also claims similarly that there is no protection against the authorities and that wherever he is in Bangladesh, he would not be able to safely relocate.

11. The standard of proof is a reasonable likelihood of risk on return. The appellant claims that the reason he did not claim asylum when he came to the United Kingdom was because he was studying. He only claimed asylum once it became clear to him that there was no change likely in the government because the Awami League succeeded in contested elections in January 2014.
12. The appellant's activities in the United Kingdom have been to attend a demonstration to protest against the Awami League. The appellant claims to have used Facebook and posted pictures on his face book. The appellant further believes that there is video footage taken of a demonstration in which one Mr Ali was the object of the demonstrator's complaints and there was a counter-demonstration by Awami League supporters and the appellant believed that he would be identified by the Bangladeshi authorities.
13. The supporting document which the appellant provides have not identified that a false FIR has been filed against him. At its highest this is something he had heard from his parents. There is no evidence from his parents or lawyers on their behalf concerning these matters and indeed there is no evidence at all from them about the appellant's presence in the United Kingdom or any fears they have arising from his past political activities or future political intentions.
14. The letters from CS essentially confirmed the appellant's activities in Bangladesh which the Secretary of State accepted had taken place but did not identify further any specific and continuing risk faced. The appellant has been in contact with his parents through the telephone and Skype or email but there is nothing from them about the issues raised in Bangladesh to justify the appellant's concerns.
15. The Judge dismissed the appellant's appeal on all grounds.

The grounds of appeal

16. The appellant and his grounds of appeal makes the following submissions, which I summarise. The Judge was wrong to dismiss the appellant's claim for asylum based on his risk on return to Bangladesh due to his genuine political opinion and belief. The Judge failed to adequately consider the country guidance evidence regarding the situation in Bangladesh and/or failed to provide adequate reasons engaging with this material. The Judge was wrong to conclude that the appellant would not be at real risk of persecution as he did not have a "profile" such that he would be of interest to the Bangladeshi authorities.

17. The Judge was wrong to make findings without adequate reasoning regarding relevant country evidence. The first is that the appellant would not need to conceal his political views if he were returned to Bangladesh to avoid persecution in Bangladesh, or that even if he did express his political views and engaged in political activity in Bangladesh he would not be at real risk of persecution and/or serious harm. Second that the appellant's profile was such that he was not at real risk of persecution or serious harm on return. Third, that the Bangladeshi authorities would not be aware of the appellant's anti-Awami League activities in the United Kingdom and fourth that the CS or Jamat-e-Islami "does not support the claim of risks to" the appellant. Lastly the Judge was wrong to find that the appellant and his claim lacked credibility in any respect.
18. One important argument advanced before the Judge of the First-tier in support of the appellant's appeal was that in light of the appellant's political views ("which the respondent did not appear to dispute") he was at real risk on return to Bangladesh. Applying **RT (Zimbabwe) and others with the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38**, which held that those who would conceal their political views on return to avoid persecution were entitled to asylum.
19. The Judge dismissed the appellant's appeal making limited adverse credibility findings in paragraph 21-25 and highlighted that there was no evidence that the Bangladeshi authorities had become aware of the appellant's anti-Awami League activities conducted widely in the United Kingdom at paragraph 19. The Judge ultimately found that the appellant's past activities do not raise his profile to be of continuing interest or indeed of any real interest to the Bangladeshi authorities, other than his participation in 2003 and 2009 activities and that Bangladesh is a democratic multi-party state and the appellant would be able to participate in political life and he would have no need to conceal his political opinions.
20. The Tribunal was referred to the country evidence contained within the appellant's bundle filed before the first-tier Tribunal. The Judge received detailed submissions on that material, but it was not considered adequately or at all in the decision. What this country evidence shows is that the situation for political opponents to the Awami League in Bangladesh is dire. The general evidence in this regard was fortified by the evidence adduced by the appellant of those in a similar situation to him who have been persecuted. In light of this evidence, it is submitted, at least to the applicable lower standard of proof, that if the appellant sought to openly criticise the Awami League or to support CS or Jamat-e-Islami in Bangladesh, he would be at

risk of physical violence, arbitrary arrests, fabricated persecutions and discrimination at the hands of the Bangladeshi authorities.

21. Given this country evidence and given the fact that the Judge appears to have accepted as did the respondent that the appellant was a genuine political opponent closely associated with large political opposition groups in Bangladesh and given the uncontested evidence that the appellant would continue vigorous overt political activity in Bangladesh, the Judge had no basis for concluding at paragraph 28 of the decision that the appellant could express himself without well-founded fear of persecution. Indeed, the Judge does not explain how he can reach that conclusion given that it clearly runs against the weight of the country evidence placed before him.
22. At paragraph 26 the Judge refers to the appellant's profile as a result of his past activities. There was and is no evidence that political opponents willing to express their positions views in Bangladesh are only liable to a risk of harm or persecution if they have a particular "profile", let alone what the indicators for a "profile" are.
23. The February 2015 COI enjoins decision makers to consider the particular circumstances a person claiming to be at risk in Bangladesh because of their political views, but there is no sufficient evidential foundation for the view that one's history of political activities has to indicate a particular type of profile before the Bangladeshi state would be interested in a political opponent, and indeed the country evidence adduced by the appellant in this case strongly indicated that this was not a prerequisite for a well-founded fear of persecution for political opinion to arise.
24. The Judge's view that there is nothing to indicate from the Bangladeshi authorities' activities that they have seen anything of the appellant's activities in the United Kingdom misses the point and does not engage with relevant country guidance. The objective information indicated that the Bangladeshi authorities may monitor electronic communication, a matter not engaged with by the Judge and it is not necessary to adduce positive evidence that the Bangladeshi authorities had seen the appellant's activities in the United Kingdom. In any event the appellant's previous political activity in the United Kingdom was primarily relevant because the appellant gave uncontested evidence that he could continue similar activities in Bangladesh and if he were to do so there is a real risk that this would come to the attention of the Bangladeshi State.

25. The Judge's focus on a "profile" based on past activity betrays an error of approach. In **RT**, the decision makes clear that the tribunal's focus should be forward-looking. It should consider whether political expression in the country of return would generate a real risk of persecution on return, which could only be avoided by suppression of genuine political views. Although the judge does address the question and **RT** issues generally his analysis is, with respect, superficial and inadequate for the reasons given.
26. The Judge at paragraph 25 of the decision said that the appellant's political associates and members of the CS and Jamaat-e-Islami do not support the appellant's claim to be at risk. These letters certainly do not suggest that the appellant would not be at risk on return and do tend to support the appellant's claim, as does the fact that those with similar histories and political views to the appellant have been persecuted in Bangladesh and the decision does not engage with this.
27. The Judge has significantly underestimated the dangers of political opponents to the Awami League in Bangladesh, which appears primarily to be the result of inadequate or incomplete assessment of the country guidance evidence placed before the Judge and his belief or assumption that Bangladesh tolerates overt political opposition which is not supported by and in fact runs contrary to the background evidence.
28. In this regard it is noted that there is no relevant country guidance case dealing with the issues which arise in this appeal, and the respondent's country information is dated. However, there was clear and sufficient evidence before the judge which established the appellant's claim to asylum.

Findings on whether there is an error of law

29. I have given anxious scrutiny to the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Davey and have considered the grounds of appeal and the submissions of the parties at the error of law hearing.
30. The main complaint made against the Judge is that he did not engage with the background evidence in respect of risks to political opponents of the Awami League who are currently in power in Bangladesh. It is argued that substantial background evidence was provided to the Judge which was not considered as there is very little mention of it in the decision. The second main complaint against the Judge is that he materially erred when he said that the appellant does not have a particular "profile"

which would put him at risk with the Bangladeshi authorities without stating what the nature of the profile should be. It was also argued that the Judge did not give proper consideration to whether the appellant's political activities in the United Kingdom would have come to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities and put him at risk.

31. The Judge accepted, as did the respondent that the appellant had participated in political activities in Bangladesh and in the United Kingdom. The Judge found that the appellant could return to Bangladesh and continue with his politics as it is a multiparty State and that the appellant would not need to conceal his political opinions and could participate in political life openly in that country, as he had done in the past.
32. The background evidence is that political activity in Bangladesh is fraught with violence from some factions and this is the way politics is done in Bangladesh. This shows that the Judge took into account the background evidence when the Judge found that the Bangladeshi political life is from time to time particularly violent which is just the nature of the way politics is conducted in that country and in this respect, it is hard to distinguish between the student wings of political parties, in terms of their willingness to use extreme actions. The Judge stated that nevertheless it is at its highest a general risk that is faced in Bangladesh and certainly not one particular to the appellant. The Judge found that the appellant does not have a real risk of persecution or serious harm as a result of his past activities in Bangladesh or for his *sur plus* political activities in the United Kingdom.
33. Background evidence states that "almost every major political party has a student wing... The Bangladesh Chattra Dhal (BCD) is affiliated with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Bangladesh Chattra League (BCL) is connected to the ruling Awami League (AL), and the ICS [Islami Chhatra Shibir] is associated with JI. These groups function in connivance with their affiliated parties and when their parties are in government, armed "student" groups become unchallenged perpetrators of human rights abuses, reportedly under the patronage of their party's politicians. The involvement of these armed groups in the political process is one of the major causes of political violence in Bangladesh. Political parties have routinely pledged, but failed, to disarm them. Fighting between rival student wings featured heavily during the political impasse in 2013 between the AL and BNP. Future disputes between the two major parties are very likely to include fighting between student wings."

34. The evidence before the Judge was that the Awami League was currently are in power in Bangladesh and have been since 2009. The appellant was a member of the CS from 2003 onwards rising through the ranks to become president of a sub-branch in 2005 and finance secretary of that organisation until he left the country in 2010 for further studies in the United Kingdom.
35. The Judge after properly evaluating the evidence was entitled to find that the appellant had not provided credible evidence that he was persecuted in Bangladesh before he came to the United Kingdom due to his political activity with the student branch, CS. The appellant's claimed political activities which resulted in the claimed negative political "atmosphere", which is the reason that he left Bangladesh, was that on one occasion had been working towards having a cricket tournament which the Awami League and CL prevented. He also claimed to have been threatened by two CL members who told him to leave Bangladesh in about July 2009. He further claims that he and others were involved in distributing leaflets in support of CS members who involved themselves in a fracas. The appellant claimed that he was not physically ill treated himself, but CL were vigorous in their opposition to CS.
36. The evidence before the Judge was that the appellant was a member of the CS from 2003 onwards rising through the ranks to become president of a sub-branch in 2005 and finance secretary of that organisation until he left the country in 2010 for further studies in the United Kingdom. The Judge found that the appellant managed to participate in political life in Bangladesh for all this time. The Judge found that the appellant did not come to the adverse attention of the authorities for his political activities whilst in Bangladesh which was a conclusion available to him on the evidence.
37. The Judge noted in his decision that the appellant tried to distance himself from his earlier evidence at question 38 of his asylum interview when he had stated, "I personally did not get any threats from the Chatra League, but my other members did". The Judge was entitled not to find the appellant's evidence was inconsistent as to whether he had been threatened in Bangladesh which went to the credibility of his claim that he was threatened.
38. The Judge also noted that appellant confirmed that he has not been arrested or detained and apart from making a reference to the issue in his asylum interview, he relied upon a false claim by way of an FIR or an arrest warrant which he claims had been filed against him. He said that his parents had been told about this from people in his organisation. However, the Judge noted that police never interviewed his parents or made enquiries from them as to the appellant's whereabouts or notified

anyone as to the nature of the allegations. The appellant says he thinks that the police did not attend his home because “others” would have known of his absence from Bangladesh. Therefore, the Judge was entitled to find no purpose would have been served in the police asking about his whereabouts. The Judge was also entitled to find that this explanation does not actually square with the appellant’s claim that the police acting for and at the behest of the Awami League would take no action or make appropriate enquiries about the appellant. He also stated that, nor does it avoid, even if it was a false claim, the matter proceeding on that basis in the appellant’s absence. There is no irrationality in these findings on the evidence.

39. The Judge also relied on the lack of documentation to support the appellant’s claim of police activities investigating the appellant and nothing to show that there is an outstanding warrant for his arrest nor any process through the courts engaged against him. The Judge also said that there is nothing explicitly from the jamaat-e-Islami concerning the appellant’s participation in local politics or in the United Kingdom.
40. I find that the Judge was entitled to find that past persecution in Bangladesh had not been established by the appellant. The Judge stated that the appellant would not be at risk on return because of his past political activities in Bangladesh which is an indicium of future persecution.
41. The Judge found that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by his immigration history. This was that the appellant was granted leave to remain until 30 May 2015. On 30 July 2013 his curtailment was considered but not pursued. On 9 January 2015 his curtailment was considered but not pursued. The appellant was aware therefore that his immigration status was precarious, but he still did not claim asylum but instead made an application on the bases of his family and private life in this country. No credible explanation was given to the Judge for why the appellant did not claim asylum though he knew that the Awami League had come into power. The appellant did not claim asylum until 16 December 2015 after his judicial review application of 7 October 2015 and his appeal to the Upper Tribunal was dismissed on 21 December 2015.
42. The Judge was entitled to find that the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum of almost 5 years went to the appellant’s credibility and to the credibility of his claim that he fears persecution on his return to Bangladesh. The Judge was entitled also to find that if the appellant was in genuine need of International protection he would have claimed asylum much earlier and not waited until all his application to remain

in this country in respect of his private and family life appeals had been dismissed and removal being imminent.

43. The Judge found that the appellant can return to Bangladesh and continue with his political activities as he has done in the past without adverse attention from the authorities. This is a perfectly rational conclusion reached on the evidence that the appellant in fact did participate in politics in Bangladesh for the CS until he came to the United Kingdom.
44. In respect of the appellant's political activities in the United Kingdom, the Judge found that the appellant supports an organisation in the United Kingdom called "Save Bangladesh" which does not exist in Bangladesh. There no error of law material or otherwise in his reasoning, that the appellant who did not attract the attention of the authorities for his political activities with the CS for a long time when in Bangladesh would attract their attention due to his activities with an organisation which is not a political party in the United Kingdom. There is no perversity in this reasoning.
45. The Judge noted that the appellant did not have the "profile" which would bring him to the attention of the authorities. This is consistent with the Country Information Report which states that "membership or support of groups opposed to the current government does not of itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh. Decision makers must assess claims made on the basis of the person's actual or perceived involvement in political opposition to the current government on the facts of the case, taking account of the nature of the applicant's claimed political activity or profile; and; the extent to which they may have come to the adverse attention of the authorities and the reasons for that; the level and nature of actual or perceived political involvement as well as their previous experiences in Bangladesh".
46. The evidence before the Judge of the appellant's political activities in Bangladesh was that on one occasion the appellant organised a cricket match which was stopped by the Awami League. Another activity was that the appellant distributed leaflets for the student body. The Judge concluded that because the appellant had not come to the adverse attention of the authorities while conducting his political activities, the authorities did not consider his involvement to be of particular consequence for it to come to their attention. The Judge was entitled to say that it is now not open for the appellant to say that he will not be able to express his political opinion openly on his return to Bangladesh when he was able to do so before he left Bangladesh.

47. The Judge referred to the background evidence which stated that Bangladeshi is a parliamentary democracy which appears in the US Department of State Report in the country report on Human Rights Practices for 2013. The report stated that “while political affiliation was sometimes a factor in the armed and persecution of members of opposition parties, the government did not persecute individuals solely for political reasons”. Therefore, the Judge did consider the background evidence even if he has not specifically referenced it in his decision.
48. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the appellant will robustly and fearlessly continue with his political activities on his return to Bangladesh and that this would put him at risk and cited the case of. **RT (Zimbabwe)**, which held that those who would conceal their political views on return to avoid persecution were entitled to asylum.
49. In **RT Zimbabwe** the question was put to thus. “Is it an answer to a refugee claim by an individual who has no political views and who therefore does not support the persecutory regime in his home country to say that he would lie and feign loyalty to that regime in order to avoid the persecutory ill-treatment to which he would otherwise be subjected? This is the question of general importance that arises in these appeals which are a sequel to the decision of this court in **HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 596**. In that case, it was held that a gay man was entitled to live freely and openly in accordance with his sexual identity under the Refugee Convention ("the Convention") and it was no answer to the claim for asylum that he would conceal his sexual identity in order to avoid the persecution that would follow if he did not do so.
50. The Convention affords no less protection to the right to express political opinion openly than it does to the right to live openly as a homosexual. The Convention reasons reflect characteristics or statuses which either the individual cannot change or cannot be expected to change because they are so closely linked to his identity or are an expression of fundamental rights. The HJ (Iran) principle applies to any person who has political beliefs and is obliged to conceal them in order to avoid the persecution that he would suffer if he were to reveal them
51. The Judge found that the appellant in this case, had been openly politically active in Bangladesh for a considerable time and had not being obliged to conceal his political opinions and activities and had pursued them robustly and fearlessly. He found that this was without any adverse consequences and the appellant did not flee his country because of adverse attention from the authorities. He came to this country for studies because he did not like the atmosphere in Bangladesh and had said that

he was not able to study. Implicit in the Judge's reasoning was that it is therefore not open for the appellant to now say that he cannot return to Bangladesh to continue political activities when he had conducted them in the past and since 2003.

52. The appellant was last in Bangladesh in 2010 and on his return, he will no longer be a student. Therefore, he will not be part of student rival groups which background evidence states is the major cause of political violence in Bangladesh. The Judge found that there is no case registered against the appellant while he was in the CS as a student and therefore his activities in the past will not bring him to the attention of the authorities because they did not while he was in Bangladesh. The appellant would not have to forfeit a fundamental right that he would be entitled to, to avoid persecution which is to participate in political activity in Bangladesh.
53. The appellant is not expected to be discreet on his return to Bangladesh and is able to continue his political activities as he has done in the past and which it was found by the Judge did not result in any adverse consequences for him and there is no material error of law in that conclusion.
54. I find that the position of the appellant is not analogous to that of a homosexual who is obliged to live a "discreet" life in order to avoid the persecution that he would suffer if he revealed his sexual orientation or that the appellant would have to hide his political opinion or indeed pledge allegiance to a party he does not belong to.
55. The Judge found that the appellant will not be persecuted purely on the ground that he belongs to the CS as that in itself will not bring the appellant to the adverse attention of the authorities the same way it had not done so in the past. The Judge found that culture of politics in Bangladesh is inevitably one of violence and therefore everyone participates in politics can be at risk and it is not a threat particular to the appellant. In other words, the appellant has not been targeted in the past in Bangladesh due to his politics and political views. There is no perversity to this conclusion.
56. The background information is that membership or support of groups opposed to the government does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh. The appellant who openly opposed the Awami League and was the CS financial secretary did in fact openly expresses views for his party and it was found by the Judge that he suffered no adverse consequences due to his political views and conduct other than the usual student group rivalries.

57. I find it is an error not to consider the background information. I accept that the Judge did not reference all the background evidence provided by the appellant in his decision but that is not to say he did not consider the background evidence. The Judge does not need to reference every piece of evidence that he has considered. I have considered the decision in the round against the background evidence and find that there is no material error in the Judge's conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk on his return to Bangladesh either due to his activities in Bangladesh or his activities in the United Kingdom. I find that there is no material error of law in the decision and I understand the reasoning and the conclusions that the Judge reached based on the evidence before him.

58. I therefore find that although there is no material error in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge and a differently constituted Tribunal would not come to a different conclusion on consideration of all the evidence in this appeal.

59. I conclude that there is no material error in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and the decision stands.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed

Signed by
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

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Ms S Chana

Dated this 25th day of November 2017