United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI- 2024-003058
	First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52852/2023 LP/02670/2024

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12 March 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

 

Between

 

PT

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr T. Wilding, Counsel instructed by Waterstone Legal

For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Field House on 13 January 2025

 

Order Regarding Anonymity

 

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

 

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court .

DECISION AND REASONS

 

1.             By way of a decision dated 18 November 2025 I found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in which the appellant's protection claim was dismissed. I set the decision aside, preserving certain facts and directed the re-making of the decision to take place in the Upper Tribunal. It was that hearing which took place on 13 January 2025.

2.             In this part of the appeal, I am concerned with whether or not there is any basis to conclude, in law, that what has happened to the appellant in the past when combined with her present circumstances means she qualifies for international protection in the United Kingdom either as a refugee or otherwise. If not, is another reason she should be permitted to remain in the United Kingdom, for example, the situation she and her children would encounter if removed to Albania or the impact of leaving the life they have developed here? I set out below the legal frameworks which govern those decisions.

Background

3.             The appellant is a citizen of Albania, originally from a village in Lezhe in the north of Albania. She met and started a relationship with an Albanian national in 2002. She joined him in Greece after about a year and moved to Italy in 2006 where they obtained lawful status. They have two children, the eldest of which was born in Lezhe in 2005 [HB218]. The appellant's case is that she had returned there from Greece to give birth as they had no medical care in Greece as they were unregistered. Their daughter was born in 2008 in Italy. The children are now aged 19 and 16 years old. They are Albanian nationals but mainly grew up in Italy and their first language is Italian. They only returned to Albania for eighteen months from June 2009. Throughout the marriage, the appellant was subjected to serious domestic abuse at the hands of her ex-husband including physical attacks and rape. In 2019 the appellant and the children came to the United Kingdom on a visit visa. The appellant claimed asylum in August 2019. However, in 2020 she returned to Italy following threats from her husband that he would harm her brother and his children. She withdrew her asylum claim. The violence continued and they eventually divorced in 2021. The appellant remained in Italy with the children, albeit separately from her ex-husband. However, in February 2022 her ex-husband traced her and attacked her in the street despite her having blocked him on all social networks and taken steps to avoid him. He forced her from the car and beat her, resulting in her requiring hospital treatment. Following this incident, the appellant decided to leave Italy and return to the UK. Before so doing, she had to return to Albania with her son to get him a passport. Thereafter they fled to the UK travelling through Spain and Bulgaria, arriving here on 16 March 2022.

4.             The appellant made another claim for asylum on. 21 April 2022 on the basis that if she returned to Albania, her husband would find her and subject her to serious harm. Her claim was refused on 2 May 2023 and dismissed on appeal on 27 May 2024. Having set aside the decision, I preserved the findings relating to the above unchallenged history and the finding at [33] of the First-tier decision that the appellant has a genuine, subjective fear of her ex-husband.

5.             At the hearing, I had the benefit of a 288 page hearing bundle ("HB"). I heard evidence from the appellant with the benefit of an Albanian speaking interpreter. I also heard evidence from the appellant's sister in English and a friend of the appellant. I heard submissions from both parties. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

 

Legal Framework

 

6.             To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason; considering the credibility of the account, that the appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason; that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; that there would not be sufficient protection available; and that the appellant could not internally relocate.

 

7.             In the alternative, the appellant must show substantial grounds for believing she would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in Albania. The burden of proof rests on the appellant.

 

8.             As for her appeal on Article 8 grounds, the 5-stage approach set out in Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27 is to be followed. It is for the appellant to establish that she has an Article 8 family and/or private life and that the respondent's decision risks interfering with it such that Article 8 is potentially engaged. It is then for the respondent to show that the decision is necessary and proportionate to one of the legitimate aims. At this stage I am to consider the provisions of section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and I must treat the best interests of the appellant's minor child as a primary consideration.

 

9.             The appellant relies on paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules which provides for leave to remain to be granted if there are 'very significant obstacles' to reintegration into the country of origin. That was discussed in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 in which Sales LJ said at [14] [1] of 'integration':

 

"It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life."

 

10.         In  NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, Whipple LJ summarised the relevant principles at [25]:

 

"25.  It is not in doubt, based on these authorities, that (i) the decision-maker (or tribunal on appeal) must reach a broad evaluative judgment on the paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) question (see  Kamara at [14]), (ii) that judgment must focus on the obstacles to integration and their significance to the appellant (see  Parveen at [9]) and (iii) the test is not subjective, in the sense of being limited to the appellant's own perception of the obstacles to reintegration, but extends to all aspects of the appellant's likely situation on return including objective evidence, and requires consideration of any reasonable step that could be taken to avoid or mitigate the obstacles (see  Lal at [36]-[37])."

 

11.         To these principles, Whipple LJ added at [26]:

 

" The test posed by paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) is a practical one. Regard must be had to the likely consequences of the obstacles to reintegration which are identified. In a case like this, where the only obstacle identified is the appellant's genuine but unfounded fear, particular care must be taken to assess the ways in which and the extent to which that subjective fear will or might impede re-integration. It cannot simply be assumed that it will. The likely reality for the appellant on resuming her life in her home country must be considered, given her subjective fear, and the availability of support and any other mitigation must be weighed. It is against that background that the judgment on whether the obstacles to reintegration will be very significant must be reached."

 

12.         In  NC the Court of Appeal held that the First-tier Tribunal's focus should have been on the likely reality of the appellant's daily life if returned and, if it thought there were likely to be significant obstacles to reintegration, it should have considered whether there were any steps NC could reasonably take to avoid or mitigate such problems, for example, by seeking help from family members and that it was not sufficient to conclude that the "very significant obstacles" test was met solely on the basis of NC's subjective fear of violent revenge A broad evaluative judgment applying an objective approach which took into account all relevant evidence, including family connections and, in that case, state protection was required [27] - [28].

 

13.         It is for the appellant to establish on the balance of probabilities claims that she meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules. If she is able to do so, assuming Article 8 is engaged, that ability is likely to be determinative of the appeal on human rights grounds ( TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 applies). If not, it is likely only to be if the respondent's decision leads to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant and/or her children that the decision could be said to be disproportionate to the need for effective immigration control.

Country Guidance

14.         The decision in DM (Sufficiency of protection, PSG, Women, Domestic violence) Albania [2004] UKIAT 59 remains valid country guidance on the situation facing female victims of domestic violence on return to Albania. I refer to it in more detail below. Of course, that decision is now of some considerable age and there has been a wealth of updating information since then. To some extent, both parties rely on the evidence contained within various of the respondent's Country Policy and Information Notes ("CPINs") on Albania. I shall refer to those as applicable when I discuss the evidence and issues in more detail below.

Discussion of the Evidence

15.         I remind myself that much of what the appellant has said is unchallenged. The previous judge found her credible [31] and there was no express challenge to her credibility or that of her sister at the hearing before me. The unchallenged background facts are summarised above. They reveal certain key points, in particular that the appellant has not lived in Albania since 2002/2003, a period now of over 20 years save for 18 months in 2009 and a short period to get her son a passport.

 

16.         As I said at [27] of the error of law decision, in the event of the appellant's ex-husband locating her, it would most likely be perverse to find that he would have no interest in her given his past conduct. I am more than satisfied that if he did so, he would behave towards the appellant as he had in the past and she would therefore face a risk of suffering serious harm at his hand. The finding that she subjectively fears him is preserved and, in the circumstances, entirely understandable. Nothing I say below undermines that but, of course, I am bound by the available evidence and applicable legal framework governing my decision.

 

17.         The updating evidence at the hearing before me is that the appellant has still not had any contact with her ex-husband since 2022 and she is unaware of his whereabouts. To her last knowledge, he was in Italy but that was in 2022. Otherwise, the appellant has not provided any updating evidence about her ex-husband's ability to trace her in Albania. There is no evidence before me that he is aware of her current whereabouts. Although I take on board that her ex-husband located her in Italy in 2022 (after they divorced), it is not proposed that the appellant return to Italy and I am considering risk on return to Albania. I was not taken to any evidence of her ex-husband's contacts or connections in Albania to give rise to a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would become aware of her return to Albania and then be able to locate her there. Put simply, notwithstanding the appellant's subjective fear, the totality of the evidence before me is not sufficient to satisfy me, even to the lower standard, that if the appellant returned to Albania, her ex-husband would become aware of this and would be able to trace her.

 

18.         The appellant's case had always been that she was disowned by her parents who remain in the village in Lezhe, North Albania. This was evident from the appellant's first witness statement, submitted to the respondent when she claimed asylum [HB224], in which the appellant set out at [14] an incident of abuse on 3 April 2012 and she said "I called my parents asking for help however my parents threatened me and told me that I had brought shame in the family and I would be responsible for their actions if I return to Albania any time". The appellant went on to explain that was the reason she returned to her ex-husband. In her appeal witness statement [HB113] and the updating statement, the appellant said at [7] that she was unable to provide evidence of the threats from her family because she does not have any connection with Albania and no friends or family left. She explained that she is "terrified to set foot, let alone obtain anything from any authorities who fail to protect me as a woman". The appellant continued at [10] to say "I have been disowned and I have no support". At [11] of her updating statement she said she fears if something happened to her in Albania the children would have no one to whom they could turn.

 

19.         In oral evidence before me the appellant said she last spoke to her parents in 2019 when she informed them that she had separated from her parents to which they responded that she had bought shame on them. Mr Tufan noted that this differed from her account in the witness statement which put the last contact as 2012 but he did not take the matter further and did not invite me to find the appellant's account about this to lack credibility.

 

20.         The thrust of Mr Tufan's submissions were that, as the appellant was of no interest to her parents, she was not at risk of being located by them if she relocated within Albania. Mr Wilding confirmed that the appellant's case was not that she was at risk from her parents, but that she could not rely on their support on return which was relevant to both her risk on return, but also the reasonableness of relocation and whether or not there were very significant obstacles to her reintegration.

 

21.         In the circumstances, I am satisfied the appellant's parents disowned her following her entering into a relationship with her ex-husband and she cannot rely on their support if returned to Albania but not that she is at risk of harm from them.

 

22.         As far as her life here is concerned, the appellant and the children live with and are financially supported by her sister (who has her own family of a husband and children). The appellant's children are now aged 16 and 19 years old. In her oral evidence, the appellant's sister said the impact of the support she provides in the UK is limited when the appellant lives in the house and she is cooking food anyway for her own children. However, it would be different if she had to support the appellant and children in another country. It would be more expensive and she could not afford it.

 

23.         Mr Tufan's submissions were that the appellant's eldest child is now an adult in good health and there was no reason he could not work in Albania and support the appellant if required. He submitted that, as some Albania was spoken at home, the appellant's son must speak some Albanian (contrary to the appellant's evidence). The appellant confirmed that the children spoke a little Albanian when they returned in 2009 although of course at that stage they were only about 4 and 1 years old respectively. The appellant's sister's evidence was that although her husband is Albanian they mainly speak English at home as her children were born in the UK. She speaks Albanian when she speaks on the phone to her parents as they do not speak English and for that reason, her children cannot easily speak to them.

 

24.         The appellant's evidence was that her son could not support her in Albania due to the fear they all have there of her ex-husband. I remind myself of the findings of the previous judge that some of the violence took place in the presence of the children, in particular the 2022 attack which was in her son's presence [HB227].

 

25.         This is not a family who have spent much time at all in Albania, despite being Albanian citizens. The children spent most of their lives in Italy and I am satisfied that is their first language. The children have clearly learnt English and are exposed to some Albanian at home. However, I am satisfied that, at the date of the hearing before me, they are unlikely to be fluent Albanian speakers and they have only got experience of life in Albania when they were both very young so are unlikely to be familiar with life there. I am further satisfied that, in the context of their young lives being characterised by domestic violence inflicted on their mother and her subjective fear, that they will have at least some apprehension about relocating to Albania, particularly as they have not lived there save for a short period when they were very young.

 

26.         The appellant's son is now a young adult. The country information as contained within the respondent's CPINs are relatively consistent that Albania remains a patriarchal society, particularly in the rural areas, but even to some extent the cities. In the same way that the appellant's son has been able to adapt to life in the UK, learn the language and receive an education, there is no reason to think (and certainly no evidence to support a finding) that he will be unable to build on his basic level of exposure to the Albanian language and pick it up, obtain some form of employment in Albania and contribute to the family finances notwithstanding his apprehension about returning.

 

27.         I accept the general premise that supporting a family living in one's home is easier and less of a burden than sending money to them to support them abroad. To that extent, I am satisfied that the support the appellant's sister would be able to provide to the appellant on relocation to Albania, both in terms of financial and practical support is more limited than it would be here. The same goes for emotional support as remote emotional support is not the same as face to face support. I find that particularly so when the appellant is returning to a place in which she has a subjective fear.

 

28.         I turn next to the appellant's mental health. As Mr Wilding acknowledged at the hearing, the appellant had not supplied updating medical notes. The unchallenged findings of the judge in the First-tier Tribunal at [41] were that when she was assessed for Talking Therapies in May 2023 the appellant suffered with moderately severe depression and moderate generalised anxiety. There was some reference to an attempt to end her life. As of 4 October 2023 the appellant was on a waiting list for further talking therapy. The GP notes printed on 12 May 2023 says "no current medication". There is no update beyond this. Mr Wilding submitted that her notes should be considered alongside the finding about her subjective fear and the appellant's presentation at the hearing when being asked about the possibility of returning to Albania. He submitted they all point to her genuine fear of being found by her ex-husband after such a long period of abuse in circumstances where she has never been protected by the authorities.

 

29.         I have no doubt that the appellant continues to have a subjective fear of her husband. Whilst there is no updating medical evidence, I am satisfied that in 2023 she presented with the mental health conditions described above which warranted therapy even though medication was not prescribed. There was no suggestion before me today that therapy is not available in Albania although the appellant's evidence in her updating witness statement is that she would not access it for fear of being locked up and her children being left alone. Nothing was said of this in submissions and I was not invited to consider the appeal on Article 3 medical grounds. Given the content of the GP notes (for example 22 March 2023) I am satisfied there is an intrinsic link between her anxiety and her past experiences. I cannot take it any further than that on the evidence available to me.

 

Conclusions on Protection Grounds

 

30.         In the country guidance case of DM, the Upper Tribunal held that being a women victim of domestic violence is not sufficient to amount to membership of a particular social group ("PSG").

 

31.         Nevertheless, the First-tier judge decided, applying DH (Particular Social Group: Mental health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC) and EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) (CG) [2022] UKUT 335 [93] that a disjunctive approach to the definition of PSG was to be utilised, that the appellant did fall within a PSG, so her claim was for a Convention reason. This finding was not challenged within this appeal but neither did I expressly preserve it. It was not the subject of submissions at the hearing before me.

 

32.         For the reasons I turn to shortly, it is immaterial in any event. However, I do not seek to depart from the finding of the First-tier based on the current caselaw on PSGs and as, in the Country Policy and Information Note: Domestic Violence Against Women, Albania, December 2022 ("the DV CPIN") the respondent accepts that the first limb of the test is met.

 

33.         Applying my findings at [17] above, I do not find the appellant's ex-husband reasonably likely to locate her in Albania, so it follows that I am not satisfied her subjective fears are well-founded and the appellant is not a refugee.

 

34.         Even if I am wrong about that and the appellant's fears of being located and persecuted by her ex-husband are made out, I find there is sufficient protection for the appellant in Albania. I say that for the following reasons.

 

35.         In DM, the Upper Tribunal found there to be sufficient protection. That is still the extant country guidance. The updating evidence as contained within the DV CPIN satisfies me that since DM was decided, the position for female victims of domestic violence in Albania has improved. By way of illustration, the country evidence contained within section [3.2] and section [6] address the relevant factors. Section [3.2] sets out the legal framework for the detection, prosecution of perpetrators of domestic violence and the protection of their victims. Section [6] deals with the available protection from state and non-state actors. Section [6.1] in particular addresses the state's attitude towards protection and notably at [6.1.9], when concerns were raised with the provision of financial assistance to victims by HRDC the issue was addressed and improved. One of the primary tools for protecting and supporting survivors of domestic violent, the "referral mechanism" is discussed at [6.2] and appears to be a multi-agency response to violence against women. Whilst not without some shortfalls it is present in all municipalities. Added to this is the evidence that the Government of Albania actively encourages reporting of domestic violence [6.3.1], has further trained the police on their obligations to deal with reports of domestic violence including the use of protective orders [6.4.1]; the improvement in statistics for the police response, the effective use of protective orders [6.4.7] and the prosecution of perpetrators [6.5.1/6.5.6].

36.         As to the provision of services for the victims of domestic violence including both government and NGO run shelters, there appears to be better provision in the cities, including Tirana rather than rural areas (including the north of Albania) [7.1.2] and [7.2.1].

37.         Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence shows that the government has taken reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of such acts notwithstanding some reports of shortfalls in that provision. As to whether or not the appellant is able to access that protection, Mr Wilding' submissions did not address that specifically save reference to the appellant's own evidence that, in Italy, the authorities did not protect her. In her witness statement the appellant relied on anecdotal evidence of the scale of domestic abuse in Albania including where people are on protective orders. Of course, as Mr Wilding no doubt appreciates, the state cannot be expected to protect all potential victims of domestic violence from ever suffering harm from their perpetrators. That is not the test I have to apply. As mentioned above, his submissions focused more so on internal relocation rather than arguing a lack of sufficient protection. Looking at all the evidence in the round, I am satisfied it supports a finding that there is sufficient protection for the appellant to the Horvath standard [2] in Albania. In light of my findings as to the lack of evidence of any reach the appellant's ex-husband has in Albania (see [17] above), I do not find that protection to be unavailable to the appellant. It follows that in the alternative scenario, even if the appellant is at risk of persecution on return to Albania, there is sufficient protection for her there so she does not qualify as a refugee.

38.         In these circumstances, I need not go on to consider whether or not there is a reasonable internal relocation option for the appellant.

 

Conclusions on the Article 8 claim

 

39.         I will deal first with whether or not the appellant is able to satisfy me that she meets the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Rules. To that end, I return to the legal framework set out in some detail above.

 

40.         The respondent's position has always been that the appellant and her children can return to Tirana where, as a single female with children, she will be better able to live, work and integrate.

41.         Mr Wilding relied on a former iteration of the Human Trafficking CPIN. The current version is dated July 2024 whereas Mr Wilding also relied on a section in the now archived March 2024 version, particularly [14.2] on "single women and single mothers". He submitted that the section was excluded from the July 2024 version with no explanation or obvious reasoning. In particular he relied on the evidence from a 2019 study by Ramaj which noted at [14.2.1] the absolute importance of family support to the efficacy of reintegration, particularly when a woman leaves a shelter. The support of family encompasses emotional, practical and economic support. The rest of the evidence referred to in [14.2] including from the Home Office Fact Finding Mission of 2022 ("the 2022 FFM") supports the importance of family support for reintegration and the difficulties faced by single women and single women without it.

42.         Whilst this section may not be entirely replicated in the July 2024 Trafficking CPIN, reliance on the 2022 FFM remains therein and much the same evidence is set out at [13.2] of the July 2024 Trafficking CPIN. There is also support for the difficulties for divorced women and single mothers in the DV CPIN (see section [8.1]) and the extent of stigma [8.1.1]-[8.1.2] and particularly so in rural areas [8.1.6]-[8.1.8].

43.         In her home area, I am satisfied that the totality of information available about the situation in the north of Albania, the patriarchal and conservative societal norms and the absence of family support from her parents, would make it particularly hard for the appellant even with support I have found her son and sister could provide (see [26]-[27] above).

44.         If the appellant relocated to Tirana, as the respondent suggests, I am satisfied the situation is different to the extent that, as an urban centre, which accommodates many women who have relocated from the north or other rural areas (see for example [8.1.8] of the DV CPIN and [13.2.1] of the 2024 Trafficking CPIN), and given the presence of the university, it is more common to find women living without a male partner or with their family.

45.         However, I am satisfied that the totality of the country background information as summarised at [41] above is such that, throughout Albania, even within the urban centres, the ability to integrate is harder for women lacking family support.

46.         I return to my findings at [26] above in relation to the appellant's son. Any employment he is able to obtain could supplement economic assistance to which the appellant would be entitled as the victim of domestic violence and/or as single mother (see [7.9.1] and [7.9.4] of the DV CPIN). As for the provision of housing for victims of domestic violence and/or single mothers, the evidence appears mixed. Whilst some provision appears to exist the ability to pay rent is compromised if they are the only source of family income although there also appears to be some NGO assistance with housing on an emergency and long term basis (see [7.10] of the DV CPIN) as well, of course, as the provision of shelters if required albeit this is likely to be a short-term solution. Given the appellant's fears, it appears unlikely she will return to Albania voluntarily but I note if she were to do so, she would have access to £2,000 per family member to assist with reintegration (see refusal letter).

47.         Drawing the various strands together, I find that the following factors amount to obstacles to the appellant's re-integration into Albania.

 

a) her length of absence since 2002 (a period now of 23 years) save an 18 month period in 2009 and 2 shorter returns, one when her son was born and one in 2022 before she fled Italy for good. The is about the same length of time for which she lived in Albania before she fled although for most of that period, she was a child in the care of her parents. She has very little experience of living in Albania as an adult;

b) her subjective fear of her husband which is likely to impact on her forging relationships for fear of the word of mouth culture in Albania may reveal her return to Albania;

c) the fact her children have barely lived there and are unlikely to have much memory of it;

d) her lack of family support in Albania (in terms of family who live there and are familiar with the culture) and where the background evidence reveals the importance of family connections;

e) the stigma the appellant will face for being a single mother which is likely to operate as a barrier to the appellant forging relationships;

f) the appellant's mental health conditions which are inherently linked to her past experiences and her subjective fears.

48.         I find all these factors ones which will make it harder for the appellant to make connections in Albania, including connections to obtain employment and social connections and relationships.

 

49.         I have set out at [46] above those factors which can mitigate the obstacles the appellant will face on return. To that I add the provision of mental health services in Albania and the sufficiency of protection for her there.

 

50.         Taking all of those factors into consideration, I am satisfied that the combination of obstacles together are capable of amounting to 'very significant obstacles' to her reintegrating in a Kamara sense and, the steps available to her to mitigate those obstacles are not sufficient to lower that risk to an acceptable level.

 

51.         It follows that I find the appellant able to meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(Vi) of the Rules.

 

52.         Returning to the framework set out at [8] and [13] above, I find the appellant has a family life here with her children and a private life in the UK characterised by her residence thus far, her relationship with her sister and her sister's family. I am satisfied that to remove her from her life here has consequences of such gravity that Article 8 is engaged. Given that the appellant is able to meet the requirements of the Rules, that is determinative of the appeal on Article 8 grounds as the public interest does not require her removal in those circumstances ( TZ (Pakistan) applies).

 

Notice of Decision

 

The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.

 

 

 

SJ Rastogi

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

4 March 2025