United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2024-003419
	First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01629/2023

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On the 24 March 2025

 

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JOSHI

 

Between

 

'RM' (Iraq)

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: The appellant represented himself.

For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

 

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 3 February 2025

 

 

Order Regarding Anonymity

 

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The reason for this order is that the appellant's claim had included a protection claim.

DECISION AND REASONS (REISSUED UNDER RULE 42 OF THE TRIBUNAL PROCEDURE (UPPER TRIBUNAL) RULES 2008, WITH ADDITIOAL PARAGRAPH 11)

 

1.               These written reasons reflect the full oral decision which was given to the appellant at the end of the hearing. The appellant appeals against the decision of Judge Thapar of the First-tier Tribunal, (the 'Judge'), who, in a decision dated 5 ^th June 2024, dismissed the appellant's human rights and protection claims. Broadly speaking, the appellant, an Iraqi citizen of Kurdish ethnic origin, claimed to have suffered adverse interest from the Popular Mobilisation Forces or 'PMF' of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ('KRI'). The Judge rejected the appellant's claim in its entirety and went on to consider the appellant's ability to redocument and return to the KRI. The Judge noted at §18 that the appellant had been issued with an INID (identity card) in Iraq. The Judge did not accept as credible the appellant's claim to no longer have his INID (§20). Central to this appeal, the Judge stated:

"Based on the evidence before me, I find the Appellant has failed to establish, to the lower standard, that he does not have his relevant identification documents or that he cannot be redocumented."

The appellant's appeal

2.               The appellant sought permission to appeal, which was initially refused by the First-tier Tribunal, but on renewal, permission was granted. The renewed application contained a series of general propositions, as follows:

"The First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) reviewed an immigration judge's decision.

• The appellant argues the judge made errors by not considering alternative explanations for inconsistencies in their story (e.g., cultural differences, trauma).

• The appellant also claimed the judge didn't consider medical evidence, witness testimony, and background country evidence.

FtT's Response:

• The FTT disagrees with the appellant and believed the judge:

o Considered explanations for inconsistencies (e.g., interpreter used).

o Took into account the appellant's lack of education and health.

o Addressed the medical evidence (referenced GP records and considered under 'very significant obstacles').

o Didn't need to mention every piece of evidence in the judgment (doesn't mean it wasn't considered).

The appellant respectfully argues that the First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) erred in law by failing to consider the following points:

• Overlooked Iraqi Policies: The judge neglected to consider relevant Iraqi policies that directly impact the appellant's ability to obtain essential documents. These policies are crucial to understanding the difficulties he faces and the subsequent risks associated with lacking such documentation.

• Unrealistic Assumptions: The judge made unrealistic assumptions regarding the ease of acquiring Iraqi documents. The appellant never received the opportunity to explain the complexities of this process in his situation.

• Smooth Reintegration: The judge incorrectly assumed the appellant's language skills and past work experience guarantee a smooth reintegration. These factors alone do not paint a complete picture.

• Persecution Risk Misassessment: The judge misjudged the persecution risk by relying on the presence of the appellant's family and the supposed safety of the area. This assessment fails to consider the crucial fact that the appellant has no knowledge of his family's whereabouts.

• Ignored Evidence and Guidelines: The judge disregarded Home Office guidelines on the potential dangers of returning to Iraq, as well as evidence highlighting violence, detentions, and torture. By failing to address these points, the appellant argues, the original decision contains legal errors and requires a thorough reassessment".

3.               The Upper Tribunal Judge granting permission did not limit the scope of his grant, but made clear in his reasons that the only arguable point related to the Judge's assessment of the appellant's ability to redocument, referred to in the passage at §20 above.

The hearing before us

4.               The appellant attended in person and had the benefit of an interpreter in Kurdish Sorani. He explained to us that he had mental health difficulties and on occasion had suicidal ideations as well as a heart problem. We canvassed with him whether he wished to proceed and was able to do so and the likelihood of his being able to have representation in the future. He indicated that there was no likelihood of obtaining representation in the future and that he was able to proceed and wished to proceed today. He confirmed that although sent from an email account in his name, the Upper Tribunal appeal form (IAUT-1) had in fact been completed by the same firm of solicitors who had completed the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and sent by them. We have significant concerns about professional representatives who complete and send such appeals but do not do so in their own names, when as was clear to us, the appellant's knowledge of the grounds of appeal was relatively limited. As a consequence and without criticism of him, it was necessary for us to go through each of the grounds in detail, and refer him to the relevant passages of the judgment and to allow him to respond. This was necessary to give him the opportunity of participating fairly in these proceedings.

5.               We return to the gist of his arguments before us. These were that the Judge had ignored evidence that he had provided of difficulties in redocumenting where the Iraqi Embassy in London had declined to issue him with new documents, which he says the Judge had ignored. He also says that his account of persecution was credible and that the Judge had erred in not believing him because no one of his age would have fled Iraq aged between 60 and 70. He would be returning to certain ill-treatment or even worse. When we canvassed with him the Judge's reasons that she did not believe him that he had lost his original identification document, he reiterated that he had lost that document. His response to the Judge not believing his account of persecution in Iraq was also to reiterate his claim.

The Secretary of State's position

6.               On behalf of the Secretary of State, Mrs Arif says two things. First, the Judge had expressly referred to having considered all of the relevant evidence and as per the authority of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 this Tribunal should assume that the evidence has been considered unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary (para 2(ii)). The real challenge in this case was the Judge's assessment of the appellant's credibility which the Judge had unarguably explained in detail at §§15 and 16 and which we do not repeat. Second, the Judge had made clear her findings as to why she did not believe that the appellant had lost his documentation, so that her analysis of redocumentation was not material.

Discussion and conclusions

7.               We have sympathy with the appellant for whom the grounds appear to have been drafted and sent on his behalf by undisclosed lawyers and he is then left to pursue them without further legal representation. He has referred us to his ill-health, as an additional factor to be considered in deciding whether the Judge had erred in law and also that the Judge ought not to have disbelieved him. However, neither begins to disclose any error of law by the Judge, which is the sole issue for us. The Judge had unarguably explained and was entitled to conclude that she did not accept the appellant's credibility. That extended not only to the risk of adverse attention in Iraq but also her specific finding that the appellant had not lost his original identification document. However strongly the appellant may feel about the assessment of that credibility, in essence this part of his ground amounts to a disagreement with, rather than disclosing any error of law in, that judgment.

8.               We turn to the second strand of the analysis which is in relation to redocumentation. Whilst it may be said that there was an arguable error in the Judge's analysis on the ability to redocument, where it is currently necessary to do so in person as per the leading authority of SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG) [2022] UKUT 110, headnote (12), that arguable error is not material. The reason that it is not material is that the Judge made clear findings that the appellant does not need to redocument, because he already has his original documentation. There is no legitimate challenge to that, other than to disagree with the Judge's assessment on credibility.

9.               In the circumstances we are satisfied that the appellant's appeal discloses no error of law, such that the Judge's decision is not safe.

Notice of decision

10.           The appellant's appeal against the Judge's decision fails and is dismissed. The Judge's decision stands.

11.           The appellant's former solicitors have since written to this Tribunal, disputing that they acted for the appellant in filing and serving his IAUT1. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal has not made any finding that it was the specific former solicitors who acted on an undisclosed basis for the appellant. While he has made a number of allegations about who did so, it is not necessary for us to determine this issue in reaching our decision.

 

 

J Keith

 

Judge J Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

5 ^th February 2025

Reissued on 21 ^st March 2025