United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2024-003839 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01209/2023

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19 February 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

 

Between

 

MR

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

Secretary of State for the Home Department Respondent

Representation:

 

For the Appellant: Ms Patel

For the Respondent: Ms Blackburn, Senior Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 1 November 2024

 

 

DECISION AND REASONS

 

1.       The appellant is a male citizen of Pakistan born on 21 September 1993. He entered the United Kingdom as a student in 2012. He last entered the United Kingdom on 15 October 2020 using his own passport and a visitor visa valid until 27 March 2021. He claimed asylum on 3 April 2021 and his claim was refused ed by the Secretary of State by a decision dated 17 August 2023. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal which, by a decision promulgated on 16 July 2024, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

2.       The basis of the appellant's claim for international protection and his appeal are set out in detail in the First-tier Tribunal's decision. In short, the appellant claims that, because he left the Pakistan Air Force without his resignation being accepted, he was charged with desertion.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

3.       The First-tier Tribunal has helpfully summarised the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal in the grant of permission:

... Ground 1 asserts that the Judge s decision is vitiated by procedural unfairness on account of the Judge either going behind a fact that was agreed by the parties or taking a new material credibility point without giving notice of the point to the Appellant. Ground 2 asserts that the Judge either made a mistake of fact or failed to take account of material matters when taking a credibility point against the Appellant. Ground 3 asserts that the Judge failed to apply the correct standard of proof when assessing the credibility of aspects of the Appellant s evidence. Ground 4 asserts that the Judge failed to apply authorities on the dangers of the indicator of inherent probability when assessing credibility. Ground 5 asserts that the Judge erred in law by requiring corroboration of aspects of the Appellant s evidence in order to find him credible.

Ground 1

4.       At [18], the judge wrote: 'it would appear that the identity document at page 239 ... assigns the role of security officer to the Appellant as the stamp over it is the name of someone else described at the base security officer which leads me to doubt the Appellant s role in the Pakistan Air Force. In my judgement, the document cannot be relied upon.'

5.       Ms Patel submitted that the judge had, subsequent to the First-tier Tribunal hearing, gone behind a fact accepted by both parties, namely that the appellant had worked for the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) and thereby had perpetrated a procedural unfairness denying the appellant an opportunity to respond. Ms Blackburn relied on the Rule 24 response of the Secretary of State. The judge's observation added nothing to the analysis as he had proceeded on the agreed basis that the appellant had worked for the Pakistan Air Force. Had the judge gone behind that agreed fact, may have been unfair but the judge's observation was not material to the outcome of the appeal.

6.       I agree with Ms Blackburn. The judge accepted that the appellant 'worked for the Pakistan Air Force' to use the words of the Secretary of State' refusal letter at [201]. The judge never went behind that agreed fact. Instead, the judge doubted the appellant's claim that he had been a security officer in the PAF. That doubt did not materially influence the judge's analysis beyond raising general doubts as to the appellant's credibility, which, for a number of entirely cogent reasons, the judge proceeded to find unreliable. I find that the judge did not act unfairly towards the appellant as alleged or at all.

Ground 2

7.       At [15] the judge wrote:

The Appellant said that his problems in Pakistan began in December 2020 and that when he arrived in the United Kingdom on 15 October 2020, he had no intention of returning to Pakistan. This is contrary to the undertaking he would give by his acceptance of a visitor visa to enter the United Kingdom for a limited time. In addition, his whole account is based on events that unfolded after he arrived in the United Kingdom, being in December 2020, when his alleged desertion charges were brought to his attention and when he came to the adverse attention of the police in the United Kingdom. There is no apparent reason for him to have formed his intention not to return to Pakistan at the time he arrived in the United Kingdom.

8.       The appellant says that 'his initial decision to remain in the United Kingdom was not prompted by the accusations of desertion that were later made against him, but rather by his efforts to enlist in the Royal Air Force.' The Rule 24 response states: 'The FTTJ is correct in stating the A arrived in the UK on 15 October 2020, and it was only after he was in the UK that claimed that he was informed his resignation had not been accepted and charges were brought to his attention [15]. Yet simultaneously the A was claiming to have had no intention to return to Pakistan before he arrived in the UK, but his visit visa application stated an intention to return to Pakistan, and it was only the events that unfolded after he arrived forced him to remain in the UK only.'

9.       Ground 2 reveals no error in the judge's decision. The appellant has not resolved the inherent contradiction in his claim that he (i) wanted to join the RAF and yet (ii) intended to return to the Pakistan at the expiry of his visit visa. The judge's observations are wholly valid.

Ground 3

10.   Ground 3 is without merit. The judge uses the word 'unlikely' at [22]. The appellant claims that the judge has not applied the correct standard of proof ('reasonable likelihood'). The judge has (i) stated the correct standard of proof at [13] and (ii) applied the correct standard of proof when finding that the appellant would not, so soon after he joined the PAF, have had access to confidential information.

Ground 4

11.   Ground 4 is without merit. The judge's credibility findings were not solely based on notions of inherent plausibility. The judge has made numerous detailed findings on the appellant's evidence and has given cogent reasons for finding that the appellant's account incredible.

Ground 5

12.   Ground 5 is without merit. Contrary to what is asserted in the grounds, the judge has not required the appellant to corroborate his account. Instead, at [26] et seq, the judge has noted the failure of the appellant to provide evidence about his uncle which he could easily have obtained from within the United Kingdom.

13.   In the light of what I say above, I find that the First-tier Tribunal has not erred in law such that its decision falls to be set aside. The appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

C. N. Lane

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

Dated: 2 February 2025