United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2024-005168
	First-tier Tribunal No: EU/50898/2023

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

 

18 ^th February 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

 

Between

 

NEERAJ NEERAJ

(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr Arafin, counsel instructed by Legal Chambers Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Field House on 5 February 2025

 

DECISION AND REASONS

 

Introduction

 

1.              The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 9 September 2024, of First-tier Tribunal Judge Easterman ('the judge') to dismiss the appeal on grounds brought under the Immigration (Citizens' Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 ('the 2020 regulations').

 

Background

 

2.              The factual background to the appeal is that the appellant is an Indian citizen who claimed that he has been a long-standing dependent of his Portuguese uncle and his wife (the appellant's maternal aunt) who live in the UK. On this basis, he sought status to remain in the UK under the EUSS having previously entered via the Republic of Ireland on 14 March 2020.

 

Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

 

3.              The appellant appealed against the refusal of the claim. The appeal was initially heard by the judge on 11 April 2024, but the matter was adjourned because the served evidence was not in a fit state to enable him to decide the agreed principal controversial issue of dependency. In his decision, the judge explained that the period before the matter was relisted provided the parties with an opportunity to fully consider all of the evidence and arguments they wished to raise in support of their positions. At paragraph [6] of his decision, the judge noted that neither side had seized this opportunity, and the papers remained much as they were when the matter was previously before him (see also [49]-[50]). At the outset of the relisted hearing on 18 June 2024, the parties spoke as one in confirming that the only issue to be decided was that of factual dependency. This broad position cohered with the appellant's skeleton argument where the issues to be determined in the appeal were set out in the following way between paragraphs [3]-[7]:

 

Issue in Appeal

 

The Appellant is inviting the Tribunal to consider the dependency issue which remains outstanding in this appeal. The main issue in this case is the Appellant's dependency on his uncle as the Respondent failed to take into account all the relevant evidence provided with his application.

 

The only issue remains in this appeal is whether the Appellant was dependent on his EEA family member.

 

The Court would need to make following determinations in this matter,

 

a. Whether the Appellant is dependent on the EEA National sponsor

b. Whether the Appellant can meet his financial needs without the support of his EEA sponsor

c. Whether the Appellant is partially or fully dependent on his EEA national family member.

d. Whether the Appellant continue to rely on his EEA family member till date

 

Appellant Submissions

 

This is a case, which, if progresses to a substantive hearing will likely to turn on its facts and the Court's assessment of those facts.

 

It is submitted that this is an Appeal which almost entirely factual in nature. It is unlikely that the Court will have to resolve any questions of law, but rather divine from evidence submitted by the parties. It is the case that the totality of evidence put before the Court is relatively very broad. The Court is being provided with evidence of the dependency by the Appellant and their EEA sponsor.

 

The only aspects of law likely to be engaged are the dependency principles of extended family member and EEA Regulations.

 

4.              Over the course of the hearing, the issues expanded. At paragraph [8], the judge recorded a shift in the respondent's position during their closing submissions when it was argued that the familial relationship of nephew was not one which qualified as a family member capable of meeting the definition of a dependent family member under the EUSS. The Judge addressed this new issue at [9]-[10]:

 

Understandably Mr. Arafin was somewhat upset by what appeared to be the withdrawing of a concession, but I pointed out to Mr. Arafin, the Respondent could not concede something that would have been in fact an error of law, and I asked Mr. Arafin whether he was suggesting the Appellant could succeed as a nephew.

 

Mr. Arafin then conceded that the Appellant could not as a matter of law succeed as a nephew, but suggested he should be able to succeed under the E.E.A. Regulations 2016 as preserved or under the Withdrawal Agreement. I pointed out that this appeal was not under the 2016 Regulations, there had been no application under the 2016 Regulations, nor had there been any decision under the 2016 Regulations, and Mr. White added for good measure that the 2016 Regulations were not open to a fresh application.

 

5.              The judge summarised the appellant's factual case. At paragraphs [17]-[28], the judge comprehensively summarised the evidence and noted the claimed background that the appellant had been supported by his aunt and uncle since he was a child in circumstances where his primary carer was his mother following the departure of his father from the family unit. It was further claimed that he continued to be entirely dependent on his aunt and uncle upon his arrival in the UK and remained so. At [32], the judge recorded that Mr Arafin carefully took him through the evidence which went to a longstanding pattern of financial support.

 

6.              At paragraph [34], the judge addressed the position adopted by the respondent in the reasons for refusal letter of 4 February 2023. The relevant passages were copied in full and touched only on the factual question of dependency.

 

7.              The judge reached his findings of fact and conclusions between [39] and [54] from which the following key matters emerge:

 

•          The evidence of the appellant and his aunt and uncle was said to be confused but it was accepted that they shared a "very close relationship" which was "entirely understandable given the history of the young man's upbringing" [40].

 

•          The appellant, as a nephew, was found to fall outside of the qualifying family relationships defined in the EUSS [41].

 

•          Despite the question of a relevant document not being in issue between the parties, the judge addressed this at [42]-[44]:

 

There is a definition for "dependent relative" and I looked at that to see whether the Appellant could meet it. As far as I can see there is no definition of relative, but it is a requirement that the relative, which the Appellant would be, has to have a relevant document, before he can succeed under the E.U.S.S. and the relevant document is that he must show he had been facilitated previously, by the Secretary of State as an extended family member.

 

There are various ways in which that could have been done but as I understand the

evidence in front of me it is not suggested that the Appellant has ever been formally

facilitated, as an extended family member of an E.U. national or their spouse at any stage. It is for that reason, not simply because he is a nephew, that on the evidence

before me I find he could not succeed under this scheme.

 

Had he been facilitated he would still have had to show that he was dependent. [...]

 

•          Gaps were noted in the financial records which made it impossible to tell whether the appellant was dependent on his uncle (see [44]-[45] and [47]). It was further found that references in the bank statements to "rent" did not accord with the narrative evidence about how these funds were used [46].

 

•          The judge was not minded to exclude the possibility that the appellant had been in a relationship of dependency with his aunt and uncle and was satisfied that he was not being misled by the evidence. However, the evidence was not clear on this factual question. In any event, "there has never been facilitation of the Appellant, that he is a person who fits within the definition section that relates to EU11 or 14" ([48]). The same point was reiterated at paragraph [51] in combination with a settled finding that the appellant had not established dependency on his aunt and uncle.

 

•          The judge rejected Mr Arafin's submission that the application, made under the EUSS, should be considered in the context of the legal framework within the 2016 regulations ([52]-[54])

 

8.              The appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 9 September 2024.

 

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

 

9.              The appellant applied for permission to appeal against the decision in reliance on the following grounds:

 

•          Grounds 1 & 2 - the judge failed to assess whether Article 18 of the Withdrawal Agreement operated in the appellant's favour in the sense that his residence in the UK was facilitated in accordance with national legislation following his entry to the UK via the Republic of Ireland. Reliance was placed on what purported to be a stamp, dated in manuscript with "14th March 2020", in the appellant's passport for the purpose to "join EU spouse". The ink stamp is dated "O7 MAR 2020" at "DUBLIN AIRPORT". It was argued that when this immigration stamp was seen in the light of the Court of Appeal's analysis of the legal effect of such a stamp in Vasa v SSHD [2025] 1 WLR 39 and the practical effects of the common travel area between the UK and the Republic of Ireland that this meant that the appellant enjoyed status to remain in the UK by virtue of the Withdrawal Agreement.

 

•          Ground 3 - the judge failed to consider all of the evidence which went to the claimed relationship of dependency especially the extensive background of committed financial support over many years. A vague reference to "Article 8" was included under this head of challenge.

 

10.          In a decision dated 7 November 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Chowdhury granted partial permission for the grounds to be argued. The component of ground three which did not attract permission was the oblique reference to Article 8 in the written grounds. This was because there was not a human rights ground of appeal before Judge Easterman such that Article 8 of the ECHR was ever in issue.

 

11.          Following the grant of permission, the respondent filed a rule 24 response to the appeal. It was suggested that it was inappropriate for permission to have been granted in relation to a point never taken in the tribunal below unless there was a ' Robinson-obvious' error of law. The substantive point was taken that the entry stamp the appellant relied upon for the purposes of seeking permission to appeal was plainly that of the Irish, not UK, immigration authorities and that this functioned to distinguish this case from Vasa. It was further argued that the stamp referred to entry as a spouse, not an extended family member.

 

12.          At the error of law hearing, we heard oral submissions from both parties. We address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

 

Discussion

 

13.          Mr Arafin acknowledged during the hearing that there was a significant degree of overlap between grounds one and two. These challenges turn on whether the ratio of Vasa applies with equal force to the immigration stamp of an Irish immigration official as it would to that of a UK official. Before we address the substantive points, we must first consider whether we should consider the evidence of the Irish immigration stamp at all. Once permission to appeal had been granted in the First-tier Tribunal on the strength of this evidence, the respondent argued in a rule 24 notice that the judge who granted permission was wrong to do so, relying on Durueke (PTA: AZ applied, proper approach) [2019] UKUT 197 (IAC). This reported decision of the Upper Tribunal gave guidance to judges, considering permission to appeal applications, not to assume that evidence relied upon for the purposes of making a ' Robinson- obvious' point - or a challenge under headnote three of AZ (error of law: jurisdiction; PTA practice) Iran [2018] UKUT 245 (IAC) - was before the judge who decided the appeal. Headnote three of AZ is directed to grants of permission on grounds that were not argued by the parties. We are satisfied that the respondent's submission is misconceived.

 

14.          Firstly, this appeal does not involve a ' Robinson-obvious' point of challenge. Lord Woolf M.R. described this kind of point R v SSHD, ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929 and how tribunal judges should approach such matters at p.945-946:

 

Because the rules place an onus on the asylum-seeker to state his grounds of appeal, we consider that it would be wrong to say that mere arguability should be the criterion to be applied for the grant of leave in such circumstances. A higher hurdle is required. The appellate authorities should of course focus primarily on the arguments adduced before them, whether these are to be found in the oral argument before the special adjudicator or, so far as the tribunal is concerned, in the written grounds of appeal on which leave to appeal is sought. They are not required to engage in a search for new points. If there is readily discernible an obvious point of Convention law which favours the applicant although he has not taken it, then the special adjudicator should apply it in his favour, but he should feel under no obligation to prolong the hearing by asking the parties for submissions on points which they have not taken but which could be properly categorised as merely "arguable" as opposed to "obvious." Similarly, if when the tribunal reads the special adjudicator's decision there is an obvious point of Convention law favourable to the asylum-seeker which does not appear in the decision, it should grant leave to appeal. If it does not do so, there will be a danger that this country will be in breach of its obligations under the Convention. When we refer to an obvious point we mean a point which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do. It follows that leave to apply for judicial review of a refusal by the tribunal to grant leave to appeal should be granted if the judge is of the opinion that it is properly arguable that a point not raised in the grounds of appeal to the tribunal had a strong prospect of success if leave to appeal were to be granted.

 

15.          It is tolerably clear from the above passage that ' Robinson-obvious' points relate to strong points of Refugee Convention law which were not taken by those representing the particular appellant. The guidance goes to whether permission should be granted for such a point to feature in the proceedings. The grounds in the present appeal, which has nothing to do with the Refugee Convention, squarely raised the Vasa point in the grounds which attracted permission. Simply put, this is not a case where we are bound to ask ourselves whether a strong point of Refugee Convention law should be considered in circumstances where it was never raised. Similarly, while the guidance in AZ does not confine itself to refugee Convention legal principles, the guidance provided at headnote three is equally directed to the issue of whether permission should be granted in relation to a ground which had not been advanced by the parties.

 

16.          It follows that there is no proper basis to invoke anything said in Robinson, Durueke or AZ to go behind a clear grant of permission to appeal on grounds which were clearly advanced by the appellant in the original application. It would be wholly artificial to consider the grounds of appeal, which were the subject of grants of permission, without considering the evidence of the immigration stamp itself. To the extent that it was necessary to make a rule 15(2) application to admit this evidence, we are satisfied that it must form part of the evidential picture we are bound to consider.

 

17.          The misplaced focus of the parties on ' Robinson-obvious' points lost sight of the reality that the grounds of appeal which were founded on the immigration stamp were more in keeping with a mistake of fact argument. This type of error of law was considered in the leading authority of E & R v SSHD [2004] QB 1044. At [66] of the judgment of Carnwath LJ (as he then was), the following considerations were held to be of importance in assessing whether a mistake of fact amounts to an error of law: 

 

[...] First, there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not have been responsible for the mistake. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning. 

 

18.          We are satisfied that this is the appropriate lens through which to assess the appellant's first two grounds. In broad terms, his argument is that the judge did not consider evidence of his admission to the UK in circumstances which amounted to facilitation of his stay in accordance with national legislation so as to bring him within the protections of the Withdrawal Agreement. We leave aside the first consideration under E & R because we did not hear oral evidence going to the provenance of the document relied upon. For the purposes of the four-pronged test in E & R, we are prepared to accept that the appellant had, in his passport, the Irish immigration stamp he relied upon. We also accept that the judge approached the appeal without any knowledge of this now-established fact. However, when we come to stages three and four of the E & R test, the appellant meets insuperable difficulties. His counsel accepted during the hearing that those who instructed him were manifestly at fault in not relying on this evidence before the judge. Counsel, who appeared in the tribunal below was just as ignorant as the judge about this stamp when he argued the appellant's case at first instance. The next question we must ask ourselves is whether the mistake played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning. To answer this question, we must consider Vasa in greater detail.

 

19.          The Court of Appeal in Vasa considered two separate appeals together because they raised similar points of principle. In each appeal, the appellants had been granted entry to the UK by UK officials who had stamped their passports purportedly under the provisions of the 2016 EEA regulations. From the Court of Appeal judgment, the decisions to refuse their applications under the EUSS were solely taken on grounds that each appellant did not have a 'relevant document' as defined in the scheme. The Court was satisfied that the passport stamps did not amount to 'relevant documents' but considered whether the basis of their admission to the UK amounted to facilitation of their residence in accordance with national legislation in accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement. In his judgment, Lewis LJ made the following observations about the legal framework at paragraphs [18], [20] and [21]:

 

[18] Article 10(2) and (3) deal with the position of other family members (ie those defined in article 3 of the Directive and whom the 2016 Regulations referred to as "extended family members"). Article 10(2) dealt with those extended family members whose residence in the United Kingdom had been facilitated in accordance with domestic law before the end of the transition period. Article 10(3) brought those persons who had applied for facilitation of entry and residence before the end of the transition period and whose residence was facilitated thereafter by the United Kingdom in accordance with domestic law within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement. Articles 10(2) and (3) provide as follows:

 

"2. Persons falling under points (a) and (b) of article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC whose residence was facilitated by the host state in accordance with its national legislation before the end of the transition period in accordance with article 3(2) of that Directive shall retain their right of residence in the host state in accordance with this Part, provided that they continue to reside in the host state thereafter.

 

"3. Paragraph 2 shall also apply to persons falling under points (a) and (b) of article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC who have applied for facilitation of entry and residence before the end of the transition period, and whose residence is being facilitated by the host state in accordance with its national legislation thereafter."

 

[Underlining added]

 

[20] Article 18 provides that the United Kingdom or member states may choose to provide for a new residence status which confers the rights guaranteed by Title II of Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement and which is evidenced by a new residence document.

 

[21] As indicated, the purpose of article 18 is to ensure that the rights of residence of EU nationals and their family members which are guaranteed by Title II are reflected in the new residence status and documents issued evidencing that status. Title II does not guarantee any rights conferred by national law on extended family members of EU nationals. They are, however, clearly intended to be within the scope of the residence status. That appears from the fact that the status applies to Union citizens, family members and "other persons", a phrase which is apt to include extended family members. Furthermore, article 18(1) (l) expressly deals with the document that may be required of extended family members falling within article 10(2) and (3) when they apply for the new residence status. The implication is that the new residence status will be available to extended family members falling within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement and who satisfy the requirements of the Withdrawal Agreement applicable to them.

 

20.          The court analysed the facts of the cases before it from paragraph [57] in the following terms (where relevant to the present appeal):

 

[57] [...] Those decisions were recorded or evidenced by the stamps in their passports. They were, as the stamps recorded, "Admitted to the United Kingdom under the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016". Those were decisions taken by a public official.

 

[58] The next question is what rights or benefits did the decisions confer upon Mr Vasa and Mr Hasanaj? That is a question as to what, given the context, a reasonable person would understand the decision of the immigration officers to mean. I am satisfied that, in context, considered objectively, a reasonable person would understand the stamps to record a decision that Mr Vasa and Mr Hasanaj were each allowed to come into the United Kingdom and live there with their respective relative who was a national of an EU member state.

 

[59] [...] The words in the stamp are "Admitted to the UK under the Immigration (EEA) Regulations". The reasonable, objective, interpretation of what the decision of the immigration officers meant was that Mr Vasa and Mr Hasanaj were allowed to come to the United Kingdom and live there with their brother and sister respectively as they were persons considered eligible to do so. For these purposes, it is not relevant whether the immigration officers were mistaken as to the facts (for example, whether or nor Mr Vasa was dependent on his brother, or whether or not Mr Hasanaj was a member of his sister's household). Nor does it matter whether the immigration officers made errors of law as to the scope of their powers. For present purposes, the issue is what, reasonably and objectively, do the decisions of the immigration officers mean. They mean, in my judgment, that Mr Vasa and Mr Hasanaj were being allowed to come and live in the United Kingdom. Put another way, using different language, they were allowed to enter and reside in the United Kingdom.

 

[...]

 

[62] That, however, is not the end of the matter. There is the question of their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. Article 10(2) brings family members (defined by article 3 of the Directive) within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement if they are persons "whose residence was facilitated by the host state in accordance with its national legislation before the end of the transition period". That is what happened in the present case. Mr Vasa's and Mr Hasanaj's residence were facilitated by the acts of the immigration officers. They were admitted to the United Kingdom, pursuant to decisions taken by public officials, that is, they were allowed to come to and reside in the United Kingdom. They fall within the scope of article 10(2). They did not have any rights derived from EU law to reside in the United Kingdom (as they were not nationals of an EEA member state nor were they direct family members of such nationals, within the meaning of article 2 of the Directive). But, if the United Kingdom chose (as it did) to create a new residence status, then article 18(1)(l)(iv) of the Withdrawal Agreement provides for that status to be granted to extended family members (as defined by article 3 of the Directive) on production of identity documents and "a document issued by the relevant authority in the host state in accordance with article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38 ", ie the document facilitating their residence in the United Kingdom. That document was, in the present case, the stamps placed in the passports by the immigration officers.

 

[63] In those circumstances, refusal by the Secretary of State to accept the document issued by the relevant national authorities did amount to a breach of the rights of Mr Vasa and Mr Hasanaj under article 18(1)(l)(iv) of the Withdrawal Agreement. Their appeals against the decision to refuse their applications under the Settlement Scheme should therefore have been allowed.

 

[65] [...] The reference to national legislation reflects the fact that extended family members (those falling within article 3 of the Directive and as defined by regulation 8 of the 2016 Regulations) did not derive rights of residence from EU law but from national law. The reference to "in accordance with its national legislation", and "a document issued by the relevant authority in the host state in accordance with article 3(2)" are simply a recognition that the legal act or decision conferring the right to reside will be one taken under national law. Articles 10(2) and 18(1)(l)(iv) of the Withdrawal Agreement were not seeking to introduce a requirement that individuals seeking to continue rights granted prior to the end of the transition period had to demonstrate that those rights had been granted under national legislation which had, as a matter of domestic law, been properly interpreted and applied. There is no reason why the Withdrawal Agreement (which concerns the position of family members of EEA nationals the United Kingdom, and family members of UK nationals in other member states) would be concerned with ensuring that domestic legislation was in place and had been properly applied. Rather, the focus of the Withdrawal Agreement was that rights under EU law (for EU nationals and their family members as defined by article 2 of the Directive) were protected after the end of the transition period and, similarly, that rights granted by relevant national authorities acting under national law (in the case of family members as defined by article 3 of the Directive) were also protected where a new residence status was created as contemplated by article 18 of the Withdrawal Agreement.

[Underlining added]

 

21.          Taking this appellant's immigration stamp at its highest, and applying the ratio of Vasa, on no sensible analysis can it be said that this document was a reflection of a decision by the relevant national authorities - namely, the UK - acting under national law, by applying the requirements of the 2016 regulations. Everything on the face of the immigration stamp relied upon overwhelmingly suggests that this was a decision taken by an Irish immigration official. There is no reference to the UK, the Home Office, the UK Border Agency or the 2016 regulations. Simply put, and to borrow the words used in Article 10 of the Withdrawal Agreement, this was not facilitation by the host state in accordance with national legislation. At the risk of stating the obvious, the decisions taken by Irish immigration officials cannot bind the immigration authorities of an entirely separate sovereign state.

 

22.          To bridge the gap between the officials of the Republic of Ireland and those of the UK, Mr Arafin relied on the international agreement between the UK and the Republic of Ireland which gives rise to the Common Travel Area (the 'CTA'). In his skeleton argument, counsel relied on paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on behalf of the two countries on 8 May 2019 which provides:

 

The CTA permits British citizens to take up residence in Ireland and Irish citizens to take up residence in the UK. The Participants are to continue to ensure that their national laws provide for such a right to reside.

 

23.          Again, at the risk of stating the obvious, the passage cited above demonstrably applies to Irish and British citizens and reflects a practical international agreement between two historically close nations to permit smooth movement between the territories for its citizens. In no way can this be seen as an agreement that transposes the decisions of one country's immigration officials as binding the other state. It only takes a moment to see the absurdity of such a proposition. The passages of Vasa cited above emphasise the critical importance of national legislation in seeking to govern the arrangements made by EU member states for extended family members. It makes no sense that the officials of one state could bind the authorities of another in a sphere where national legislation plays an essential role in how such arrangements are made in those particular territories. Mr Arafin was unable to point to any part of the CTA agreement, or indeed EU legal instruments, which could sustain such an extravagant argument.

 

24.          Much of the error of law hearing was devoted to the ancillary question of whether the appellant would also have to satisfy the substantive requirements of the EUSS even if the Irish immigration stamp were embraced by the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement. In view of the conclusions we have reached above, we are satisfied that the appellant's argument about the Irish immigration stamp was not capable of having a material impact on the judge's reasoning. On our analysis, the stamp adds nothing to the merits of the appellant's appeal and does not come close to engaging the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement. Even if the stamp were before the judge - and it was conceded by the appellant's representative that it was not - it could not have conceivably resulted in a different outcome. If there was a mistake of fact in not considering the Irish immigration stamp, it was occasioned by the fault of the party who now seeks to rely on it, and it would have been entirely immaterial even if had been before the judge. It must follow that grounds one and two do not involve material errors of law.

 

25.          Ground three can be dealt with more succinctly. The suggestion that the judge did not adequately or lawfully address his mind to the evidence of a lengthy background of financial dependency does not withstand a fair and natural reading of the judge's decision. As summarised above, the judge described at some length that the appellant relied on financial records which posed more questions than they answered and left him with the sense that there were considerable gaps in the claimed movement of funds over the years. The judge did not fail to consider the evidence going to the background of financial support, but he instead simply found that the appellant had not met his burden to show the historic pattern of support he had asserted. During the error of law hearing, Mr Arafin sought to take us to the underlying evidence which was said to have demanded a different factual conclusion on the issue of dependency. These submissions, and those advanced in writing in the grounds of appeal and the skeleton argument struck us as amounting to no more than disagreements with the judge's lawful findings of fact. The appellant cannot be in any doubt as to why the judge resolved this issue against him. In law, the judge was not required to say any more than he did. Ground three does not reveal an error of law.

 

Notice of Decision

 

The decision of the judge did not involve material errors of law. The appeal against this decision is accordingly dismissed and the decision of Judge Easterman stands.

 

Paul Lodato

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

12 February 2025