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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments >> UI2024005265 [2025] UKAITUR UI2024005265 (26 March 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKAITUR/2025/UI2024005265.html Cite as: [2025] UKAITUR UI2024005265 |
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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER |
Case No: UI- 2024-005265 |
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First-tier Tribunal No: HU /05015/2020 |
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
26 th March 2025
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON
Between
TN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation :
For the Appellant: Ms Fitzsimons, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Thompson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) via CVP on 17 March 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, the decision, dated 23 rd September 2024, of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal ("the Judge") who upheld the Respondent's decision to refuse the Appellant's claim for asylum.
Background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Vietnam. She entered the United Kingdom with her brother on 27 th April 2002 when she was 12 years old. She claimed indefinite leave to remain as the dependent relative of her maternal aunt and cousin on 3 rd September 2002. Her aunt exploited her by using her to undertake housework and childcare in both her home and the home of friends. The Appellant left her aunt's house in 2007. The Single Competent Authority has since concluded that she was a victim of modern slavery whilst living with her aunt.
3. In 2007 the Appellant entered into an abusive relationship with a male who obtained work for her in a nail bar and took control of her wages until 2010. The Single Competent Authority has since concluded that she was subject to domestic and financial abuse during that period but was not subjected to forced labour.
4. The Appellant was encountered working in the nail bar by immigration officials on 8 th June 2010.
5. She was granted indefinite leave to remain on 25 th November 2013.
6. She married her husband in 2014 and gave birth to her first child, L, on 19 th January 2015. Her husband is the father.
7. She claims that in 2017 she had a " brief fling" with a male, JN, who used her to undertake criminal activity, for which she was later convicted. She claims that the relationship with her husband ended in 2017.
8. She was convicted after trial of conspiracy to produce cannabis and, on 11 th December 2018, was sentenced by HHJ Barker to 3 years and 9 months imprisonment. In his sentencing remarks, HHJ Barker stated that the Appellant had played a significant role in the criminality. She had an operational function in the chain of the conspiracy, namely was the securing of property for the growth of cannabis. She was motivated by financial gain. She continued to be involved after the arrest of others which, HHJ Barker concluded, undermined her assertion of doing JN's " bidding".
9. Her husband was sentenced, on the same occasion, to 17 months custody for one offence of possessing criminal property, namely £39,100, to which he had pleaded guilty.
10. The Appellant was served with a notice of intention to deport her on 27 th December 2018. She was served a deportation notice and confirmation that her human rights claim had been refused on 26 th March 2020. She was released from immigration detention on 15 th May 2020. She was referred to the National Referral Mechanism on 3 rd June 2020 and claimed asylum on 11 th June 2020.
11. She gave birth to her second child, I, on 11 th June 2021. The child's father is not named on the birth certificate. She claims that the father is not her husband and is an unknown male.
12. Her claim for asylum was refused on 2 nd September 2022. Her claim was certified under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as she was presumed to constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom by virtue of being convicted of a particularly serious offence, namely an offence for which she was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least two years.
13. She gave birth to her third child, V, on 2 nd December 2022. The child's father is her husband.
14. The Appellant claims that she continued to live with her husband until February 2024. They have not had a relationship since 2017 albeit had a " fling" in 2022 which resulted in her becoming pregnant with V. He is therefore the father of her first and third child. She does not know who fathered the second child.
15. She states that she would return to Vietnam as a single mother with no support and would be vulnerable to abuse and re-trafficking. She also claims to fear that her husband's family would seek to kidnap her children.
16. The Appellant attended a hearing before the Judge on 23 rd August 2024 to appeal the March 2020 refusal of her human rights claim and the September 2022 refusal of her asylum claim.
17. The Appellant maintained that she was at risk of re-trafficking on account of being a lone woman with no source of support in Vietnam. She therefore claimed entitlement to asylum or humanitarian protection and that removal would be a breach of her Article 3 and 4 ECHR rights. The Respondent disputed that she would return as a lone woman and contended that she remains in a relationship with her husband, who is also subject to a deportation order.
18. The Appellant claimed that removal would breach her Article 3 ECHR rights on medical grounds, namely that she is a suicide risk.
19. In relation to Article 8, she claimed to satisfy Exception 2 within section 117C, namely that the effect of her deportation on her children would be unduly harsh. She also claimed that there are very compelling circumstances over and above those within Exception 2.
20. Within her determination, dated 23 rd September 2024, the Judge accepted, at paragraph 32, that the Appellant had rebutted the presumption that she currently constitutes a danger to the community.
21. However, she dismissed the Appellant's appeal against the refusal of international protection. She rejected the Appellant's account that her marriage had come to an end after she had a fling with JN. She did not accept that the Appellant had been exploited by JN and found that the Appellant was friends with JN and had seen an opportunity to work with him for financial gain. She relied upon HHJ Barker's sentencing remarks. She concluded that any separation between the Appellant and her husband in 2017 was " brief" and that they maintain a subsisting spousal relationship. The Appellant would not return to Vietnam as a lone woman but would return with her husband.
22. In reaching the conclusion that the Appellant and her husband remain together, the Judge had regard to various matters, including the following:
a. The Appellant's husband was also involved in the criminal activity that led to the Appellant's imprisonment (paragraph 36);
b. The Appellant and her husband travelled to Vietnam together in February 2018 (paragraph 36);
c. He took over the care of L in July 2019 (paragraph 37);
d. He fathered her youngest child (paragraph 39);
e. The Appellant did not disclose that her husband was the father of her youngest child in a witness statement, dated 15 th July 2022, which was "... a significant omission from the evidence and is an attempt by the appellant to mislead the Tribunal...";
f. The Appellant and her husband continued to live together and, after their release from prison, made arrangements to live near each other until they could again live together (paragraph 45);
g. There is no evidence that a divorce has been initiated, despite the Appellant saying in her May 2023 witness statement that they are finalising the divorce papers and, in her April 2024 witness statement, that they had signed the divorce papers but that it was not yet finalised (paragraph 45); and
h. The Appellant's credibility is damaged by the fact that she did not claim asylum until June 2020, despite being served with a deportation notice in December 2018 and a deportation order, in which her human rights claim was rejected, in March 2020. She did not claim fear of trafficking in her screening interview or asylum interview. In her screening interview she stated that she could not return to Vietnam as she had been away for a long time and she and her children are settled in the United Kingdom (paragraphs 57-59)
23. The Judge dismissed the Appellant's account that her husband's family would attempt to steal the children and noted that L had lived with his paternal grandmother in Vietnam between September / October 2017 and January 2019 and that the Appellant's husband had shown a strong commitment to the children (paragraph 42).
24. The Judge concluded:
" 50. I further find that this appellant would not be at risk as a lone woman with three children. I find that this appellant would be returning with her husband and would additionally have her husband's family to assist her and the children on return. I find that this appellant would not be alone and without support and vulnerable to traffickers. I further find that this appellant is not poorly educated but has 10/11 GCSE's, A Levels in design and technology, maths, information technology and critical thinking and is a businesswoman who has set up and run two businesses in the UK, the most recent whilst having three young children to look after. I find that this appellant is a very resourceful woman.
51. I accept that the appellant has had periods of mental health issues at times in her life, namely when she started school in the UK, had a baby (post-natal depression) and was sent to prison but find that she will have her husband and his family to support her and assist her with accessing any treatment she may need ."
25. The Judge similarly dismissed the Appellant's Article 3 ECHR medical ground of appeal. She accepted, at paragraph 67, that the Appellant is a seriously ill person on account of her mental health. However, she concluded that the Appellant would not return to Vietnam as a lone woman. The Judge was not satisfied that necessary treatment is either not available or not accessible to the Appellant or that she would suffer a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her mental health which would lead to a reduction in life expectancy or intensive suffering (paragraph 72).
26. In relation to Article 8 ECHR, the Judge concluded that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant's children to remain in the United Kingdom without the Appellant (paragraph 79), but that it would not be unduly harsh for them to relocate to Vietnam with their mother (paragraphs 80-82).
27. The Judge considered that there were not very compelling circumstances to otherwise find that removal would be a disproportionate breach of the Appellant's Article 8 ECHR rights. In doing so, she took into account the three submissions contained at paragraph 74 of the Appeal Skeleton Argument, dated 20 th May 2024:
" Alternatively, in addition to the above, cumulatively, there are obviously compelling circumstances outside of the Rules:
a. That the evidence shows, on the lower standard, that she was in fact trafficked for the purposes of forced criminality;
b. As a victim of trafficking, she should have the benefit of the non-punishment principle. Punishment would also includes deportation;
c. The evidence adduced overwhelmingly shows that the Appellant's criminality was part and parcel of her situation of vulnerability ."
28. In rejecting those submissions, the Judge noted HHJ Barker's sentencing remarks and, in reliance on the basis upon which he sentenced the Appellant, rejected her account that she had been forced into the criminal acts, stating, at paragraph 86:
" The appellant says that she just did what JN told her and did not know that cannabis was being produced at the house and that she did not ask him what the business was and just went along with pretending to be someone else and using another persons documents. I do not accept that the appellant would not have asked and did not know that the properties were being used for cannabis production. The appellant is an intelligent businesswoman, and I find it inconceivable that she would not have had at least a suspicion. I find no basis for going behind the findings of the SJ who would have had far more information as to the appellant's involvement than I have before me. The SJ found the appellant's role was significant and continued after the arrest of JN, that she was well aware of the situation and was not doing JN's bidding ."
Grounds of appeal
29. Grounds of appeal were initially refused by another First-Tier Tribunal Judge on 16 th October 2024.
30. The Appellant sought permission from the Upper Tribunal upon three broad grounds.
31. Ground 1 claimed the judge failed to have regard to evidence concerning
a. The Appellant's relationship with JN;
b. The father of her children; and
c. The breakdown of the relationship with her estranged husband.
32. Ground 2 argued that the Judge reached adverse credibility / vulnerability findings made in isolation without regard to the psychiatric evidence.
33. Ground 3 argued that the Judge undertook an inadequate / flawed assessment of the public interest in deportation and / or the fair balance in proportionality
34. Permission to appeal was granted by an Upper Tribunal Judge on 10 th January 2025:
" 3. I consider ground 2 is arguable. The decision reads well and is carefully reasoned, but it is arguable that when the judge made adverse credibility findings against the appellant she did not consider what impact the appellant's poor mental health and vulnerability might have made on her evidence.
4. Whilst I would not have granted permission on the other grounds if they stood on their own (as on the face of it, the judge appears to have taken into account the evidence referred to, she simply did not accept it) I do not limit the grounds, as clearly if there is force in ground 2 then the other grounds may have merit taken with ground 2."
The hearing
35. The papers were contained within a 1,513-page bundle, save for the initial refusal of permission to appeal by the First-tier Tribunal Judge which was provided separately.
36. Ms Fitzsimons relied upon the grounds of appeal.
37. She addressed me on ground two first, given the contents of the grant of permission. She relied upon the contents of the medical reports that were before the Judge, particularly the latest report from Dr Nuwan Galappathie, psychiatrist, dated 15 th May 2024 in which he concluded that the Appellant has the following conditions, for which she requires ongoing care:
a. Recurrent depressive disorder, current episode severe, without psychotic symptoms; and
b. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
38. Ms Fitzsimons particularly relied upon the following paragraphs of that report:
" 82. 7. Please comment on our client's ability to disclose issues relating to gender and sexual based violence. Please address why late disclosure may exist and why there may be discrepancies in her account.
83. In my opinion, any late disclosure is likely to be explained by possible gender and sexual based violence and her subsequent mental health problem by way of depression, anxiety and PTSD. Miss Nguyen presents as a highly vulnerable individual due to her mental health problems and reported past experiences. This includes undisclosed trauma during her journey to the UK and delayed disclosure of being exploited into domestic servitude as a child when she arrived in the UK. She is likely to have not fully understood the events that occurred at the time. She is likely to have experienced high levels of shame in relation to her past experiences which would explain why she has been reluctant to disclose the experiences that she reports. Miss Nguyen suffers from PTSD. It is notable that a core symptom of PTSD is avoidance. She is likely to have avoided disclosing her past experiences as she would have found this to be re-traumatising. It is notable that she has still not been able to disclose the detail of the trauma that she reportedly experienced during her journey to the UK.
84. 8. Please comment on how the trauma of sexual violence can impact on processing and recollection of memories and how this may have affected the client's ability to recall her account of past trauma. How may this affect the Home Office's assessment of her credibility? How may this affect her ability to participate in legal proceedings, including the cogency of her evidence?
85. In my opinion, Miss Nguyen reports a significant past history of trauma and suffers from depression, anxiety and PTSD. Depression has been found to impair memory for past events.10 In my opinion, it is likely that her mental health problems have had an adverse impact on her memory and ability to recall past events. PTSD has also been shown by research to impair declarative memory (ability to consciously recall facts and events within long term-memory).11 In my opinion when taking into account her past experience of trauma and subsequent mental health problems it is understandable why Miss Nguyen has significant problems with her memory and recalling past events. It is also notable that she has not yet been able to disclose the detail of the trauma that she reports experiencing during her journey to the UK. In my opinion, the trauma that she reports, avoidance of discussing her past trauma's and problems with memory may be misinterpreted during interviews with the Home Office as indicating lack of credibility whereas her reluctance to disclose details and lack of clarity of her account can be explained by her mental health problems by way of depression, anxiety and PTSD.
86. Research has also identified that for individuals with PTSD, discrepancies within the individual's accounts were common. It was found that within those with high levels of PTSD, the number of discrepancies increased with the length of time between interviews, with more discrepancies occurring for details peripheral to the account than in details that were central to the account.12 In my opinion, it should be noted that her PTSD is likely to have significantly affected her memory and that any absence of information or inconsistencies in her history could be related to the trauma of the events that she outlines in the past, rather than such gaps being due to her fabricating any information (Bogner et al, 200713; Cohen, 2001)14. It is notable that victims of abuse and trauma are often unable to place their experiences within chronological order. In addition, the stress that she is experiencing is also likely to significantly impair her memory and that any inconsistency does not necessarily mean that her past trauma did not occur but instead is likely to represent the severity of the trauma that she has experienced ."
39. Ms Fitzsimons reiterated the written grounds of appeal in relation to grounds 1 and 2.
40. Mr Thompson warned against reading the Judge's determination piecemeal. He argued that, when read as a whole, the determination demonstrates a sufficient regard to the Appellant's mental health and to all of the evidence.
Discussion and analysis
41. Throughout consideration of the appeal, I have had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at paragraph 2:
" The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract ."
Ground 2
42. I have considered the grounds in the order of Ms Fitzsimons' oral submissions.
43. It is correct that the Judge did not expressly state in her determination that she had considered the Appellant's vulnerabilities when assessing credibility. However, it is clear from a holistic reading of the determination that the Judge had the Appellant's mental health and vulnerabilities at the forefront of her mind throughout her assessment of the evidence.
44. It is clear that the Judge adhered to the guidance within AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 as evident from paragraph 13 of her determination:
" Given the medical evidence I treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness in line with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance and Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction May 2022. Dr Galappathie sets out in his latest report dated 15 May 2024 that the appellant has been diagnosed with PTSD, depression and anxiety. It is accepted that the appellant is a victim of modern slavery. The appellant was offered breaks when needed and the following adjustments were put in place:
• Closed court room.
• Short questions using ordinary language and with adequate time for the appellant to respond.
• Questions to be asked sensitively and questions relating to her history of trauma were to be avoided where possible so as not to retraumatise the appellant.
• Care to be taken to ensure that the appellant understands the question and has answered fully ."
45. She referenced the Appellant's mental health at paragraph 51 and, at paragraph 67, detailed:
" I am satisfied, considering the reports as a whole, that the appellant is currently a seriously ill person and has severe depression, anxiety and suffers continuing symptoms of PTSD."
46. The Judge made reference to Dr Nuwan Galappathie's 15 th May 2024 report at paragraphs 13, 61 and 64 of her determination and so it is clear that she had regard to his opinions throughout her assessment of the evidence, including the Appellant's credibility.
47. The criticism at paragraph 17 of the grounds of appeal that the Judge made reference to the Appellant as resourceful is without merit. As accepted by Ms Fitzsimons in her oral submissions, being vulnerable and being resourceful are not mutually exclusive. Further, the Judge's reference to resourcefulness should not be considered in isolation and it is appropriate to read it in the context of the full point that was being made by the Judge, at paragraph 50:
" I further find that this appellant is not poorly educated but has 10/11 GCSE's, A Levels in design and technology, maths, information technology and critical thinking and is a businesswoman who has set up and run two businesses in the UK, the most recent whilst having three young children to look after. I find that this appellant is a very resourceful woman ."
48. The Judge clearly had regard to the Appellant's vulnerability and the contents of the expert medical evidence. Having done so, she nevertheless made adverse credibility findings based on a holistic view of the evidence. Those findings were reasonably open to the Judge and were adequately reasoned.
49. There is no error in law in the treatment of the Appellant's evidence and ground two is therefore dismissed.
Ground 1
50. Ground 1 argues that the Judge failed to take into account the evidence of the Appellant in relation to:
a. Her relationship with JN;
b. The father of her children; and
c. The breakdown of her relationship with her husband.
51. The Judge outlined within her determination, at paragraph 10, the documentary evidence that was before her.
52. At paragraph 31, she appropriately referenced Budhathoki (reasons for decision) [2014] UKUT 341 which, at paragraph 14 held:
" It is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for the First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case. This leads to judgments becoming overly long and confused and is not a proportionate approach to deciding cases. It is, however, necessary for judges to identify and resolve key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons, so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost."
53. That extract is pertinent when considering the challenge to her assessment of the evidence, as is the guidance in Volpi, particularly paragraphs 2(iv) and (vi), above.
54. In relation to the evidence of the Appellant's relationship with JN, the grounds argue that the Judge rejected the Appellant's account that she had a " brief fling" with JN and failed to take into account the Appellant's evidence in her March 2021 witness statement about believing that she had been drugged by JN when they had sex and Dr Galappathie's evidence that " any late disclosure is likely to be explained by possible gender and sexual based violence and her subsequent mental health problem by way of depression, anxiety and PTSD."
55. However, the point made by the Judge was that the Appellant had not mentioned any " brief fling" with JN in an earlier account, whether abusive or otherwise. Further, even had the Judge not taken that matter into account, which I do not accept as I am satisfied that she had regard to all the evidence that was before her, it would not constitute a material error of law as the Judge accepted, at paragraph 45, that the Appellant and her husband separated for a brief period around the time of the Appellant's claimed " brief fling" with JN. However, she concluded that they reconciled. That was a finding reasonably open to the Judge to make, was adequately reasoned, and is not infected by any error in assessment of whether the Appellant and JN had a " brief fling".
56. In relation to evidence about the father of the Appellant's children, the grounds argue that the Judge failed to have regard to the fact that the Appellant detailed that her husband is the father of her youngest child in her May 2023 witness statement. However, that does not undermine the Judge's assessment that the failure to mention that he was the father in her earlier witness statement was a " significant omission" and designed to mislead. That was a conclusion that was reasonably open to the Judge, regardless of whether the Appellant subsequently disclosed the information.
57. The grounds state that the Judge failed to take into account the fact that the second child's birth certificate does not name a father and that the Appellant stated in her oral evidence that the child has no father. I reject that argument given that, as outlined above, I am satisfied that the Judge considered all of the evidence that was before her. She was not required to recite each part of the evidence. She gave an adequate explanation as to why she rejected the Appellant's account of her second child's paternity and her findings were reasonably open to her to make.
58. In any event, even if the Judge had erred in finding that the Appellant's husband is the father of her second child, and if in fact the child was conceived after an encounter with an unknown male, it would not undermine the Judge's conclusions that the Appellant and husband are presently in a relationship, given the they continued to live together until at least February 2024; the lack of evidence of divorce; and him fathering a subsequent child with the Appellant.
59. In relation to evidence about the breakdown of the relationship with the Appellant's husband, it is argued that the Judge failed to take into account the Appellant's evidence that the relationship with her husband was abusive and that she had not previously disclosed that fact as she was ashamed, which is plausible given her background of being abused and her poor mental health. However, the Judge did not make any reference to the late disclosure of abuse as being undermining to the Appellant's credibility. The Judge concluded that the relationship between the Appellant and her husband was ongoing and that was a finding that was reasonably open to her for the reasons listed at paragraph 22, above.
60. The argument within the grounds that the Judge failed to take into account that the Appellant does not have the funds to pay for a lawyer to complete her divorce ignores the fact that the Judge had noted the lack of any evidence of divorce proceedings, despite the Appellant having said that divorce papers had been signed and that the divorce was being finalised.
61. The Judge clearly took into account all the evidence before her and reached findings that were reasonably open to her upon consideration of that evidence and which were adequately reasoned within her determination. As such, ground 1 of the grounds of appeal is dismissed.
Ground 3
62. The Appellant argues that there was a flawed assessment of the public interest in deportation and / or the fair balance in proportionality and relies upon the Judge's finding that the Appellant is no longer a danger to the public.
63. The Judge outlined the relevant legal principles at paragraphs 16 to 25 of her determination, including section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which states that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
64. The Judge considered the statutory exception relied upon by the Appellant, namely whether the effect of her deportation would be unduly harsh upon her children. The Judge concluded that it would not be and the grounds of appeal do not challenge the legality of that conclusion or how it was reached.
65. The Judge then considered whether there were otherwise very compelling circumstances and concluded, at paragraph 88:
" Having considered all the evidence and taking into account the nature and seriousness of the offence, public concern over the deportation of foreign criminals and the maintenance of public confidence in the system of deportation I find that the public interest in the appellant's deportation remains high ."
66. The Judge had, earlier in her determination, dismissed the claim of risk in Vietnam and, at paragraph 72 found:
" Considering my findings above this appellant will not be returned as a lone woman but will have her husband and his family to provide support, both emotionally and financially and to assist her to access any medical treatment she may require on return to Vietnam."
67. She considered the best interests of the children and concluded that their joining her in Vietnam would not be unduly harsh.
68. She assessed that the Appellant was no longer a danger to the public and I am satisfied that she had that and all of the circumstances in mind when she considered whether there were very compelling circumstances. As she stated at paragraph 88, above, she had " considered all the evidence".
69. Her conclusion that there were not very compelling circumstances was reasonably open to her and adequately reasoned. There was no error in her proportionality analysis or her conclusion that, in all of the circumstances, the public interest in deporting the Appellant outweighed her personal circumstances as found to be the case. Ground 3 is therefore dismissed.
Conclusion
70. The Judge's determination demonstrates a thorough and detailed analysis of the evidence and contains findings of fact that were open to her and conclusions upon adherence to the relevant legal tests. As such, no error of law is made out, either material or otherwise.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.
DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24 th March 2025