United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2024-005333
	First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53259/2023

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On the 19 February 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

 

Between

 

JAKIR AHMED

(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Ms Sanders, counsel instructed by Morgan Hill solicitors

For the Respondent: Ms Young, Senior Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 7 February 2025

 

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1.              The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 27 September 2024, of First-tier Tribunal Judge Curtis ('the judge') to dismiss his human rights appeal.

Background

2.              The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was a human rights challenge brought against the respondent's refusal, dated 28 February 2023, of the appellant's application to remain in the UK as the parent of a British child. The application was considered through the prism of the parent gateway of Appendix FM, EX.1 and paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules before consideration was given to the broader Article 8 claim outside of the rules. The centrepiece of the appeal was the contention that the appellant was seeking an order of the Family Court to permit him to have regular contact with his daughter following the irretrievable breakdown of his relationship with the child's mother.

3.              The length of time the appellant had resided in the UK, and the continuity of that period, were additional points of dispute between the parties.

Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

4.              The appeal was heard by the judge on 13 September 2024 before dismissing the appeal on human rights grounds in a decision promulgated on 27 September 2024.

5.              The overarching legal principles which apply to Article 8 human rights appeals were summarised by the judge between [4] and [6] of his decision. At [13], the judge recorded that he notified the parties at the hearing that he considered himself to be bound by CJ (family proceedings and deportation) South Africa [2022] UKUT 336 (IAC) and RS (immigration and family court proceedings) India [2012] UKUT 218 (IAC) and stood the matter down to afford the representatives an opportunity to digest the guidance and formulate any submissions they might wish to make. RS (India) is a reported decision of the Upper Tribunal. It was decided by a panel which included McFarlane LJ (as he then was) so that he could bring his depth of experience in Family Court proceedings. In the panel's decision, at [36]-[37], the following observations were made about the inter-relationship between immigration and family proceedings which involve the best interests and welfare of children:

Deputy Judge Woodcraft acknowledged the problem of 'who goes first' where there are parallel proceedings in immigration and family cases. The family court may well be assisted by knowing whether a person in the position of the appellant is likely to be able to remain in the United Kingdom and be an active presence in the child's life. The immigration court would be informed by the family court's assessment of the child's welfare.

Although both the Secretary of State and the judges of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal have a duty to treat the child's best interests as a primary consideration in the application of administrative action including immigration action that is likely to affect the child, the Tribunal does not have any means of assessing these matters for itself, in particular: there is no local authority or children's guardian, no access to the service provided by CAFCAS, and no independent means of ascertaining the wishes, concerns and interests of the child. It is generally not considered desirable to hear oral evidence from a child of tender years (below the age of 12) when this is likely to be a source of stress, anxiety and possibly tension with any caring parent. It would be undesirable if the child felt responsible in some way for the removal of an offending parent.

6.              At [43] and [44], the tribunal posed a series of questions (the ' RS (India) questions') which immigration judges should ask themselves when confronted with an Article 8 human rights appeal at a time when there are concurrent family court proceedings:

[43] In our judgment, when a judge sitting in an immigration appeal has to consider whether a person with a criminal record or adverse immigration history should be removed or deported when there are family proceedings contemplated the judge should consider the following questions:

i) Is the outcome of the contemplated family proceedings likely to be material to the immigration decision?

ii) Are there compelling public interest reasons to exclude the claimant from the United Kingdom irrespective of the outcome of the family proceedings or the best interest of the child?

iii) In the case of contact proceedings initiated by an appellant in an immigration appeal, is there any reason to believe that the family proceedings have been instituted to delay or frustrate removal and not to promote the child's welfare?

iv) In assessing the above questions, the judge will normally want to consider: the degree of the claimant's previous interest in and contact with the child, the timing of contact proceedings and the commitment with which they have been progressed, when a decision is likely to be reached, what materials (if any) are already available or can be made available to identify pointers to where the child's welfare lies?

[44] Having asked those questions, the judge will then have to decide:-

i) Does the claimant have at least an Article 8 right to remain until the conclusion of the family proceedings?

ii) If so should the appeal be allowed to a limited extent and a discretionary leave be directed?

iii) Alternatively, is it more appropriate for a short period of an adjournment to be granted to enable the core decision to be made in the family proceedings?

iv) Is it likely that the family court would be assisted by a view on the present state of knowledge of whether the appellant would be allowed to remain in the event that the outcome of the family proceedings is the maintenance of family contact between him or her and a child resident here?

7.              At [47], the tribunal considered the information which could usefully be exchanged between the two jurisdictions:

In addressing these questions there will need to be informed communication between the judge deciding the immigration question and the judge deciding the family question. It is important that a system be established so that both jurisdictions can be alerted to proceedings in the other and appropriate relevant information can be exchanged, without undermining principles of importance to both jurisdictions.

8.              The guidance in RS (India) was endorsed by the Upper Tribunal in CJ (South Africa) save for the question at [44(ii)] of RS (India) in view of the change in the law which meant that it was no longer possible for an Article 8 human rights appeal to be allowed to a limited extent.

9.              For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the decision of Judge Curtis:

•          In summarising the relevant immigration history, at [2], the judge noted the appellant's claim that he arrived in the UK under a work permit which was valid between 2 October 2005 and 2 October 2006 and thereafter overstayed until he made an application on 28 March 2020 based on his family and private life which was treated as valid until 6 February 2023.

•          At paragraph [7], the judge identified the documentary material which had been put before him including a bundle the appellant had prepared for the purposes of a hearing in the Family Court on 28 May 2024 and two further orders of the Family Court from May and June 2024.

•          The judge recorded that neither side applied to adjourn the hearing ([13]).

•          The issues to be resolved in the appeal were articulated at [11]:

i. Whether the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with his daughter such as to bring para. EX.1 into play; and

ii. Beyond that, the Appellant argues that the refusal of his application amounts to a disproportionate breach of rights enjoyed under article 8 ECHR which calls for an assessment outside of the Rules.

•          The first of these issues was resolved against the appellant for the reasons set out at [15]-[16]. It was found to be uncontroversial that he was the female child's biological father. She was born in June 2020, and he had not had any contact with, or direct access to, her for over three years since 1 August 2021, which was when his relationship with her mother broke down. Overall, it was found that he lived in York, 200 miles away from his daughter, who resided in London with her mother and that he did not play any role in her upbringing.

•          From paragraph [17], the judge turned his attention to the second issue, the proportionality assessment under Article 8 of the ECHR. He summarised the procedural history of the Family Court proceedings at [18]-[20].

•          At paragraph [19], the judge summarised in some detail the Family Court hearing of 21 August 2023:

A further hearing was held on 21 August 2023. The Appellant's representative was said to have been sick and only attended after the hearing had been concluded. AN had attended the hearing with K. It was noted that the schedule of allegations from AN, directed by the court on 13 February 2023, was more than four months' late "without a statement and that some of the allegations do not appear to go to welfare issues". AN was invited to review the schedule with her new solicitors. There had been no disclosure from the police, the Respondent (i.e., the Home Office) or from the local council, despite a direction at the last hearing. The court could not therefore make a decision about the necessity of a fact-finding hearing. AN disclosed that the Appellant had not taken up any indirect contact following the hearing of 13 February 2023. The matter was adjourned until the first available date after 30 October 2023.

•          Between paragraphs [21] and [24], the judge set out, in considerable detail, the procedural history of the appeal proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal. At [23], it was found to be "unsatisfactory" that the appellant's representatives (who were also on record as his representatives in the Family Court proceedings) had been inactive in failing to contact the Family Court between August 2023 and May 2024 during a period when extensive efforts were being undertaken to case manage the appeal in the First-tier Tribunal.

•          The judge described, at [24], the background to a decision he took on the papers to refuse an adjournment application mounted on the basis that a hearing was listed before the Family Court on 29 October 2024. The reasons which underpinned that earlier decision were reproduced:

Principally for the reasons set out in my Directions notice of 11 June 2024 and noting that the hearing in the family court of 29 October 2024 is merely a directions hearing and that, subsequent to that, there appears to be the need for a fact-finding hearing in relation to the Appellant's ex-partner's allegations of domestic abuse and then, in light of whatever findings are made thereat, a final hearing of the Appellant's application, the application for an adjournment is refused because to do so would incorporate significant delay to the resolution of the appeal, much of which has been brought about by the Appellant's own unwillingness to properly engage with his application at the family court.

•          At [25], it was reiterated that the appellant's representative had not renewed the application to adjourn at the substantive hearing.

•          In introducing his consideration of the RS (India) questions, the judge said this at [28]:

[...] I did not hear submissions about whether the Appellant had an adverse immigration history but I am entirely satisfied, on the basis that it is his account that he overstayed the work permit, which expired on 2 October 2006, and did not seek to regularise his immigration status until 28 March 2020, after he had married AN by proxy. On his own account (and I make no findings in this appeal as to whether he has continually resided in the UK since he entered in October 2005) he has an adverse immigration history because of his period of overstaying. I therefore proceed to address the individual questions.

•          In answer to the first RS (India) question, the judge found in the appellant's favour that the Family Court proceedings were likely to be material to the immigration decision because he recognised that if it were to succeed this would confer the foundation to establish family life with his daughter ([29]).

•          Addressing the RS (India) question of whether there were compelling public interest reasons to exclude the appellant irrespective of the outcome of the Family Court proceedings, the judge, at [30], again found in the appellant's favour. Despite his inability to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, his lengthy period of overstaying and his previous caution for assaulting his former partner, none of these factors were regarded as elevating the public interest to a compelling level.

•          From paragraph [31], the judge found there to be substantial evidence that the family proceedings were brought to delay or frustrate removal. The judge's reasons for answering this RS (India) question adversely to the appellant are set out over the course of 14 detailed paragraphs. It would overburden my decision to reproduce this analysis in full, but, in broad summary, the following matters attracted weight in the assessment:

o    The appellant had shown very little interest in, or contact with, the child, did not rely on any photographic evidence of the relationship prior to their separation, produced little evidence of material support for the child or of attempts to agree contact with the child's mother ([31(i)-(vi)]).

o    There was a significant delay of almost a year before proceedings were instituted in the Family Court to pursue contact with the child and this was a matter of a few months before the application for leave to remain was lodged ([31(vii)]).

o    The appellant demonstrated little commitment to prosecuting his application before the Family Court and both he and his representatives appeared to be little more than bystanders as proceedings languished for many months without progress. He did not attend a hearing to decide whether a fact-finding process would be required ([31(viii)-(ix) & (xi)]). At paragraph [31(x)], the judge concluded that the appellant had deliberately declined to press his application in the Family Court and that this stood in stark contrast with the vigorousness with which the First-tier Tribunal appeal had been pursued.

o    As a judge who also sits in the Family Court with a private law ticket, judicial notice was taken of the remaining procedural steps to be taken before a final conclusion might be reached. The family Court proceedings were regarded to be unlikely to draw to a close before the end of Summer 2025. [31(xii)]

o    "Pointers" were discussed which tended to suggest that the child's best interests lay in not having direct contact with the appellant. These "pointers" included a caution for assaulting the child's mother and the contents of a safeguarding report from CAFCASS. However, it was noted that a fact-finding hearing had not yet taken place. The overall conclusion was reached, on the available evidence, that the child's best interests were in continuing to live with her mother without contact from the appellant. [31(xiii)]

•          Against the backdrop of these findings, the judge asked himself, at [32], whether he should adopt the "usual" approach of allowing an Article 8 human rights appeal because of the extant proceedings before the Family Court. He found that on weighing all of the factors, he did not have a right founded on Article 8 to remain in the UK to pursue the Family Court proceedings and that there was nothing to indicate that he could not do so from Bangladesh in any event.

•          It was decided, partly in reliance on the disclosure order directed of the Home Office, that the Family Court would be assisted by knowing the outcome of the appeal ([34]).

•          The appellant was found not to have family life in the UK, but it was accepted that he had established a private life which would be interfered with by the refusal decision ([35]).

•          In assessing public interest in the proportionality analysis, the judge attached significant weight to the maintenance of effective immigration controls and noted that the appellant did not meet the rules. His standard of English was held against him applying s.117B(2) of the 2002 Act. There was nothing to suggest that he would become a financial burden on UK taxpayers - this was treated as a neutral factor. [36]-[38]

•          In weighing in the balance the appellant's private life factors, the judge said this at [39]:

On the Appellant's side of the scales are the following factors. He claims to have been in the UK since October 2005. I am not prepared to make a finding that that is the case given this was not an appeal about long-residence and the Appellant has not therefore provided documentary evidence that might demonstrate the continuity of his habitation in the UK. However, even on his own case, he does not meet the 20-year residence route. If he did remain after his work permit expired, he spent around 14 or 15 years in the UK unlawfully as an overstayer and any private life built up when his immigration status was unlawful would, having considered s.117B(4), attract little weight. He did enjoy leave to remain from August 2020, two months after K was born, but his immigration status then was precarious and, having considered s.117B(5), it would also attract little weight. I have attached little weight to his private life because there were no particularly strong features of it that would justify anything more (noting that the statutory framework does not mean I am constrained by a straitjacket).

•          The competing public interest and private life factors were found to weigh in favour of the refusal being necessary and proportionate and did not occasion any unjustifiably harsh consequences ([40]). The refusal decision was not unlawful, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed ([41]-[42]).

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

10.          The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:

                                                   I.             Ground 1 - the judge erred in declining to reach a finding of fact about how long the appellant had resided in the UK given how central this matter was to the appellant's ground of appeal based on his Article 8 private life human rights.

                                                II.             Ground 2 - the assessment of the family life dimension of the appeal was tainted by a various errors of reasoning.

11.          In a decision dated 19 November 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Karbani granted permission for both grounds to be argued.

12.          On 29 January 2025, the appellant's representatives applied to rely on fresh evidence in support of the appeal under rule 15(2A) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules. The new evidence consisted of a notice of hearing produced by the Family Court showing that a fact-finding hearing had been listed on 3-4 April 2025. This date of hearing was first confirmed in November 2024, approximately two months after Judge Curtis' decision to dismiss the appeal. Upon querying how it could be said that this evidence could be relied upon to challenge the judge's preceding decision, Ms Sanders acknowledged that the evidence was potentially of greater value at a rehearing of the appeal if it was found that the judge's decision fell to be set aside as involving an error of law. Accordingly, she did not press the application, and I found that it would not be in the interests of fairness and justice to admit the evidence at this stage of the proceedings.

13.          At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Discussion

14.          The first ground of appeal is founded on the suggestion that the judge improperly closed his mind to important factual matters which went to the strength of the appellant's private life accumulated over his extended period of residence in the UK. The judge's approach to the length of the appellant's stay in the UK is to be seen primarily at [39] of his decision, but also at [28], in the context of addressing his mind to RS (India).

15.          At [28], the observation in brackets, that "[...] I make no findings in this appeal as to whether he has continually resided in the UK since he entered in October 2005" is tolerably clear that the judge declined to reach settled findings on the continuity of his residence since his arrival in 2005. The opening observation of [39] could have been expressed with greater clarity, but when considered in full, the judge is plainly referring again to his unwillingness to engage in the fiction that this was an appeal brought under the 20-year long residence threshold of paragraph 276ADE(1)(iii) of the Immigration Rules. It is in this context that the reference to continuity of residence can be seen to refer to a part of the rules which could not conceivably be met because it was common ground between the parties that the appellant had not resided in the UK for 20 years. In an appeal where it could not be sensibly suggested that paragraph 276ADE(1)(iii) could be satisfied on the bare asserted length of residence, there was simply nothing to be gained by assessing whether the period of residence, which fell short of 20 years, was over a continuous period. In any event, I am inclined to agree with the submission made by Ms Young that the evidence served on the appellant's behalf was simply not directed to the continuity of his residence in the UK - this was a point which the judge made himself at [39] of his decision and further underscores the proposition that this was the only narrow matter he was not minded to consider given the nature of the appeal before him. Beyond the unsupported assertions of the appellant, I was not directed to any evidence put before the judge which might have supported a finding that the appellant had been continuously resident in the UK for the period he had claimed.

16.          When the entirety of [39] is read fairly and naturally, it would be difficult to conclude that the judge disregarded the length of time (as opposed to the continuity of residence) which the appellant claimed to have been in the UK. On the contrary, the judge expressly referred to a period of overstaying of 14 or 15 years as being a factor which could only attract little weight when applying s.117B(4) of the 2002 Act. While this observation was expressed in contingent language by predicating this sentence with the use of the word "if", it brings into sharp relief that a more settled finding in the appellant's favour on the length of time he claimed to have been in the UK could not have materially assisted his case.

17.          The appellant's suggestion that the judge was required in law to reach settled findings of fact going to the precise length of his stay in the UK, and whether it was continuous, is exceptionally difficult to reconcile with an appeal where the 20-year threshold of paragraph 276ADE simply had no purchase on the undisputed fact that he had not been resident in the UK for 20 years, continuous or otherwise. The submission that the judge should have found that the appellant had been continuously resident in the UK for over 19 years resonates with an impermissible 'near-miss' argument.

18.          For the foregoing reasons, the judge's approach to this dimension of the appeal did not involve an error of law.

19.          Turning to the second ground of appeal, this challenge involved various discrete complaints about how the judge evaluated the RS (India) questions. During the error of law hearing, I queried whether it remained the appellant's position, as appeared to be suggested in the written grounds, that the judge erred in law in proceeding to hear the appeal when he did. I raised this point because it appeared to me that this would be a difficult argument to sustain in circumstances where a tactical forensic decision appeared to have been taken not to seek to renew the adjournment application which was previously refused by the same judge on the papers. Ms Sanders clarified that it was not suggested that the judge should have adjourned because no application was made at the hearing for him to do so. Instead, Ms Sanders was clear that the challenge was to the substance of the decision taken by the judge, not when he took that decision.

20.          The submissions coalesced around particular themes:

a)       The judge wrongly approached the allegations made by the child's mother as established before the family court had an opportunity to decide these controversial matters.

b)       The judge should have left the assessment of the child's best interests to the Family Court to resolve once it was fully equipped to do so.

c)        The judge misunderstood the guidance in RS (India) and wrongly decided to share his decision with the Family Court.

d)      The judge distorted the procedural history of the Family Court proceedings and wrongly found against the appellant in his commitment to those proceedings.

I will address each theme in turn.

The judge wrongly approached the allegations made by the child's mother as established before the family court had an opportunity to decide these controversial matters.

21.          Ms Sanders argued that the judge had unquestioningly taken at face value the allegations made, in the Family Court proceedings, by the child's mother. This submission founders on a fair and natural reading of the judge's reasons. The only allegation of violence which the judge treated as established was the caution accepted by the appellant which he admitted involved a slap to his former partner while the child was asleep in the property. In the same part of the decision, at [31(xiii)], the judge touched on concerns expressed within the CAFCASS report about the allegations of further domestic violence which might merit a fact-finding process. The judge expressly stated that the Family Court had yet to conduct a fact-finding process but indicated that there was evidence which pointed away from it being in the child's best interests for him to be in direct contact with her. The reference to "points" is instructive because it adopts the same phrasing used in the leading authorities which guides judges as to how they should approach their task in cases such as this. At [28] of the senior panel's decision in CJ (South Africa), the guidance in RS (India) was discussed whereupon one of the factors to be considered was "whether there are any materials that can be made available to identify pointers to where the child's welfare lies". This is precisely what the judge did at paragraph [31(xiii)] of his decision. In using the cautious and nuanced language of pointers he could discern from the material before him, he was faithfully applying the guidance in CJ (South Africa) as drawn from RS (India).

The judge should have left the assessment of the child's best interests to the Family Court to resolve once it was fully equipped to do so.

22.          It was argued that the judge was wrong to assess the best interests of the child before the Family Court could embark on a similar assessment informed by a fuller evidential picture than was available to the First-tier Tribunal. I unhesitatingly reject this proposition. On the contrary, the judge was required to assess the best interests of the child based on the evidence he had available to him. It would have been an error of law for him to neglect to assess this primary factor in the context of a human rights appeal which partly hinged on a family life claim made on the strength of a prospective father/daughter relationship. The judge's decision does not preclude the Family Court from deciding this question for itself in the course of those proceedings in due course. The reality is that both jurisdictions were seized of proceedings in which each would be required to assess the best interests of this child. One set of proceedings must necessarily conclude before the other and there is no fixed rule as to which set of proceedings should go first. The appellant's representatives certainly did not point to any authority which suggested that the Family Court enjoys precedence in this field and that the First-tier Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber is duty bound to wait until Family Court decisions on overlapping factual questions have been taken. The closest any of the authorities get to such a proposition is the "usual" approach of short adjournments in the First-tier Tribunal to permit Family Court proceedings to run their course. As the judge observed, the usual approach will sometimes need to give way to a different approach where the particular facts demand it. The judge explained in cogent terms why this was such a case, not least because he had no confidence that the application the appellant brought in the Family Court was being prosecuted with the necessary commitment such that any adjournment in the First-tier Tribunal was unlikely to be of short duration.

The judge misunderstood the guidance in RS (India) and wrongly decided to share his decision with the Family Court

23.          I found it difficult to understand how the decision taken by the judge to share his decision with the Family Court could amount to a material error of law. Even if the appellant is right that this was to misread the question set out at [44((iv)] of RS (India) because the consideration is directed at the likely implications of a decision favourable to an applicant in the Family Court to a contingent immigration decision, any misunderstanding does not strengthen the merits of the appellant's human rights appeal. The highest this contention could reach is that judge was wrong to conclude, based on RS (India), that it was appropriate to share his decision to dismiss the appeal. Had he decided not to share the decision, this could not have had any bearing on the outcome of the appeal.

The judge distorted the procedural history of the Family Court proceedings and wrongly found against the appellant in his commitment to those proceedings.

24.          The thrust of this complaint is that the judge adopted an imbalanced approach to his assessment of whether the appellant was motivated to pursue his application before the Family Court. The points taken against the appellant at [31(viii)-(ix) & (xi)] and [31(x)] were said to be notable because they failed to acknowledge other factors which had operated to delay the proceedings. This argument fails for two principal reasons. Firstly, simply because the judge did not mention these other factors (such as the delays brought about by the child's mother's failure to comply with directions) in the context of his findings at [31] is not to say that these additional matters were disregarded. The summary of the proceedings at [19] of the decision reveal that the judge was plainly mindful of the part played by the child's mother and other agencies in delaying the efficient progress of the Family Court proceedings. Secondly, at [31], the judge was directing his analysis to the appellant's conduct in the context of those proceedings. His task in asking himself the RS (India) questions was not to perform some kind of makeshift and broad review of the overall Family Court proceedings, but was instead to assess whether there was "any reason to believe that the family proceedings have been instituted to delay or frustrate removal, and not to promote the child's welfare". This naturally caused the judge to evaluate whether the appellant's conduct in those proceedings was reflective of prosecuting those proceedings with the kind of commitment which might be expected of a man working diligently to secure the right to have contact with his child. Put bluntly, in the context of this consideration, the judge was not concerned with whether other parties might also be at fault - his focus was rightly on the appellant and whether there was reason to believe that his motives for bringing the Family Court application was for reasons other than securing access to his child in her best interests.

25.          During the error of law hearing, I was taken to parts of the documentary material before the judge which it was said should have been the subject of express consideration by the judge. Examples were the appellant's assertions at paragraph 12 of his position statement and paragraph 4 of his witness statement before the Family Court where he professed his fervent wish to be permitted to have access to his daughter and the efforts he had made to secure that outcome. This struck me as a misconceived argument in which the judge's lawful findings of fact were challenged on the strength of a line-by-line analysis of evidence which was suggested to militate in favour of a different factual conclusion. This, together with emphasising other aspects of the evidence which may have weighed in favour of a finding that there was nothing sinister in the applicant or his representatives neglecting to chase the Family Court to progress the case, resonated with factual disagreements rather than errors of law. A different judge may have taken a different view of the facts, but that falls a considerable distance short of this judge having adopted an unlawful approach to his findings of fact or to have provided unlawfully inadequate reasons for those findings.

26.          Overall, the judge's carefully structured and meticulous assessment of the evidence in answering the RS (India) questions made it abundantly clear why the appeal was dismissed. The reasoning in support of the overall conclusions were cogent and properly directed to the matters which fell to be considered in lawfully deciding this appeal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the judge did not involve material errors of law. The appeal is dismissed, and the judge's decision shall stand.

 

 

Paul Lodato

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

15 February 2025