United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

 

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2024-005531
	First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/54660/2023 LP/00913/2024

 

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21 February 2025

 

 

Before

 

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

 

 

Between

 

PA

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

v

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr J Greer, instructed by Broudie Jackson Canter Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

 

 

Heard at Field House via cvp on 12 February 2025

 

 

Order Regarding Anonymity

 

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the Appellant] ( and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

 

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant ( and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court .

DECISION AND REASONS

1.               The Appellant is a national of Nigeria born on 1 March 1983. She has a history of sexual abuse and arrived in the United Kingdom on a visit visa on 9 March 2021 and made a protection claim in May 2021 on the basis that she was being forced into marriage and that her father had been threatened by the person to whom she was supposed to marry and his father. This application was refused in a decision dated 17 July 2023. The Appellant appealed against that decision and her appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal for hearing on 17 September 2024. In a decision and reasons promulgated on 27 September 2024 the appeal was dismissed.

2.               An application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was made on 9 October 2024 on the basis that the decision of the judge was confusing and difficult to understand. The grounds were particularised as follows:

2.1.          Ground 1: there was perversity in the judge's approach to the case in respect of the Appellant based on [15] of the refusal decision.

2.2.          Ground 2: there was perversity in that the judge purportedly found inconsistencies and at [16] of the decision it was unclear why the judge found the Appellant's evidence about being stalked to be inconsistent.

2.3.          Ground 3 asserted there was inadequate reasoning by the judge and in relation to [19] it was impossible to understand what was meant.

2.4.          Ground 4 asserts that the judge gave weight to immaterial considerations in relation to whether or not the Appellant was married to another individual, her explanation being that a third party stole her identity and used it for fraudulent purposes. The judge accepted this at [21] to [23] but then at [26] held it against the Appellant for not explaining her relationship history. It was asserted this could not properly undermine her general credibility.

2.5.          Ground 5 asserted that there was perversity in the finding as to the plausibility of the Appellant's claim and at [32] the judge was confused over the Appellant's account of being selected for forced marriage when a child rather than an adult.

3.        Permission to appeal was granted by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in a decision dated 3 December 2024 in the following terms:

"2. It is acknowledged that the decision is, in places, difficult to read, and the cross references to other documents is unhelpful. However, this in itself does not form the basis for a ground of appeal. The issue in this respect is whether it is capable of being understood. In addition, as to the substantive grounds pleaded, the majority are based on perversity, which is a high hurdle to overcome.

3. However, in respect of Ground 1, although the other points may have less merit, as to the point raised in paragraph 14 on inconsistency, it is arguable that the Judge's conclusions are contradictory. On this basis Ground 1 may be argued. As to Ground 2, it is arguable that the finding as to inconsistency is not adequately reasoned in the light of the evidence recited. It may be argued. Similarly as to Ground 3, it is arguable that, as set out, paragraph 19 is so difficult to read so as to not enable the Appellant to fully understood the point being made by the Judge. It may be argued. As to Ground 4, given the finding that the Respondent had not proven that the Appellant was married to OSO, and the recitation of the explanation given as to this matter by the Appellant, it is arguable that the criticism of her for not producing sufficient evidence on that matter is misplaced. It may be argued. Ground 5 may be argued also.

4. I am satisfied that it is arguable that the Judge made a material error of law. Consequently permission to appeal is granted on all grounds pleaded".

Hearing

4.        At the hearing Mr Lawson on behalf of the Home Office submitted that looking at the case overall it appeared to be extremely confusing and it was very hard to understand what the judge was trying to actually set out in the decision, for example, why the judge found against the Appellant for not reporting the forced marriage when she went to the police to report the burglary. Mr Lawson accepted that, considered holistically, there were material errors of law in the decision and reasons of the First-tier Tribunal.

5.        I accepted Mr Lawson's concession. I will now set out my reasons for so doing.

6.        As the First-tier Tribunal Judge who granted permission to appeal acknowledged, the fact a decision is difficult to read and confusing is not necessarily the basis for establishing a material error of law. Furthermore, the use of the term "perversity" is unhelpful as it requires a high threshold to be met and essentially amounts to a rationality challenge. However, I consider that the judge did make material errors of law in terms of his analysis of the Appellant's case. At [13] there is ultimately no clear finding as to whether or not the judge accepted the Appellant's evidence. At [14] the judge appeared to find inconsistencies where it is unclear as to what the basis was for those claimed inconsistencies between her interview, witness statement and oral evidence. At [16] and [18] the judge found an inconsistency as to whether or not the Appellant was being subjected to stalking because she was only grabbed on one incident, which fails to take account of the fact that she also said that she would see someone following her when walking on the street, which is consistent with her father's evidence. At [25]-[26] the judge's conclusions as to whether or not the Appellant was married and her relationship history were confused and appeared to rely on inconsistencies which were not necessarily present. At [32] the judge seemed to be confused about whether the Appellant was committed to a forced marriage as a child or as an adult based on the background evidence.

7.        As the Upper Tribunal held in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC) at [14] per Haddon Cave J, whilst it was not necessary or helpful for a judge to exercise every detail or issue raised in a case:

"It is, however, necessary for First-tier Tribunal judges to identify and resolve the key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons for preferring one case to the other so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.

8.        In this case I find that the key issues were not clearly resolved with clear reasons provided for the judge's conclusions.

9.        I sought the views of the parties as to outcome and both Mr Greer and Mr Lawson submitted that the appeal should be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo.

 

 

Notice of decision

10.    I set the decision of the First tier Tribunal aside. Due to the lack of clear findings a full fact finding exercise needs to be conducted and following Begum [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) I remit the appeal for a hearing de novo before the First-tier Tribunal in Manchester.

 

 

Rebecca Chapman

 

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

19 February 2025