Appeal No. EAT/442/91

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 5th October 1992

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)

	MR K GRAHAM CBE

	MR R H PHIPPS

MS V INGRAMS	APPELLANT

LONDON BOROUGH OF LEWISHAM	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

	PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MS V F INGRAMS
(In person)

	

	MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT):  By an Originating Application dated 28th November 1990, Ms Ingrams alleged that she had been unfairly dismissed by her employers, the London Borough of Lewisham.  She had been the Personal Assistant to the Head of the Building Works, clearly a responsible position.  The fact that she was so appointed comes as no surprise to us in view of, what I hope she will not think is a condescending remark, the extremely able way in which she has presented her appeal before us, and no doubt presented her case before the Industrial Tribunal.

	The issue before the Tribunal was, at once, a simple and yet often a difficult one, namely, whether the provisions of Section 67 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, and in particular subsection (2), had been complied with so as to bring the complaint made to the Industrial Tribunal within time.

	Ms Ingrams was dismissed on the 20th August 1990 without notice;  her Originating Application was received on the 4th December 1990, it was therefore 15 days out of time.  
	The Applicant had been represented in her proceedings in front of the Borough by her union official, a Mr Collins, who is a Branch Secretary.  There had been two days of disciplinary hearing and then there had been an appeal, which was not concluded until March 1991. 

	The hearing before the Industrial Tribunal was on the 10th June 1991, it is abundantly clear that the hearing of the internal appeal before the Borough was not completed until some 3 or 4 months after the date which was relevant for the presentation of the Originating Application.  The Tribunal, having dealt with the question of the time limits, were extremely critical of the way in which the timing of appeals took place in front of the Local Authority.  There were some arguments on either side, as almost inevitably there are in any set of circumstances, but the Tribunal clearly felt that the Borough should look carefully at its internal procedures to see that this did not happen again.  What happened was this Ms Ingrams, being guided and advised throughout by Mr Collins, failed to realise the time limits for bringing her case before the Industrial Tribunal.  She was aware of a right to complain of unfair dismissal before an Industrial Tribunal, but she was given the specific advice by Mr Collins, to wait until the completion of her internal appeal against dismissal before putting in her application to the Industrial Tribunal.  As has been pointed out by one of the lay Members of this Tribunal, who is extremely experienced in these matters, as soon as one sees an element of delay it is important to concentrate on the time limits and it is clearly a matter that should be at the forefront of one's mind.  As Ms Ingrams conducted her own case, Mr Collins was not called and was not a witness before the Tribunal.  However, it is clear that he gave advice and was acting throughout and that either his advice was bad or he failed to appreciate what was happening. 

	The Tribunal looked at four possibilities of what had occurred, without actually asking Ms Ingrams what the advice had been at the later stages.  They looked at the possibility that Mr Collins had forgotten to remind Ms Ingrams about the three months, alternatively he had given no advice about it, alternatively that he had given advice which she had forgotten about or he had plainly given the wrong advice.  They said, whichever way one looked at that situation it was his responsibility and that it would have been reasonably practicable for Ms Ingrams to have presented her claim within time.  They relied, of course, on the well known principle that an applicant is not entitled to say, although in the hands of competent advisers, nevertheless, he or she did not know of the time limits involved.  The expression is used "hide behind" but as we have explained to Ms Ingrams, there is no criticism of her whatsoever.

	In her able submissions to us, Ms Ingrams made a number of points.  First, she submitted that one of the four possible events that could have occurred and which were considered by the Tribunal, was her own fault.  Therefore it did not fall into the same category as the other three and therefore that there was an error in the reasoning.  I am afraid we cannot accept that that is a legal flaw in the reasoning of this decision.  As we have pointed out, we are unable to help Ms Ingrams unless we find an error of law.

	Secondly, she submits that no actual time limit was mentioned.  That may be so, but nevertheless where this principle of the responsibility of advisers is being considered it is unlikely that any specific time limit would have been mentioned because the advisers are deemed to know the time limits well;  they are there, the usual three month time limit in the Act.

	Lastly, and perhaps, most pungently, she criticises the Local Authority for not telling her that time was running out.  The Tribunal could not accept that, and nor indeed can we;  it cannot be thought necessary, or even a reasonable practice, that an employer should keep an eye on the time limit for every single employee who is dismissed or made redundant, as the case may be.  Therefore, that criticism is not well founded.

	It follows therefore, that despite the careful way in which this appeal had been presented, we find ourselves quite unable to help Ms Ingrams, who seem to be most unfortunate in the advice that she received her trade union, the National Union of Public Employees.  As was suggested to her by the trade union Member of this appeal, sitting today, if she refers this Judgment to the Trade Union it may be that consideration would be given to any question of compensation should she have been entitled to it on the facts of the case, about which we must say at once, that we know nothing.  But that is not before us and it is not for us, strictly, to advise her, but it may be the sensible course for her to take.

	In the circumstances, therefore, we are quite unable to help and the appeal must be dismissed at this juncture.