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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Starr v British Railways Board [1992] UKEAT 613_91_2901 (29 January 1992) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1992/613_91_2901.html Cite as: [1992] UKEAT 613_91_2901 |
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MRS M L BOYLE
MR R H PHIPPS
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MISS J STARR
(The Appellant in person)
For the Respondents MR WILLIAM NORRIS
(Of Counsel)
The Solicitors Department
British Railways Board
MacMillan House
PO Box 1016
Paddington Station
London
W2 1YE
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an Appeal by Miss Starr from an Order of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (South) ordering her to produce her birth certificate.
The issues arise because by an Originating Application dated the 31st July 1991 Miss Starr alleges that she was the subject of unlawful sexual discrimination. Her employers were British Rail, she was employed by them from the 1st October 1990 to the 18th July 1991, she therefore did not have the qualification period for a case under the 1978 Act and brings her case under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
When she was employed by British Rail she was employed as a woman. She has been very frank with us and it is quite clear that she has changed her sex and become a woman. That follows from a statement, a very frank statement, that she was born male. That statement made to us was not before the learned Chairman who made the Order for disclosure of the birth certificate. However, that statement now has clarified the issues greatly. We will direct that it forms part of the pleadings in this case and in so far as it contains admissions they are admissions in the case.
As a result we have to consider whether on the normal basis of the rules for Discovery it was necessary that the birth certificate be produced either for the clarification and decision of issues or for the saving of costs. We have reached the conclusion that in the light of the way in which Miss Starr has now helped us to understand her case, this is not necessary and the Appeal will therefore be allowed.
Mr Norris has made the point that the Industrial Tribunal will need, or may need, to decide what was the sex of Miss Starr at birth. Even without her birth certificate there is now a very substantial body of evidence upon which they could decide that fact, and the relevance of that fact is a matter for them. Indeed, certain issues may arise which are difficult, not of solution in fact, but of relevance in law to the proceedings before them. It is not for us to seek to analyse or decide those points of law we prefer to wait until the case has been heard and the facts have been found. In any event it may, or may not, be necessary to decide those difficult points of law, but those are matters for the future. At the moment the sole issue before us is as to whether or not the Appeal should be allowed on the Order to produce a birth certificate. We decide that it is not necessary at this juncture, therefore the Appeal will be allowed and it is allowed. The matter will be now heard by an industrial tribunal.