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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Winder v Circle Freight International [1994] UKEAT 170_93_0702 (7 February 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1994/170_93_0702.html Cite as: [1994] UKEAT 170_93_0702, [1994] UKEAT 170_93_702 |
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I N T E R N A L
At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)
MRS M L BOYLE
MR J A SCOULLER
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR D G V WINDER
(In Person)
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at London (North) on the 4th January 1993. For reasons notified to the parties on the 14th January 1993 the Tribunal unanimously decided that Mr Winder's dismissal by his employers, Circle Freight International, was fair.
Mr Wilder was dissatisfied with the decision. By a Notice of Appeal dated 15th February 1993 he appealed to this Tribunal on the grounds set out in an attached letter.
The background to the dispute is that Mr Wilder was employed as Director of Transport and Distribution by Circle Freight International, who carry on business transporting cargo. His employment began on 28th March 1983 and he was earning a basic salary of £28,000 per year until that employment was terminated on the 12th May 1992.
By his Notice of Application, presented to the Tribunal on the 6th July 1992, Mr Winder complained of unfair dismissal. He stated that:
"On the 12th May 1992 I was handed a letter written by my Personal Manager, that my contract of employment would be terminated with effect from the same date on grounds of redundancy.
I dispute that this was a genuine reason for my dismissal because the jobs that I was doing are still there and being done by various other persons . . . if the reason for my dismissal was redundancy my employer acted unreasonably in treating this as a sufficient reason for dismissing me because they failed to discuss any of the jobs that I controlled prior to allocating same to other persons or to give me sufficient prior warning of redundancy and/or they failed to take reasonable steps to find me suitable alternative employment within the Company or with an associated company."
Circle Freight International disputed the claim of unfair dismissal and asserted in their Notice of Appearance, dated 29th July 1992, that Mr Winder had been dismissed by reason of redundancy, that they had acted reasonably in treating that as a sufficient reason and had acted reasonably in the manner of carrying out the dismissal. They had been informed and consulted concerning his redundancy and denied that there had been any unfairness in his selection for redundancy.
Those were the issues between the parties which the Industrial Tribunal was asked to resolve at the hearing last year.
The Tribunal, having stated the background to the dispute referred to the fact that Mr Winder was aware that there was going to be a re-organisation. He assumed that, because of his contact with the previous management of the Company, prior to a take-over, his job was secure and that he would be in charge of the re-organised Transport Division. There were discussions in April between Mr Winder and management about the situation. He was informed of the possibility that he might be made redundant. He was informed that he would be considered for another appropriate position within the re-organised Company. He was interviewed for a post in May, but was not thought to be suitable for it. The Tribunal found as a fact that Mr Wilder accepted that there was a need for reduction in staff and that he admitted that there was no other comparable position in the Company to which he could have been moved. But he did not accept that he could not have fulfilled the position for which he was interviewed.
In paragraphs 9 and 10 the Tribunal came to these conclusions on the facts:
"9. We find from the evidence that there had to be a reduction in the number of personnel and, therefore, the applicant's job was redundant because of the reorganisation. The respondents had made enquiries as to whether they could suitably redeploy him elsewhere in the organisation and concluded that they could not do so. They had discussed the matter with him prior to his dismissal and he at no time appeared to have claimed that his job should not have been made redundant, neither did he seek to pursue the selection for redundancy with any of higher management.
10. We find, therefore, that the reason for dismissal was redundancy within Section 57(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. Section 59 of that Act does not apply as it was agreed that he was the only person in that particular position so that the selection procedures did not apply to him, and we find that, having regard to the reason shown by the respondents, the employer acted reasonably in treating this redundancy as a sufficient reason for dismissing the applicant within Section 57(3) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978."
Mr Winder, who conducted his case "in person" before the Industrial Tribunal, has conducted this appeal in person. We have pointed out to him that this Tribunal only has jurisdiction to deal with errors of law on the part of the Industrial Tribunal. It is not able to re-hear the evidence relating to the facts and it is not able to disturb the findings of fact made by the Tribunal, unless it is shown that there was in some way a mistrial of the hearing or an error of law in the way in which the decision was reached.
We have considered in some detail, with Mr Winder, the points which he makes in his letter of the 15th February 1993, in support of his appeal. Having discussed the matter with him at the hearing, and between ourselves, we are unable to find in this appeal any error of law on the part of the Tribunal. Mr Winder is not entitled to appeal against the findings of fact. In those circumstances there is no arguable point of law which could be dealt with at a full hearing of the Tribunal. We shall therefore dismiss the appeal at this preliminary hearing.