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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Piggin v Meason Freer & Co Ltd [1994] UKEAT 781_94_3011 (30 November 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1994/781_94_3011.html Cite as: [1994] UKEAT 781_94_3011

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BAILII case number: [1994] UKEAT 781_94_3011

Appeal No. EAT/781/94

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 30 November 1994

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE HOLLAND

MR ROY JACKSON

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MR G C PIGGIN          APPELLANT

MEASON FREER & CO LTD          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant MR P KILCOYNE

(of Counsel)

Messrs Gore Brownes

(Solicitors)

Rutland Centre

Halford Street

Leicester LE1 1TQ


 


MR JUSTICE HOLLAND: On 18 May and 9 June 1994, an Industrial Tribunal at Leicester heard an application by Mr Piggin alleging unfair dismissal by the Respondents on 12 November 1993. In the event, that Industrial Tribunal unanimously decided that the dismissal on that day was not unfair. In the result, Mr Piggin appeals against that finding. Of necessity, he has to contend that the finding was erroneous as a matter of law, so that this Tribunal can and should intervene by allowing the appeal and giving such other and further directions as then seem appropriate.

The matter has been listed before us on an ex parte basis and our immediate concern is as to whether the Appellant has demonstrated that his appeal is reasonably arguable, so that this Tribunal, properly directed and having heard both sides, could be minded to allow an appeal.

Turning then to the merits of the matter as presented to us this morning, it is conceded that within the reasons there is a plain indication that this Tribunal properly directed itself as to the appropriate principles of law.

What, however, is said is this: that in paragraphs 7 and 8, the Tribunal, in arriving at its decision, reached a conclusion which was not open to it as a reasonable tribunal of fact and to that extent the decision was perverse and, as perverse, was a decision which amounted to one that was erroneous in law.

This morning we do not have to decide and have not sought to decide the merits of that particular submission. In particular, we cannot do so finally, because we have not heard from the Respondents at all but, having listened to Mr Kilcoyne's careful submission, we are satisfied that we should adjourn this appeal and restore it for hearing when the other side can be represented to argue its position. We do so without making any further comment about the merits of the matter or, indeed, the merits of Mr Kilcoyne's submissions. All we are satisfied about is that they can be properly developed before a full tribunal on an inter partes basis.

That concludes the extent of our deliberations this morning, save that we are minded to direct that the Chairman's notes of evidence be transcribed and be made available for this Tribunal and the parties at the subsequent hearing.