Appeal No. EAT/814/93

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 4th May 1994

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

	MR J D DALY

	MR T THOMAS CBE

MR K D SKERRITT	APPELLANT

LONDON BOROUGH OF HACKNEY	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

	PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR K SKERRITT
(In Person)

	MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT):  This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at London (North) on the 1st July 1993.  For reasons notified to the parties on the 9th August 1993 the Tribunal unanimously decided that Mr Skerritt had not been unfairly dismissed by the London Borough of Hackney.

	Mr Skerritt, who was represented at the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal by Miss Jordan from the Free Representation Unit, was dissatisfied with the decision and decided to appeal.  His Notice of Appeal is dated 9th August 1993.

	At the hearing today, which is a preliminary hearing to decide whether there is an arguable point of law in the case, Mr Skerritt did not have the benefit of representation.  We are, however, satisfied from reading the papers and hearing what Mr Skerritt had to say on the appeal, as well as reading some notes which he handed in, that all the points, which could have been made on this appeal by a representative, have been made by Mr Skerritt in the argument.

	The proceedings against the Hackney Council were started by Mr Skerritt when he presented an application to the Industrial Tribunal on the 6th July 1992.  He complained of unfair dismissal from his position of Administrative Assistant in the Asbestos Section.  He had worked for the Council from the 3rd November 1975 down to the date of his dismissal on the 15th April 1992.  He stated in his Notice of Application that he had, before his dismissal, suffered a period of sick leave resulting from stress and anxiety caused by events at work.  He complained that he was not offered any counselling or assistance by his employer and he was not interviewed with regard to re-deployment.  He applied for re-deployment to a post of Technician Engineer, but heard nothing from the Council.  He was dismissed from the Council on payment of three months' pay in lieu of notice in April 1992.

	The Tribunal went into the details of the points made by Mr Skerritt in his complaint and by Miss Jordan on his behalf at the hearing.  They heard representations and evidence from the Council.  The Tribunal set out in some detail the history of the events leading up to Mr Skerritt's dismissal.  The conclusions of the Tribunal are stated in paragraph 5 as follows:
		"The Applicant was dismissed and the effective date of dismissal was 15 April 1992.  The category of reason for the purposes of Section 57 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 was capability.  The dismissal was fair having regard to the provision in Section 57(3) of the Act because the Respondent had consulted with the Applicant throughout the period of his absence and the level of consultation was reasonable.  The medical prognosis was very poor and the Respondent had to weigh up its own needs against the needs of the Applicant.  In the circumstances it was entitled to conclude that its own needs should prevail over those of the Applicant.  The Applicant's previous job was unfilled and the Respondent was being put to cost and inconvenience in trying to keep the post open for him.  The other matter which arises is that of the Applicant's position under the Respondent's Guidelines for redeployment.  We are satisfied that the Applicant attended meetings with the Respondent's Personnel Officers between February and the date of his dismissal at which three job opportunities were proposed.  It is unfortunate that the only one that he chose to pursue was the one for which he did not possess the relevant background and experience.  Although the Applicant complained of the service that he received from these Personnel Officers it is very strange that upon dismissal the only ground for appeal was that he was permanently incapacitated and should have received a medical retirement.  In the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the Respondents undertaking) we find that the Respondent acted reasonably in treating the Applicant's ill health as a sufficient reason for dismissing him."

The reference to an appeal was an appeal that Mr Skerritt had brought against his dismissal. That appeal was heard and dismissed.

	In his argument and in the notes which he handed in for us to read, Mr Skerritt made these points.  First, he questioned the correctness of the statement in paragraph 5 of the decision that the Council was entitled to conclude that its own needs should prevail over those of Mr Skerritt.  Mr Skerrit went into more detail about the points he wished to make about redeployment.  He said that the Tribunal was wrong to have found that the Council had acted fairly, because the Council had not adhered to its own redeployment procedure.  He said that the Tribunal was wrong to have concluded that he was offered three positions.  There was no evidence upon which that conclusion could have been reached.  He said that the Tribunal failed to enquire whether the jobs, which were purported to have been offered to him, were within his capacity.  In those circumstances Mr Skerritt submitted that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal should be reversed, or the Industrial Tribunal should be asked to review its decision.

	We have considered those points made carefully and accurately by Mr Skerritt.  The difficulty that we have is that they are all points which relate to the facts found by the Tribunal.  They do not raise any question of law, by which we mean, a question on the meaning of the Employment Protection Act or on the way in which it should be applied to these facts.  The Tribunal has found as a fact that efforts were made by the Council to redeploy Mr Skerritt in another position.  The Tribunal has found as a fact that there were levels of consultation that were reasonable and that efforts were made to find other jobs for which, unfortunately, Mr Skerritt did not possess the necessary background and experience thought by the Council to be necessary.

	In those circumstances, there is not a point of law.  We are sorry that Mr Skerritt has had the difficulties that he has had with his health, resulting in the loss of a job. That is not a legal question which we have jurisdiction to hear.  In those circumstances the appeal will be dismissed.