Appeal No. EAT/861/94

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 25 October 1994

	Before

	HIS HONOUR JUDGE J HULL QC

	MR L D COWAN

	MR W MORRIS

MR D WOOD	APPELLANT

BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

	PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY
OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

	JUDGE HULL QC:	In this case Mr Wood, who is a works supervisor at Crofton, was employed by British Railways Board and had been employed by them since August 1974.  He had risen to the position of works supervisor and on 18 November 1993, after apparently some unpleasantness, he was dismissed for using bad language to his manager.  We do not need to say any more about it.  

	He complained to the Industrial Tribunal at Leeds and on 23 June 1994, the Industrial Tribunal, sitting at Leeds under the chairmanship of Mr Hesselberth, gave their decision.  Summary Reasons were given on 23 June and said that they found that the reason given was one falling within the Act of 1978 and they found that the dismissal was fair having regard to the criteria in Section 57(3) of the Act.  It was a dismissal following a disciplinary hearing on which findings of fact were made. 

	Thereafter Mr Wood was minded to appeal.  He had 42 days from the despatch of the Full Reasons in which to appeal under our rules and under the Industrial Tribunal Rules, Rule 10, he had 21 days to apply for the Full Reasons of the Industrial Tribunal.  In fact, he did not apply until too late.  Apparently, a letter was written on 1 August by solicitors acting on his behalf and the Chairman asked the Secretary of the Tribunals to reply as follows:

		"Appreciating that the applicant was not represented by Messrs Jones Goodall [the solicitors] or indeed, other Solicitors, he was nevertheless represented by an experienced full-time Union Official capable of advising on time limits and procedures.  Accordingly I am not in this case prepared to exercise my discretion to extend the time limit and the application for extended reasons is refused".

	So, without the extended reasons of course Mr Wood cannot appeal.  There is this relatively short time limit and the question whether to extend this in any case must depend on what is put forward by the Applicant.  

	It must be a matter of discretion for the Chairman.  The Chairman has exercised his discretion and says that he will not extend time and give Full Reasons, which would of course involve the Tribunal in considerable labour.

	Whether or not that appears harsh, the fact is that there is a time limit for a purpose and the Industrial Tribunal, and not ourselves, has the discretion to extend it.  There is an application to us arising from this.  No grounds are shown to us for saying that the Chairman exercised his discretion improperly and the Applicant himself has not appeared before us today.  

	This case is in our list under our Practice Direction to see whether we can discover any point of law.  It matters not whether we, or any of us, would have exercised our discretion in the same way as the Chairman did.  Indeed, it is quite impossible for us to say; we know so much less about the facts.  

	We none of us think that there is any point of law disclosed here and in those circumstances the appeal falls to be dismissed at this stage and we so order.