Appeal No. EAT/419/94

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 28 July 1995

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE TUCKEY

	MR A E R MANNERS

	MR S M SPRINGER MBE

MR A P SUMMERS	APPELLANT

KINSON COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION 	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR
	ON BEHALF OF THE 
	APPELLANT

	

For the Respondents	MR P D BROOM
Solicitor
	Messrs Woodford & Ackroyd
	Director Generals House
	Rockstone Place
	Southampton
	SO15 2EP

	MR JUSTICE TUCKEY:   This is an appeal against a decision of the Southampton Industrial Tribunal when following a preliminary hearing on 8 March 1994 presided over by the Chairman alone, the Tribunal decided that Mr Summers did not have two years' continuous employment and that he was not dismissed for an inadmissible reason and so it did not have jurisdiction to hear his complaint of unfair dismissal.  

	The Appellant has not appeared before us today and has written a courteous letter explaining why that is so.  Nevertheless, we have considered the papers before us, including his Notice of Appeal.  Essentially, this complains that he was summoned to a preliminary hearing to decide what was the effective date of termination of his employment and whether his complaint was made within the prescribed three month time limit, and found himself facing a hearing which decided the points which we have already identified.

	Mr Broom, who appeared for the Respondents before the Tribunal, has explained to us what happened as follows.  When Mr Summers came before the Chairman for the preliminary hearing it was apparent from his IT1 that because he was asserting that his employment began on 13 January 1992 and he was constructively dismissed on 2 September 1993, he did not have the necessary two year qualifying period and so, on the face of it, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear his complaint.  Because of what he said about Health and Safety in the IT1 the Chairman suggested that he might be able to get round the difficulty which he apparently faced, by saying that he was constructively dismissed for an inadmissible reason, that is to say, related to Health and Safety, where a two year continuous period of employment is not a pre-requisite to a complaint of unfair dismissal.  With, we are told, Mr Summers's consent, the Chairman then proceeded to investigate the matter and his conclusion was (and we state the matter shortly, since it is not the conclusion that is the subject of the appeal, but the way in which the hearing took place) that Mr Summers was not, in fact, constructively dismissed as he says, but resigned by letter dated 1 September 1993.  
	The Health and Safety Inadmissible Reason could have applied if Mr Summers had been dismissed since, as chance would have it, the relevant statutory provisions came into force on 31 August 1993.  But the Chairman considered whether any of the matters identified in Section 57A applied to the Applicant's case and concluded that they did not.  There was therefore, no dismissal for an inadmissible reason and so the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear Mr Summers's complaint.

	As we have already said, there is in fact no appeal against these findings.  The appeal is against the way in which the matter proceeded.  We have the Chairman's notes.  There is no record of the Applicant having objected to the hearing proceeding to consider what was effectively a life-line thrown to him by the Chairman since, on the face of it, his claim fell to be dismissed without any investigation at all.  We are satisfied that Mr Summers had the opportunity to put his case.  It was fully and fairly considered by the Chairman who reached the conclusions to which we have referred.

	We can see no grounds upon which this Appeal Tribunal can, or should, interfere with the Industrial Tribunal's decision and accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.