Appeal No. EAT/280/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 26 September 1996

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J HICKS QC
MR A E R MANNERS
MR G H WRIGHT MBE

SHORROCK GUARDS LTD	APPELLANT	
(1) MR J SCREEN
(2) UK GUARDING SERVICES LTD	RESPONDENTS	

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR TOBY HOOPER
(of Counsel)
Securicor Management Services
Securicor Park House
15 Carshalton Road
Sutton
Surrey SM1 4LD	
For the 1st Respondent

For the 2nd Respondent	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT

MR MARTYN WEST
(Advocate)
Peninsula Business Services Ltd
Stamford House
361/365 Chapel Street
Manchester
M3 5JY	

 JUDGE J HICKS QC:      We allow this appeal since that conclusion is consented to by all parties.  It is not necessary to give an extended judgment with full reasons.  The point involved is however, a very short and simple one.  

	The application was on the basis that the employee was dismissed for a reason connected with a Transfer of Undertakings.  It was common ground that at the date of the transfer and of the dismissal he had been employed for less than two years and therefore would not have been within the protection of what might be called the ordinary provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, but the Industrial Tribunal held (and no criticism is made of them in this respect) that they were bound by a decision of this Tribunal, Milligan v Securicor Cleaning Ltd to hold that the effective certain Directives under European law was that the fact of employment of less than two years did not afford any defence when the dismissal was in connection with a Transfer of Undertakings.  

	The Court of Appeal has now in the case of MRS Environmental Services v Marsh decided that Milligan was wrongly decided; that the two-year qualification period is necessary in such circumstances and since the employee admittedly therefore did not qualify, that is the basis (a perfectly understandable basis) which we approve on which has been consent to the allowance of the appeal and we therefore order that it be allowed to the extent of dismissing the claim of unfair dismissal.  There are other aspects which are not affected by that, but that is the decision that has been consented to by all parties and which we make.