Appeal No. EAT/706/94

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 2 May 1996

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

	MR P M SMITH

	MRS R A VICKERS

HAROLD SUPPLIES PLC	APPELLANTS

MR J JACKSON	RESPONDENT

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellants	MR J RAMSDEN
(of Counsel)
Messrs Layard Horsfall
Solicitors
328 Upper Street
Islington
London
N1 2XQ

For the Respondent	MR JULIAN BENSON
(of Counsel)
Messrs Goodhand & Forsyth
Solicitors
Central Parade
Victoria Road
Horley
Surrey
RH6 7PW

	MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT):    We made an order this morning revoking our order of 30 November 1995 and putting in its place a fresh order for the payment of £8,500 forthwith to Mr Jackson, and for the immediate taxation of the costs of the appeal referred to in paragraph 1 of the agreement of 13 November 1995.

	We have now been asked to make an order for costs on the hearing of this application this morning.  Under Rule 34 of the 1993 Rules it is provided that: 

		"(1)  Where it appears to the Appeal Tribunal that any proceedings were unnecessary, improper or vexatious or there has been unreasonable delay or other unreasonable conduct in bringing or conducting the proceedings the Tribunal may order the party at fault to pay any other party the whole or such part as it thinks fit of the costs or expenses incurred by that other party in connection with the proceedings."  

	On the basis of that rule Mr Benson made an application on Mr Jackson's behalf that the costs of today's application be paid by Harold Supplies.  We grant that application.
  
	In our view, there has been unreasonable conduct on the part of Harold Supplies Plc in conducting these proceedings.  They entered into an agreement with Mr Jackson on 13 November 1995, under which they agreed to pay him the sum of £8,500 plus his costs to be taxed, if not agreed, within 28 days.  They have not paid anything.  Mr Ramsden, who appeared on their behalf this morning, is unable to offer any explanation why they have not paid anything.  

	It is their conduct that has caused this application to be made, not just in relation to the taxation, which could not proceed in the absence of an order, but also in relation to the payment of the principal sum.  

	We therefore make that order.  

	Those costs are to be taxed forthwith if not agreed.  It is obviously convenient, if they cannot be agreed, for these costs to be taxed at the same time as the costs of the appeal.