Appeal No.	 EAT/1307/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 22 January 1997

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
MR P A L PARKER CBE
MS B SWITZER

MR K HARRISON	APPELLANT

BROOKWAY TRANSPORT CO LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	APPELLANT IN PERSON	

		MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):   The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether Mr Harrison has an arguable point of law in relation to a decision which had been promulgated on 8 October 1996.  By that decision an Industrial Tribunal held at Ashford, Kent on 16 September 1996, ruled that they did not have jurisdiction to consider the Applicant’s complaint of unfair dismissal, arising out of the dismissal by his former employers on 23 April 1996.  

	The Applicant had been an international HGV driver.  The effective date of termination of his employment was 23 April 1996.  Although he had previously been employed by his employers, there had been a break in his continuity of service between 23 July 1995 and the 16 October 1995. During part of that period the applicant had been employed by another company, albeit one which was associated with his employers.  Having considered the evidence in relation to the break in his period of service, the Tribunal concluded that he did not have more than six months continuous service prior to his dismissal and therefore they did not have jurisdiction under the legislation to consider his complaint of unfair dismissal.  

	The Applicant is clearly extremely distressed by his dismissal.  Driving a heavy goods vehicle on an international basis is a plainly responsible job and we have no reason to believe that he was unfit to do that work prior to the date of his dismissal.  The consequence of his dismissal has been in his own words “to take him to the brink”.  He has written a number of documents which are wholly inappropriate to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.  During the course of a brief oral hearing today, he demonstrated, as he recognised, considerable anger with his former employer’s Manager, who was responsible for his dismissal; and with the Tribunal system which he believes has deprived him of justice.  

	His manner and demeanour during the Tribunal case made it very difficult for us to seek to discuss with him what the points of law might be.  However, we listened carefully to what he said.  When we announced the decision to him, it became plain that it was better that we gave our reasons later as we now do.  

	He complained, first, about the fact that the case had been adjourned at the request of the employers at very short notice, despite the Tribunal’s statement in principle that adjournments at short notice would not be granted.  It seems to us that he was not deprived of a fair hearing when the matter came back before the Industrial Tribunal and that even if he had a genuine complaint about the granting of an adjournment at late notice, that caused him no prejudice.  

	Secondly, he says that he was deprived of the opportunity of seeing evidence in relation to the reason why an adjournment had been sought.  He wanted evidence that the Manager concerned was away or was going to be away and he expected to be provided with tickets or some such documentation, but that was not provided.  Again, it seems to us that by the time the case had been adjourned and came back for a new hearing, that matter ceased to have any real importance, particularly as the question of the continuity of his employment did not depend, as we understand it, on the credibility of the witnesses.  

	Thirdly, he complains that the Industrial Tribunal did not comply with his request to order the Respondent’s to provide tachograph evidence at the hearing.  That might have been relevant had the matter been within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but as it was not, it seems to us that that is a complaint which is empty.  

	The fourth point that he makes is a sad one.  He says that he has been “driven to the brink” by the unfairness of his employers and by the judicial system; that the employer’s Manager is a dishonest person, and that he can prove it; that he has been forced to the position where he either has justice in his own terms or death.  He told us that he has been on hunger strike for over three weeks now and that he is near to the “brink of death”.  He was saying, in effect, that if we did not grant his application today, he would see to it that he died in a way which would be of embarrassment to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

	We have to say that we must do justice in accordance with law.  We have to be satisfied that there is an arguable point of law before we can admit an appeal.  We are not satisfied that there is an arguable point of law and therefore we must dismiss the appeal.  

	The final matter is this: the Appellant has chosen to write abusive indecent and obscene remarks on many of the documents sent to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.  It is not clear to us why he has chosen to do this.  As President I wish to make it clear that in future no such documents will be accepted by the Office.  They will be returned to the sender.  It seems to me and my colleagues that a clear distinction can be drawn between the sort of language which the Appellant has chosen to use in this case on the one hand and strong expressions of disagreement with a Tribunal decision on the other.  The former is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.  The latter is acceptable although perhaps unhelpful to the person’s cause, as we act on the basis of reasoned decision and argument and not mere assertion and abuse.