Appeal No.	 EAT/1325/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 27 February 1997

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE N BUTTER QC
MRS R A VICKERS
MR N D WILLIS

MR C COOPER	APPELLANT

CITY OF LIVERPOOL COMMUNITY COLLEGE	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING 

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR GARY MORTON
(of Counsel)
Mr Graham Clayton
Solicitor
Hamilton House
Mabledon Place
London
WC1H 9BD	

	JUDGE N BUTTER QC:     This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal by Mr Cooper in respect of a decision of the Industrial Tribunal at Liverpool on 3 October 1996.  The Extended Reasons for the decision were sent out on 16 October 1996.  The unanimous decision of that Tribunal was that the application be dismissed.  It was a preliminary hearing by the Tribunal to decide whether the application had been brought in time and whether it ought to proceed. 

	The background is stated shortly in the Extended Reasons.  Mr Cooper was employed by the Respondents working only three hours a week and claims that he was dismissed in July 1993.  He believes that he is now entitled to bring a claim for unfair dismissal or for a redundancy payment.  According to his case, it was only a year or so after the dismissal that he became aware of the possibility of his being able to present a claim, and he therefore presented an application to the Industrial Tribunal on 26 July 1994.

	The Tribunal considered the relevant provisions concerning the time periods in question and dealt specifically with the case of Biggs v Somerset County Council [1996] IRLR 203 and considered argument presented there, concerning Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome.  The Tribunal also considered the case of Preston v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust, [1996] IRLR 484, which concerned a claim under the Equal Pay Act and Article 119.

	Importantly, the Tribunal said in paragraph 13 of their Reasons:

“13.  It was conceded on behalf of Mr Cooper that if his case fell to be determined now, then it would have to be dismissed on the basis of the law as it currently stood.  We were invited to stay his application until such time as the Preston case was resolved, on appeal.”

	I pause to say that the record shows that Mr Cooper was represented before the Tribunal by Counsel who, no doubt, had given careful consideration to the position, before making the concession he did and was anxious, in the circumstances, that the Tribunal would stay the application in order that, at some future date, the matter might be reviewed in the light of such decision or decisions as appellate courts might reach in due course.

	The Tribunal, understandably in our view, decided that it would not be proper to impose a stay.  They have referred to the question of the delay which might well occur, indeed, would be likely to occur, and this Tribunal today endorses that point of view.  There may well be situations where it is known that in the immediate future an important decision is likely to be made which will affect the outcome of an application and in those circumstances, although no clear rule can be laid down, the Industrial Tribunal might feel it right to adjourn for a short time.  This is not such a case.

	The Tribunal concluded in paragraph 22 by saying:

“22.  In the light of the concession made on behalf of Mr Cooper, the automatic result of that decision is that his applications fail and are dismissed.”

	This Tribunal today considers not only that the Industrial Tribunal was entirely entitled to reach that conclusion, but that no error of law, of any sort, has been demonstrated as being reasonably arguable.

	In these circumstances and for these reasons we are unanimous in our view that it would not be appropriate for the appeal to proceed further and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.