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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Blundell v McDonnell Information Systems Ltd [1997] UKEAT 134_97_1804 (18 April 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/134_97_1804.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 134_97_1804

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: This is an appeal by the applicant before the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Industrial Tribunal against a decision of that tribunal sitting on 9th August 1996 that he was not unfairly dismissed by his former employer, McDonnell Information Systems Ltd. Extended reasons for that decision are dated 27th November 1996.

The appellant commenced employment as a computer engineer at the respondent's Washington site on 13th December 1982. At all relevant times his line manager was Mr Mike Bree.

On 24th April 1992 he was dismissed by reason of redundancy but later reinstated following a successful appeal. It was and is the appellant's case that since his successful appeal in 1992 Mr Bree has held a grudge against him which led Mr Bree to identify the appellant for redundancy again in 1995.

The Industrial Tribunal rejected that factual case. It found that the appellant was properly selected for redundancy in December 1995, offered alternative employment in Wakefield which he rejected, and properly consulted. In particular it rejected the appellant's contention that he was deliberately under-trained by Mr Bree so that he might be identified for redundancy under the skills matrix assessment used in the redundancy selection process and operated by Mr Bree and his junior, Mr Couch.

This is a preliminary hearing held to determine whether or not this appeal raises any arguable point or points of law to go to a full appeal hearing.

The grounds advanced in this appeal by the appellant, who appears on his own behalf today, really amount to an attempt to re-run the factual issues relating to Mr Bree which were resolved against the appellant by the Industrial Tribunal.

He has this morning drawn our attention to certain documents which were contained in the bundles before the Industrial Tribunal. In particular, he points to an appraisal carried out by Mr Couch in about 1994 on which Mr Couch commented:

"All round good performance. Makes serious efforts to update his knowledge."

Mr Blundell has referred us to other documents which show that whereas in 1991 he was assessed on a points system in a way which resulted in his coming out top of four particular employees some 100 points ahead of his nearest rival, when the assessment was made in 1995 leading to his final dismissal, he had sunk to second from bottom amongst those same four employees. This, he shows, demonstrates that he has been unfairly treated by Mr Bree his manager and Mr Couch his junior in the assessment of skills which was carried out in 1995; or at the very least that he was not given sufficient training to allow him to perform better in that exercise. He tells us that all of these matters were argued before the Industrial Tribunal, and it is clear that the tribunal rejected the inference which Mr Blundell asked them to draw.

The appeal is put on the basis of perversity. Perversity arises where an Industrial Tribunal takes into account irrelevant factors, fails to take into account relevant factors, or reaches findings of fact for which there is no evidential basis. Otherwise, an appellant faces a high burden to show that the Industrial Tribunal's conclusion was an impermissible option. In this case there was evidence from Mr Bree to contradict that given by the appellant. It seems that the tribunal preferred Mr Bree's evidence. That is essentially a matter for them as the fact-finding tribunal.

We have no doubt that the appellant is genuinely aggrieved at the outcome of this case before the Industrial Tribunal. However, that is not of itself a ground for our interfering with the tribunal's decision. We are quite satisfied that this appeal raises no arguable point of law and therefore it must be dismissed.