Appeal No.	 EAT/1462/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 19 February 1997

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D PUGSLEY
MR L D COWAN
MRS M T PROSSER

MR C PLASKETT	APPELLANT

WILLIAM JACKS SERVICES LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON	

	JUDGE PUGSLEY:   This is a preliminary hearing in which the appellant, Mr Plaskett, has submitted a ground of appeal from a decision of the Industrial Tribunal London (South) which was heard on 6th February 1996 and promulgated on 11th November 1996.

	The background may be briefly etched. Mr Plaskett had been employed in the retail garage industry since 1959. He had his own company, Ashleys Car Rental Limited, which was purchased by the respondents in 1986. By virtue of a service agreement, he was employed for an initial period of two years continuing for successive annual periods unless notice to the contrary shall be given by the Director to the Company not less than six months prior to the anniversary date in any one year or by the Company to the Director not less than one year prior to such anniversary in any one year. In other words, he had to give six months if he wished to go, and the Company had to give twelve months to him if they wished to terminate his employment.

	Under Clause 20 of that agreement, it is provided as follows:

“For the purposes of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, the Director is hereby given written notice of the following matters:
(a) the Director should refer any grievance about his employment hereunder to the Chairman of the Board and the reference will be dealt with by discussion and a majority of those present at the relevant board meeting of [at] which the grievance is discussed; ...”

	We have considerable sympathy for Mr Plaskett. He was dismissed towards the end of his working life.

	The tribunal set out their principal findings of fact at paragraph 5:

“The Applicant was requested repeatedly as Director in charge of the company over a long period of January 1993 to July 1994 to suggest some strategy e.g. marketing plan for “turning round” the fortunes of the Respondent from being in a loss making to a profitable position.”

	We understand that Mr Plaskett feels that due weight was not given to his submissions. Mr Plaskett may not agree with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal and the findings of fact, but it is a decision from which it is very clear the tribunal have been given consideration to the matter. Their conclusion firstly, that the dismissal was fair is carefully set out in their conclusions. They accept there may well have been a breach of Clause 20 to which we have adverted, though they do not, and with respect we agree with them, accept the applicant’s interpretation of that Clause entitled him to a face to face meeting with the Chairman. But looked at in the context of the findings of the tribunal, it is not for us to say whether we agree with those facts or not, they are the fact finding body. We cannot see that there is any error of law.

	We understand that Mr Plaskett considers they reached the wrong decision. We can only refer this matter to a full hearing if there is an error of law. We have considered very carefully whether it can be said that the failure to follow Clause 20(a) made it inevitable that the dismissal was unfair. The Industrial Tribunal set out their reasons fully and they came to the view that within the provisions of s.98(4) that this was a fair dismissal. We have to say that we do not think that that decision can be criticised as a matter of law. There really is in our view no error of law in their formulation of the issues. We read the letter which is set out at page 34 and 35 of the bundle giving him that notice, as actually saying in its final sentence, if we can put it in slightly more homely language, “Look, even your employment for the next 12 months could be reviewed if things do not buck up”. In fact they did not dismiss him summarily but with proper notice.

	We must dismiss this appeal. In our view there is no arguable point of law to refer to a full hearing.