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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Albany v Manners & Anor [1997] UKEAT 530_97_1605 (16 May 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/530_97_1605.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 530_97_1605

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	MR D THOROGOOD Chief Executive
For the Respondents	NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): A Notice of Appeal was filed in this case against an Interlocutory Order of an Industrial Tribunal made on 27 February 1997, by which the Tribunal refused the Respondents' application for an adjournment.

The position was this. The Respondents are a charity. They were the employers of two persons who are the Respondents to this appeal. Those two individuals had brought proceedings in an Industrial Tribunal complaining of unfair dismissal. The case came before an Industrial Tribunal on 20 January 1997 and had to be adjourned for reasons which do not concern us. During the course of discussions as to the next hearing date the Tribunal indicated to the parties that they would only be able to reconvene as a Tribunal as at 13 June 1997.

Without going into the merits of the appeal, for reasons which will become clear in due time, it was Mr Thorogood, on behalf of the charity, who was of the view that it was unlikely in the circumstances that the hearing date would be required, because it was the charity's intention to seek to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement with their former employees and settle the case.

Furthermore, the Chief Executive of the charity, who had been handling the case on behalf of the charity at the Industrial Tribunal, had it in mind at that time, that is, in January, to take an expedition to Iceland, but the date (as I understand it) of the expedition had not at that time crystallized. When it did, it appeared to conflict with the 13 June date fixed for the hearing and accordingly, on 25 February he wrote and asked for the 13 June date to be vacated. In their letter of 27 February containing the order, the Tribunal said this:

"The Chairman has considered all you say and has balanced that against the desirability of bringing this case to a hearing without delay. Your request for a postponement is refused for the following reason(s):

The date of the hearing was agreed before it was fixed. In that situation a postponement is not normally granted save in exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. The circumstances in this case are neither."

Mr Thorogood appealed against that order by a Notice of Appeal which is dated 28 April 1997, which was received here on 30 April. It follows that the Notice of Appeal was lodged more than 42 days after the order of the Industrial Tribunal was promulgated. In those circumstances, before we entertain such an appeal, we must be satisfied that Mr Thorogood has provided us with a full and honest explanation of the reason for not complying with the Rule and to satisfy us that that explanation represents a good excuse for the default before we will come to exercise our discretion.

The explanation which has been tendered, which we are satisfied is full and honest, is that he was simply unaware that there was a time limit for making an appeal against a Tribunal's order of this sort, and he only sought advice on behalf of the charity on 22 April from a Legal Advisory Service for the charitable sector. He was told of his right to make an appeal, but was not given any indication by that service as to the time limit for making such an appeal. It is clear that when he went to see the Legal Advisory Service on that date, by then time had already expired. So his explanation is a combination of a statement that he was ignorant of the time limit and that his professional advisers, when he saw them, did not give him correct advice.

We have directed ourselves in accordance with the decision of United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar & Another, [1995] ICR 65, which is a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. We refer in particular to the heading in that report, under the rubric application of Principles by the Appeal Tribunal. We have applied the general guidelines which relate to the exercise of the discretion which we have.

It is our view that the explanation which Mr Thorogood has offered to us does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in this case, or, indeed, a good excuse. It seems to us that ignorance of the time limit is not an excuse which is acceptable. These days both the Industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal produce documentation, in readily understandable form, which is available at Industrial Tribunals and Citizens Advice Bureaux and makes the position quite plain as to the time limit for appealing.

We do not think that it is reasonable that a person who is engaged in litigation should be of the view that there is simply no time limit for making an appeal. If Mr Thorogood had applied his mind to this question he would have appreciated, we think, that there must have been some kind of time limit. Once he had arrived at that conclusion, it seems to us that it was his responsibility to find out what it was; which, as I have indicated, he could easily have done.

For these reasons therefore we are not prepared to extend the time for making this appeal. In the circumstances therefore, we shall dismissed the appeal.

We can add that Mr Thorogood should appreciate that it was going to be difficult for him to persuade us that the Industrial Tribunal had not exercised their discretion in this case correctly. So he should not feel overly aggrieved at the decision which we have arrived at in refusing to extend time for his appeal.

Therefore the appeal is dismissed.