Appeal No.	 EAT/826/97

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 10 November 1997

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
MRS R CHAPMAN
MR A C BLYGHTON

MISS S GREEN	APPELLANT

SHEILA GREY (Proprietor) - HAIRPIN	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR M MONDE
(Representative)	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):     The purpose of this hearing was to determine whether there is an arguable point of law in a Notice of Appeal which has been filed in this case. The decision against which an appeal is being brought is a refusal by an Industrial Tribunal Chairman to provide a decision in extended reasoned form, so as to enable the appellate court to review the substantive decision which has been made in this case.

	The outline facts relevant to this appeal may be shortly stated. On 25th November 1996 Miss Green presented to an Industrial Tribunal a complaint alleging: first, breach of contract and second, unfair dismissal. The employers responded with a Notice of Appearance on 9th December 1996 and there was then a hearing before the Industrial Tribunal on 23rd January 1997. 

	The decision of the Industrial Tribunal following that hearing, in a written decsion in summary reason form was sent to the parties on 3rd February 1997. Her application was dismissed.

	Within the fourteen day period provided by the Rules, an application was made to the Industrial Tribunal for a review of their decision, that is by letter dated 17th February 1997. On 24th February 1997 the Industrial Tribunal indicated that a decision had been made on the review, and would be promulgated in due course. We should say that we do not have a copy of their decision in our papers.

	On 12th March 1997 an appeal was lodged here. It was then pointed out to the appellant that we required a decision in extended reasoned form, and we were told that the Industrial Tribunal had already refused to give a decision in extended reasoned form. Therefore, the first part of the appeal is against the refusal of the Industrial Tribunal to give its decision in extended reasoned form.

	The case concerned a dismissal in the context of Miss Green’s pregnancy. She relies first of all on the statute, she also relies upon an agreement which she says was made with her former employer. It is not possible from the summary reasons to detect how it is that the Industrial Tribunal have dealt with both those complaints. This is not a case where we can manage without having extended reasons.

	The reason why we think that it is arguable that the Industrial Tribunal should have provided extended reasons, is that it was obvious to them and must have been obvious to them as a result of the letter of 17th February 1997, that the applicant in this case wished to advance an appeal. The tribunal were therefore on notice within the 21 day period that a decision in extended reasoned form would be required. Accordingly, it seems to us to be distinctly arguable that the tribunal erred in law in the exercise of their discretion not to provide extended reasons outside the 21 day time limit that was provided. 

	We will write to the Industrial Tribunal Chairman inviting him to provide us with a decision in extended reasoned form now that we have become seized of this matter, and we will await developments. This appeal will have to be listed for a further hearing. We would hope that this hearing would be inter partes, and that if the Court was of the view, that the case could then be dealt with substantively, it seems to us that it should proceed to deal with the appeal substantively at that time. It would undesirable that there should be three hearings in this matter as opposed to two. We hope by then, therefore, that the Industrial Tribunal Chairman will have responded favourably to our request. If he does not do so, we will then have to deal with this case on the basis that we do not have extended reasons, and what we should then do in relation to any rehearing.

	For these reasons we allow this matter to proceed to a full hearing and we will act as I have indicated.

	It will be inter partes, listed for a full hearing, Category B. It will take an hour and a half.