Appeal No.	 EAT/104/98

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 20 March 1998

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE N BUTTER QC
MR P R A JACQUES CBE
MR R N STRAKER

MISS H MANN	APPELLANT

LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY
OR REPRESENTATION
ON BEHALF OF 
THE APPELLANT

	JUDGE BUTTER QC:     This is a preliminary hearing of an appeal by Miss Mann in respect of a decision of an Industrial Tribunal at London (South) held on 28 August 1997.  The Chairman sat alone.  He gave his extended reasons on 8 September 1997.

	Today Miss Mann has not appeared.  There is no skeleton argument from her and the Tribunal does not have a telephone number for her with which to make contact.

	The Tribunal considers that it should proceed nevertheless with the preliminary hearing.  If the Tribunal is to decide, on the material before it that there is here an arguable point to go forward, then it will so direct.  If it decides that there is, in truth, no arguable point, then it will dismiss the appeal.

	The decision of the Chairman was that:

“(1)  The Originating Application was not presented to the Tribunal within the period specified in section 111 (2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 despite it having been reasonably practicable for the Originating Application to have been presented within that period.
(2)  As a consequence the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the Applicant’s unfair dismissal complaint and the Originating Application is dismissed accordingly.”

	In the extended reasons which he gave, the Chairman has said that it was on 12 December 1996 that the Applicant presented an Originating Application.  That application gave the date of termination of employment as 13 September 1996.  

	The Respondent entered a Notice of Appearance and maintained, for reasons which were set out there, that the effective date of termination of the employment was, in fact, 23 August 1996.  The Chairman pointed out that under Section 111 (2) of the 1996 Act, a Tribunal should not consider an unfair dismissal complaint unless the Originating Application was presented to the Tribunal:

“(i)  before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or
(ii)  within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.”

	The Chairman then reviewed the facts.  He heard evidence from the Applicant and he said, in paragraph 10 of the extended reasons:

“I found the Applicant’s evidence to be equivocal, contradictory and inconsistent.”

	He rejected the Applicant’s evidence and found that, at the latest by 2 September 1996, she had been notified by the Respondent that her employment had been terminated summarily.  He said, at the end of paragraph 11:

“It may well be that the Applicant’s employment was terminated in breach of contract but I am satisfied that it was terminated summarily and that the effective date of termination was no later than 2 September 1996.”

	In paragraph 13, he said:

“At the time of the termination of her employment the Applicant was being advised by solicitors and at about the same time she consulted her union.  There was no evidence before me that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within the three-month period except for some evidence as to a short period towards the end of that three-month period.  Accordingly [the Chairman said] I am satisfied that it was reasonably practicable for the complaint to have been presented within the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination.
As a consequence I find that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the Applicant’s unfair dismissal complaint and the Originating Application should be dismissed.”

	The Tribunal today finds it impossible to say that the Chairman erred as a matter of law in the decision that he reached, or that he reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal could have reached.

	In these circumstances we are unanimous in our view that there is no arguable point to go forward to a full hearing and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.