Appeal No.	 EAT/123/98

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 20 March 1998

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
MR K M HACK JP
MS B SWITZER

MR M BISHOP	APPELLANT

THE HUT ASSOCIATION	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY NOR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):	The purpose of this hearing is to consider the Notice of Appeal which has been filed by Mr Bishop against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at London (North) on 20th and 21st October 1997. 

	Mr Bishop had made complaints against his former employers, the Hut Association, which is a charity. 

	At the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal in October 1997, the Industrial Tribunal considered the question as to whether his claims should be struck out. There were a number of complaints which the Hut Association made about the way Mr Bishop had conducted himself in preparing for a five day hearing which had been listed for the 20th October 1997, and they related to his alleged failure to comply with orders made by the tribunal; and with the way he had approached the whole question of attendance at the hearing and the discovery process, and so on.

	By their decision the Industrial Tribunal concluded that his claims should be struck out on the grounds set out in their decision which were, essentially, because of his wilful refusal to comply with an order made under rule 4(7); and secondly, under the provisions of rules 13(2)(e) and 13(2)(f). 

	This morning Mr Bishop who has not attended, as is his right, sent us a fax to apologise for taking so long to respond to us, but he says that:

“After taking legal advice and also as I am neither able to obtain legal aid or raise any funds I would like withdraw my appeal for the case to be heard.”

As we understand it, he is withdrawing his appeal against that part of the tribunal’s decision that his claims should be struck out on the grounds set out in the decision. He is not now seeking to say that he should have those complaints heard. 

	The second part of the tribunal’s decision was that Mr Bishop should pay to the Hut Association a sum of £500 on account of the costs which they had incurred. The tribunal’s decision in relation to that aspect of the matter was this:

“13.  Having announced its decision in this regard, the Tribunal then had made to it by the Respondents an application for an order for costs. Having considered the merits and the fact that the Applicant’s financial means are extremely limited as the present time, the Tribunal limited their order to an order for costs to be paid by the Applicant to Respondents in the sum of £500.”

	In the fax, to which I have referred, Mr Bishop says this:

“However I would you to consider the cost of £500 awarded against me. I would you to consider my financial situation and the fact that I think this harsh.
I shall not be attending on the 20th.”

	The tribunal has a discretion to award costs in the circumstances of a case such as this. Therefore one cannot say that in principle the tribunal have erred by making such an order. In relation to the amount of such an order, that seems to us to require the Industrial Tribunal to take a view as to the circumstances of the case, and the means of the person against whom an order for costs is sought. It is apparent to us from the terms of their decision that the Industrial Tribunal enquired about the applicant’s financial means. It was because of those enquiries that they were able to conclude that his means were “extremely limited”. In those circumstances, it seems to us that the Industrial Tribunal have exercised the discretion which is given to them by Parliament for making an order for costs and assessing the appropriate sum. 

	We are unable to say that it is arguable that the tribunal have erred in law in the way in which they have exercised their discretion. Accordingly, it seems to us, that that part of Mr Bishop’s appeal which had not been withdrawn, does not raise any arguable point of law fit for a further hearing by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and accordingly, his appeal must be dismissed.