Appeal No.	EAT/1404/97

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 13 February 1998

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP

MR R LLOYD	APPELLANT

THAMES WATER CONSTRUCTION LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):     The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is an arguable point of law in appeals which Mr Lloyd wishes to make against decisions of an Industrial Tribunal contained in writing following a hearing on 7th August 1997 and following a further hearing on 3rd October 1997. Technically the appeal against the decision of 7th August 1997 was presented to us out of time, but in response to Mr Lloyd’s request that we should deal with both matters, we are prepared in the circumstances to extend time for the purposes of his appeal and we our therefore prepared to consider both decisions together.

	By their first decision, the Industrial Tribunal, in summary reasons, ruled that Mr Lloyd’s claim for a redundancy payment was presented to the tribunal within time, but that his complaint of unfair dismissal had been presented out of time and that it was reasonably practicable for him to have presented it within time. Accordingly, they concluded that as the effective date of termination was on 10th December 1996 and the Originating Application was presented on 12th May 1997, only that part of the claim relating a redundancy payment, for which the time limit is six months, fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

	On 3rd October 1997, the matter came on for hearing. The tribunal, differently constituted, considered the evidence before them. It was the respondents’ contention that there was no entitlement to a redundancy payment because Mr Lloyd had not been dismissed, rather he had resigned. The Industrial Tribunal recited the fact that the applicant had been employed for many years by the respondent company and its predecessors in title, and that whilst in the employ of the local authority, there had been schemes whereby employees could take advantage of various redundancy packages. He was employed essentially as a driver. His health had deteriorated due to stress. He decided that he no longer wished to remain in employment.

	It appears that the stressful nature of his illness may have affected his judgment. When he said that he wanted to resign, very properly the respondent company took steps as best as they could to make sure that this was in fact his real intention. Faced with all that material, the Industrial Tribunal concluded that as there had been a resignation, then there was no entitlement to a redundancy payment.

	The appellant has appealed. It is apparent that he is still having some difficulties in his health. He is hearing voices. He believes his employer and his trade union may have conspired together to ensure that he left his employment in circumstances in which he was denied any entitlement to redundancy compensation. He also, I think, believes that when he reported the matter to the Police, the Police themselves may have come under some kind of pressure from the employers not to take any action in relation to it.

	However that may be, we have to ask ourselves the question, whether there are any grounds for believing that as a matter of law either of the two decisions of the Industrial Tribunal can be successfully appealed.

	We have given this matter careful consideration and in doing so have looked at the various letters which have been sent to us. We have come to the conclusion that there are no arguable points of law. 

	In relation to the first decision, it was obviously clear that the application for unfair dismissal had been presented out of time, and that there was no good reason which prevented the applicant from putting an application in within time. Accordingly, they were right not to proceed with the case of unfair dismissal.

	In relation to the second decision. It seems to us that on the material before the Industrial Tribunal they were fully entitled to conclude that there was no entitlement to a redundancy payment because there had been no dismissal. A person is only entitled to receive a redundancy payment upon dismissal and accordingly, if the tribunal were entitled to conclude that there was no dismissal, they were entitled and obliged to find that he was entitled to a redundancy payment.

	Having reviewed the evidence with care, and having paid particular attention to the steps taken by the employers to make sure that the applicant truly did intend to resign, we do not think that the conclusion they arrived at in this case could be described as perverse or unsupported by evidence.

	Accordingly, we are bound to say that this appeal must be dismissed.