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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Pidcock v St Matthias School [1998] UKEAT 655_98_1712 (17 December 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1998/655_98_1712.html Cite as: [1998] UKEAT 655_98_1712

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON
For the Respondents	NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT) This is an appeal against the Registrar's refusal to extend time for the lodging of a Notice of Appeal.

In September 1997 Mr Pidcock, the Applicant/Appellant, complained to an Industrial Tribunal that his employers, St Matthias School, were making unlawful deductions from his wages in various respects. The matter came on before an Industrial Tribunal on 22 December 1997 at London (North). The Tribunal Chairman concluded that there had been no unlawful deductions made from the Applicant/Appellant's wages.

The decision of the Tribunal was expressed in summary reason form and thereafter in response to Mr Pidcock's application, written extended reasons for the Tribunal's decision were promulgated and sent to the parties on 16 April 1998. It is from that date that the 42-day time limit for putting in a Notice of Appeal commences. Accordingly, the last day for lodging a Notice of Appeal was 28 May 1998. The Notice of Appeal was received by the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 29 May 1998; in other words, it was one day out of time. Mr Pidcock had posted the Notice of Appeal on 27 May sending it by Recorded Delivery.

The explanation which Mr Pidcock put forward for lodging the Notice of Appeal out of time was as follows. On 23 April 1998, that is one week after the extended reasons had been sent to the parties, he wrote to the Regional Officer of his Trade Union, UNISON, seeking their assistance in relation to the appeal. He received a response to his letter on 22 May 1998. That letter, dated 20 May 1998 from UNISON refused assistance because he had represented himself at the Industrial Tribunal. Incorrectly, UNISON went on to observe that the time scale for lodging an appeal ended on 14 April and that it appeared to them that the issue of representation was in any event an academic one. On the same day, Mr Pidcock sent a fax to UNISON correcting what they had said about time for appealing, pointing out that time expired after 28 May "which is only six days away". He complained that the whole attitude of his Trade Union towards his case had been of a delaying nature right from the start and concluded by saying: "because of the lack of time left if you are going to help me you can fax me on my friend's number", which he then gave.

Not having heard from the Union in response to that fax, he posted the Notice of Appeal on 27 May believing that because it was sent by Recorded Delivery it would arrive within the prescribed time limit of which he was well aware.

It seems to me that Mr Pidcock's explanation supported as it is by correspondence which has been sent to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, is a full and honest explanation for the delay. In normal circumstances the fact that an appeal is just one day out of time would not be regarded as a matter which had much weight for the obvious reason that extending time by just one day would logically lead to there being no effective time limit. It must be emphasised that the 42-day time limit is a limit and not merely a target to be aimed at. But in this case, it seems to me that I can legitimately conclude, in the exercise of my discretion, that it would be just to extend time to Mr Pidcock having regard to the background facts to which I have referred.

It is clear from the facts that Mr Pidcock was fully aware of the need to get a Notice of Appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal no later than 28 May. Whilst he can legitimately be criticised for leaving things to the last moment and sending the Notice of Appeal on 27 May, it does seem to me unjust to hold that against him and to conclude that time should not be extended because the postal services did not deliver the Notice of Appeal as promptly as he had anticipated. I am satisfied that he has made every sensible endeavour to put forward a Notice of Appeal with the assistance of his Union. Largely through his Union's delay, as I see it, he was forced to leave the matter to the last minute. On this basis I have been prepared to exercise my discretion to extend time.

Accordingly, the appeal will be allowed.