Appeal No.	 EAT/660/98

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On  1 June 1998

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
MR K M HACK JP
MR S M SPRINGER MBE

MR J McLEOD	APPELLANT

ECOVERT SOUTH LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

INTERLOCUTORY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	IN PERSON	
For the Respondents	MR P SCHOFIELD
LEGAL ADVISER
ENGINEERING EMPLOYERS FEDERATION
BROADWAY HOUSE
TOTHILL STREET
LONDON SW1H 9NQ	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):     This is an interlocutory appeal.  Mr McLeod complained of unfair dismissal against his former employers, Ecovert South Ltd.  He took his claim to an Industrial Tribunal, together with a colleague.

	The Tribunal, after a hearing on 3 April 1998, unanimously concluded that both the applicants were unfairly dismissed, but refused both of their applications for reinstatement or re-engagement and in the case of Mr McLeod assessed his contributory fault at 75%.

	The hearing on compensation is due to take place on 4 June.  Mr McLeod wishes to postpone that hearing until after he has had an opportunity to present to us his appeal against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal.  He says that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal was biased against him.  Whether he is accusing the Tribunal of actual bias or apparent bias or whether he is saying that the decision of the Tribunal is so obviously wrong that there must be some kind of bias, is not entirely clear.  But we understand at least that he is saying that no reasonable Tribunal, properly directing itself, could have arrived at the conclusion that he was 75% to blame for his own dismissal and to have rejected his request for reinstatement or re-engagement.

	The position, therefore, is that Mr McLeod wishes to postpone the hearing for 4 June until after he has had the chance to present that appeal.  If we were to reject that appeal, and the matter went back for a compensatory hearing and he did not like the Tribunal’s decision on that point, then we could find ourselves having to deal with yet another appeal.  It follows, therefore, that one application for unfair dismissal could lead to two sets of appeal.

	The interests of justice require that a case be finally disposed of as soon as is reasonably practicable.  The employers have a right to have the case on compensation heard and determined as soon as is practicable.

	We can see no prejudice to Mr McLeod at all if we were to dismiss his appeal against the Tribunal’s decision to continue the hearing on 4 June 1998.  If we were to accede to his application we can see some grounds for thinking that there could be prejudice to the employers if, in due time, the appeal were to be dismissed.

	In these circumstances, it seems to us that there is no basis on which we can say that the Tribunal’s decision to go ahead with the hearing on 4 June, amounts to any kind of misdirection in law or is a perverse exercise of discretion.  It seems to us that it was a decision which they were entitled to take.  We are not entitled to interfere with it and accordingly, this appeal in relation to the hearing of 4 June will be dismissed.  But I should make it perfectly plain that that does not prejudice Mr McLeod’s right to come to us at the end of the case and present such arguments as he wishes, both in relation to liability and, if appropriate, quantum.