Appeal No.	 EAT/192/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 26 March 1999

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MR A D TUFFIN CBE
MISS D WHITTINGHAM

MR P PANDYA	APPELLANT

LEICESTER CITY COUNCIL	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	IN PERSON	

	JUDGE D M LEVY QC:     This is an appeal by Mr Pandya in these circumstances.  He was employed on what may have been a casual contract by the Leicester City Council, the Respondent.  His casual employment was terminated.  He made a complaint to an Employment Tribunal by an Originating Application dated 13 September 1998. 

	There was a hearing on a preliminary point of his complaint on 14 December 1998 by a Chairman, sitting alone, at an Employment Tribunal.  The Chairman ordered that Mr Pandya was to pay a deposit of £150 as a condition of being permitted to continue with this application.  Summary Reasons were given for that decision.  They read as follows:

“1.  The applicant alleges a breach of contract in his employment with the respondent.  He was employed as a standby clerk and although at the time he made his application to the Tribunal he was not required to carry out work under that contract, his employment was continuing.
2.  The Tribunal do not have jurisdiction to consider a claim alleging a breach of contract unless the contract of employment has terminated.  There is therefore no reasonable prospect of success in this application before this Tribunal, as the applicant will be unable to show a breach of contract falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
3.  The applicant did not attend the hearing, but has indicated that he is now working on a self-employed basis and there is no reason to suppose that he is unable to pay a deposit of £150.”

	That decision was sent to the parties on 17 December 1998 and, by a Notice of Appeal dated 4 January 1999, Mr Pandya appealed against that decision and against a later decision of the Tribunal dated 15 January 1999.  That second decision of the Employment Tribunal was in this form:

“In exercise of my powers contained in Rule 13(2)(f) of the Rules of Procedure set out in Schedule 1 to the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 1993, I hereby strike out the Originating Application herein for want of prosecution.
EXTENDED REASONS
1.  The applicant has failed to prosecute his claim.  He has failed to respond to letters from the tribunal.
2.  In particular he has failed to respond to a letter dated 22 December 1998 which warned him that unless a reply was received within 7 days the claim would be struck out pursuant to Rule 13(2)(f).”

	A letter of 22 December 1998 was sent to Mr Pandya in these terms:

“Thank you for your letter of 20 December 1998.
A Chairman of the Tribunal has directed me to reply that the Tribunal cannot enter into correspondence about this order (a copy of the original has already been provided) [and that is the order to which we have already referred].  He can see no reason to vary the order.  If the deposit is not paid within the time specified the application will be struck out.”

	Marked on this in the copy provided to us is “Received Wed, 23 Dec, 1998”.  Mr Pandya has told us this morning (he appears in person) that he did not reply to that letter.  

	This Employment Appeal Tribunal wrote to Mr Pandya a letter dated 9 February 1999 notifying him that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the first decision of the Employment Tribunal unless Extended Reasons were provided.  He has not since provided Extended Reasons, so we are without jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the first decision of the Employment Tribunal.

	As to the second decision of the Employment Tribunal, if, as he accepts, Mr Pandya did not reply to the letter, the Tribunal in exercising its discretion was entitled to make the order which it did make.  In the circumstances there is no appeal which can go forward to a full hearing.  

	Although we have to dismiss the appeal because of Mr Pandya’s failure to take necessary procedural steps we add this:  we have all looked at the claim which Mr Pandya has put forward and to all of our eyes, if it had been heard by an Employment Tribunal, the chances of Mr Pandya succeeding would appear to have been very remote.  That, however, does not arise

for a decision.

	The present appeal has no chance of success.  We therefore dismiss it at this stage.