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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Spindlow v. Starpoint Electronics Ltd [1999] UKEAT 262_99_1406 (14 June 1999)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/262_99_1406.html
Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 262_99_1406

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BAILII case number: [1999] UKEAT 262_99_1406
Appeal No. EAT/262/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
             At the Tribunal
             On 14 June 1999

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE J ALTMAN

MR D J JENKINS MBE

MRS R A VICKERS



MR S SPINDLOW APPELLANT

STARPOINT ELECTRONICS LTD RESPONDENT


Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING – EX PARTE

© Copyright 1999


    APPEARANCES

     

    For the Appellant MISS JENNIFER EADY
    (of Counsel)
    Appearing under the Employment
    Law Appeals Advice Scheme
       


     

    JUDGE ALTMAN: This is an appeal from the decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at London (South) on 2nd November 1998, when they dismissed the application of the appellant for unfair dismissal arising out of his termination of employment allegedly for redundancy. It comes before us by way of a preliminary hearing to determine whether there are grounds sufficiently arguable to merit the full hearing of this appeal before the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

  1. The Notice of Appeal canvasses two areas of complaint. First its complains that the tribunal erred in law in concluding that the reason for dismissal was redundancy and finding that an admissible reason and, secondly, it contends that the tribunal erred in its analysis of the question as to whether the respondents were reasonable in treating that redundancy as the reason for dismissal in accordance with the statutory tests.
  2. In the decision of the Employment Tribunal in a section headed "The Facts" the tribunal set out the circumstances which gave rise to a decision by the respondents that there was a redundancy situation: the downturn in demand for their goods of a substantial amount, leading to a requirement for redundancies in the stores dispatch and inspections areas, and followed by a process at the end of which the appellant was dismissed.
  3. No other reason for dismissal has been advanced by or on behalf of the appellant. Whilst we note the grounds of appeal set out, we are driven to the conclusion that on the facts as found by the tribunal in relation to those matters, the tribunal were perfectly entitled to come the decision they did, that the reason for dismissal was redundancy, as an admissible reason under the Employment Rights Act 1996. We can see no prospect of an appeal on that ground succeeding.
  4. However, we are greatly indebted to Miss Eady, who has taken on this case at very short notice today to help the appellant who admitted to us his own difficulty and anxiety in presenting his case to us himself. She concentrated on the tribunal's approach to the reasons given by the respondents for treating the redundancy as the reason for dismissing the appellant. She focussed on a number of matters.
  5. The first was the identification of the "pool" and the issue as to whether or not that is a necessary formalistic procedure: She drew attention to paragraphs 6 and 14 in support of the proposition that it is not clear what pool the tribunal believed the respondents were using, which, she says, is the necessary precursor to the tribunal's ability to assess reasonableness.
  6. The second matter which Miss Eady refers to is the question of the selection criteria.
  7. The third matter she referred to was essentially in relation to consultation and, in particular, the question of there being no collective consultation, and the question as to whether the tribunal considered the extent to which the initial decisions about selection criteria, redundancy situation and pool were subject to consultation.
  8. Fourthly, there is the extent to which the tribunal adverted to whether and to what extent the respondents should have taken particular account of this appellant's own personal circumstances which demonstrate difficulties which Miss Eady said would be apparent to anyone that knew him or spoke to him.
  9. Fifthly, there is the extent to which the consultation was viewed by the tribunal as full consultation or just an opportunity by the employee to respond.
  10. Sixthly, there is the extent to which in judging the fairness of the decision the tribunal took account of the time scale. She contrasted the month or so during which the respondents had notice of a fall off in turnover on the one hand and the two days of notification and decision making which, on the face of it, appear to have consumed the redundancy dismissal process.
  11. We have come to the conclusion that all those matters raise issues of law properly to be considered on appeal. We do not consider that there is any argument in relation to the identification by the tribunal of the reason for dismissal as being redundancy.
  12. Accordingly we direct that this matter be listed for a full hearing before the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The case can be listed in Category C. The case should be listed for up to one day. No notes of evidence are required from the Chairman. Skeleton Arguments must be filed and served not less than 15 days before the hearing.


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/262_99_1406.html