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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Mir v. Page & Ors [1999] UKEAT 566_99_2807 (28 July 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/566_99_2807.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 566_99_2807

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION


 


JUDGE LEVY: Dr Azhar Mir ("the Appellant") was an employer of various applicants who made complaints to an Employment Tribunal when their employment ended. They claimed redundancy pay in lieu of notice. The numerous complaints were consolidated and were heard by an Employment Tribunal consisting of a Chairman alone sitting at Ashford on 26 February 1999, when many employer applicants were represented and Mr Bourne of Counsel represented the Appellant.

1. A number of the claims were dismissed for failure to commence proceedings in time. A number of them were successful. From those which were successful, the Appellant appealed by a Notice of Appeal received by this Tribunal on 7 April 1999. The decision of the Employment Tribunal was promulgated to the parties on 9 March 1999. The Notice of Appeal was settled by a firm of solicitors. The grounds of appeal in paragraph 6 state that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in that:

"1) It held that the Contracts of Employment of the Applicants were not frustrated by virtue of the compulsory closure on the 12^th June 1996 of the Danefield Nursing Home pursuant to an Order of the Maidstone Magistrates Court made on the 11^th June 1998 cancelling the registration of the said Nursing Home;

It held that if, contrary to its said finding, the said Contracts of Employment were frustrated, this was the result of the Acts or Omissions of the Appellant who was thereby unable to rely upon such self induced frustration and

It so held contrary to the weight of the evidence adduced by and on behalf of the parties."

2. Thus the appeal is one of perverse decision by the Tribunal. We have received from the Appellant's solicitors a letter bearing today's date and sent by fax, that the Appellant is unable to attend the Preliminary Hearing and seeking an adjournment for a later hearing. The letter went on to say that in the event that the application for adjournment was unsuccessful, the Appellant had asked the solicitors "to request that the Tribunal deals with the matter in his absence, holding that there is an arguable point of law in the Appeal." Having referred to paragraph 6 of the Notice of Appeal, the fax stated that there was nothing the solicitors could add in support of the Appellant's contentions. We have considered the terms of the fax. It would be inappropriate to grant an adjournment of this hearing, fixed some time ago, an adjournment which would delay further such payments as is due to the Respondent if the appeal fails.
3. We have carefully considered the decision of the Tribunal. We find that on admitted facts and the material which was before us the Tribunal was entitled to find the facts as found and entitled to come to the conclusion of law that it did. There is a careful consideration of the different submissions of Counsel appearing for the Appellant. Those submissions of Counsel are carefully analysed before they are rejected. In our judgment this was an admirable judgment by the Chairman sitting alone. He reached a decision in law which he was entitled to reach. There is no matter which can properly go forward to an appeal either on the grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal or on any other grounds. We therefore dismiss this appeal at this stage.