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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Loganathan v. Samsung Electornics Research Institute [1999] UKEAT 832_98_0411 (4 November 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/832_98_0411.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 832_98_411, [1999] UKEAT 832_98_0411 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MISS A MACKIE OBE
MR G H WRIGHT MBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
FULL HEARING
Revised
For the Appellant | NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT |
For the Respondent | MR M TRAFFORD (of Counsel) Instructed by Messrs Baker & McKenzie Solicitors 100 New Bridge Street London EC4V 6JA |
JUDGE PETER CLARK: The Appellant, Mr Loganathan, was employed by the Respondent, Samsung Electronics Research Institute as an R F Development Engineer from the 14th February 1997 until his summary dismissal on the 4th September 1997 for alleged gross misconduct.
(i) A fellow employee Ms Adilovic, a native of the former Yugoslavia, was pursuing an immigration application to the Home Office.
(ii) Ms Adilovic's solicitor, acting on her behalf in that matter, informed the Respondent that the Home Office had notified him that it had received a fax from the Respondent's offices relating to her and disclosing facts about her conduct which could be damaging to her application.
(iii) As a result an investigation was set in train. The Respondent, through Mr Oakley, the group leader, established that two fax transmissions were sent to Home Office numbers from the Respondent's office machine, between 13.20 hours and 13.23 hours on the 2nd September 1997. Further, two employees, Messrs Breslin and Williams said that they saw the Appellant operating the fax machine at that time.
(iv) The Appellant was interviewed and denied sending the fax to the Home Office. He said that he had used the machine to fax his curriculum vitae to an agent. He supplied that person's fax number but no such number was recorded on the machine fax log.
(v) The Appellant was seen again. He asked to speak to his line manager, Mr King, following that private conversation, Mr King informed his management colleagues that the Appellant would admit faxing the Home Office about Ms Adilovic, if he could be allowed to resign. At that stage, the Appellant said that he hated Samra, (Ms Adilovic).
(vi) The Respondent decided to summarily dismiss the Appellant and did so.
(vii) Despite his denials in evidence, the Chairman concluded that the Appellant did send the Home Office fax concerning Ms Adilovic.
"revealing confidential information relating to the company, it's business activities, products or employees, to any person, without the prior consent of the company, unless it is necessary for carrying out his/her duties".
(i) It is said that the Chairman erred in failing to consider whether or not the contents of the fax which the Appellant was alleged to have to sent to the Home Office were true in whole or in part. Our first observation is that there is no question of it simply being alleged that the Appellant sent the relevant fax, the Chairman found on compelling direct evidence that he did in fact send it. Secondly, the truth or otherwise of the contents is nothing to the point. The question is whether for the purposes of the contractual disciplinary rule, the Appellant revealed confidential information relating to an employee without consent and outside the course of his duties. The Chairman found that he did and on the evidence was entitled to reach that finding. Thirdly, and in any event, there was evidence from the Appellant's own admission at the final disciplinary hearing that he hated Ms Adilovic; hence the Respondent's conclusion that the fax was sent maliciously, that is, motivated by spite.
(ii) We can take the next three grounds of appeal together. In our judgement, the Chairman was entitled to conclude on the facts that the Appellant was in breach of the relevant disciplinary rule and that such breach warranted summary dismissal at common law.
(iii) Finally, a point is taken on the constitution of the employment tribunal. It is said that the Chairman ought not to have sat alone to hear this case. The power enabling a Chairman to sit alone to hear a complaint of wrong dismissal is contained in section 4(1)(a) (2) & 3 (d) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, subject to section 4(5) of the act. In essence, a Chairman sitting alone may hear a complaint of wrongful dismissal, subject to regard being had to the factors set out in section 4(5).
"Where it appears to the Appeal Tribunal that any proceedings were unnecessary, improper or vexatious or that there has been unreasonable delay or other unreasonable conduct in bringing or conducting the proceedings the Tribunal may order the party at fault to pay any other party the whole or such part as it thinks fit of the costs or expenses incurred by the other party in connection with the proceedings".
Rule 34(2) gives this Tribunal discretion as to whether to assess any costs ordered to be paid or to refer the matter to the taxing officer a taxation.