Appeal No.	EAT/1279/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 18 January 2000

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MR D J HODGKINS CB

MRS T O'SHEA	APPELLANT

THE ROYAL HOSPITAL NHS TRUST	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING – EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR E BROWN
(Legal Adviser)
Southwark Law Centre
Hanover Park House
14-16 Hanover Park
London
SE15 5HG	

	JUDGE PETER CLARK:	

1.	On 4th March 1991, Mrs O’Shea, a black African woman, commenced employment with the respondent Trust as a staff nurse (Grade E) on the Radcliffe Ward at Bart’s Hospital.

2.	In January 1994 a new ward manager, Sister Norton, took charge of the Radcliffe Ward.

3.	Over time the appellant perceived that she was being subjected to racial harassment and bullying by Sister Norton. She pursued an internal grievance, but her allegation of unfavourable treatment on racial grounds was not accepted by those investigating her grievance. Finally, she resigned from the employment and on 29th September 1999 she presented a complaint of unlawful racial discrimination to the Employment Tribunal.

4.	The claim was resisted and came on for hearing before a tribunal sitting at London (North) under the Chairmanship of Mrs M H Don. By a reserved decision with extended reasons promulgated on 18th August 1999 that complaint was dismissed. Against that decision this appeal is brought. This is a preliminary hearing held to determine whether the appeal raises any arguable point or points of law to go forward to a full appeal hearing.

5.	The argument advanced by Mr Brown in support of the appeal focuses on the way in which the tribunal dealt in their reasons with the evidence of Mary Slater, an equalities officer who conducted an investigation into the appellant’s complaints and produced a report which concluded that the findings which she had made did not support the allegation of racial harassment and bullying, and further a memorandum, which was in evidence before the tribunal from Nooruddin Ahmed, a non-executive director of the Trust.

6.	Before examining those contentions further we remind ourselves that the assessment and evaluation of witnesses and the evidence which they give is essentially a matter for the fact-finding tribunal, the Employment Tribunal, not for us. Our jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law only.

7.	Dealing first with the evidence of Ms Slater, the tribunal were impressed not only with the evidence which she gave before them, but also with the careful way in which she conducted her investigation into the appellant’s various specific complaints about her treatment at the hands of Sister Norton. The findings and conclusions of Ms Slater were accepted by those dealing with the appellant’s grievance at three successive internal stages. In a nutshell, the tribunal also accepted Ms Slater’s conclusions having themselves examined the individual allegations, which were dealt with in evidence before them.

8.	The tribunal’s approach is attacked on the basis that, it is said, in cross-examination Ms Slater accepted that observations made by a doctor M in one of the documents which was in evidence suggested that Sister Norton had adopted a racially stereotypical attitude towards another person, not the appellant. 

9.	So far as Mr Nooruddin Ahmed’s memorandum is concerned, he had spoken with the appellant and in that document he gave his opinion that the appellant may have been victimised by Sian Norton and that exit interviews by nursing staff who had left the respondent as an alleged consequence of Sister Norton taking charge of the Ward may have helped to alert management to the possibility of discrimination.

10.	Mr Brown points out that neither of these matters is dealt with at all in the reasons of the Employment Tribunal. He crystallises the point of law, which he invites us to take forward to a full hearing, in the following terms. He submits that the tribunal misdirected itself when it adopted the conclusion of Ms Slater in her report and either ignored any evidence which may have contradicted the original conclusion or accepted the re-evaluation of Ms Slater’s conclusions in the light of her cross-examination but did not provide adequate findings as to that fact. He makes a similar submission in relation to the effect of Mr Ahmed’s memorandum.

11.	We have considered that submission in the light of the requirement imposed on Employment Tribunals to provide reasons for their decision. In the words of Bingham LJ in Meek v Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250 at page 251, what is required is for the reasons to: 

“… contain an outline of the story which has given rise to the complaint and a summary of the Tribunal’s basic factual conclusions and a statement of the reasons which have led them to reach the conclusion which they do on those basic facts. The parties are entitled to be told why they have won or lost. There should be sufficient account of the facts and of the reasoning to enable the EAT or, on further appeal, this court to see whether any question of law arises; …”

12.	It is well-established that it is not necessary for an Employment Tribunal in its written reasons to deal with every point which has arisen in the course of evidence and argument before them. They heard, in this case, from six witnesses. It seems to us that the tribunal have adequately explained to the parties why they have won or lost. 

13.	We infer that the two specific points raised today by Mr Brown, did not, in their general deliberations, cause the tribunal to question the eventual conclusions reached by Ms Slater. In short, they were not impressed by those points. That, it seems to us, is entirely a matter for them. We can discern no arguable point of law raised in this appeal. Accordingly it must be dismissed.