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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Raval v. London Borough of Camden [2000] EAT 187_99_1702 (17 February 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2000/187_99_1702.html Cite as: [2000] EAT 187_99_1702

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR C CIUMEI (of Counsel) Instructed by: Ms K Clark Head of Membership Legal Services UNISON 1 Mabledon Place London WC1H 9AJ
For the Respondents	MS A MORGAN (of Counsel) Instructed by: The London Borough of Camden Town Hall Judd Street London WC1H 9LP


 


JUDGE WILSON: This has been the final hearing of the original applicant's appeal against the decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at London (North) on 2nd November 1998 that the Originating Application was presented outside the time prescribed in section 68 of the Race Relations Act 1976, namely three months, and that it was not just or equitable to extend the time limit.

1. We have started from the interlocutory decision in these proceedings, which were produced by a very experienced Chairman sitting alone, in which he did not take for himself, much less have put before him the possibility of, a preliminary point of jurisdiction, but proceeded under the clear presumption that there was a case to be answered on its merits and about which he gave directions concerning further and better particulars and other matters.
2. From that starting point we proceeded to the arguments presented by Mr Ciumei in the Notice of Appeal and amplified in his skeleton argument and submissions this morning, and those of Ms Morgan, similarly in her skeleton argument and amplified this morning. Those skeleton arguments and the Notice of Appeal are to be regarded as part of this judgment and are incorporated in it.
3. Mr Ciumei sets out a number of matters which he says should have been considered so far as the question of justice and equity are concerned for the purposes of section 68 of the Act. Ms Morgan says that there was no evidence led about them and therefore the tribunal's conclusion was a proper one to which it could come.
4. We take note of Ms Morgan's objections, but we also observe that in our experience and judgment, Employment Tribunals usually go out of their way to help inarticulate applicants, especially if represented by incompetent representatives. There is no indication anywhere in this case, in the papers, that this tribunal took that approach, which is regrettable
5. For our purposes today, it is sufficient to refer to two errors of law about which there can be no dispute and which are apparent from the face of the decision itself.
6. The first error of law concerns the reference in paragraph 5 of the decision to the fact that no fresh Originating Application relating to his domestic appeal had been presented by the applicant. In these circumstances, the tribunal says that it concluded that the applicant was satisfied with the internal processes and that they had been exhausted and wished to take the matter no further. It therefore did not appear that there were any factors on which the tribunal could exercise its discretion to say that it was just and equitable to extend the time limit.
7. In our judgment, that is a complete non-sequitor. This applicant was making no allegations of any racial discrimination in the way in which the appeal procedure, domestically, had been operated. There was, therefore, nothing about which any fresh application could be brought. So far as the applicant's original application was concerned, he made no attempt to withdraw and it remained for hearing. In our judgment, it was an error of law by this tribunal to consider that the question of a fresh application or otherwise, had anything to do with what they had to decide.
8. The second error of law is the total absence of any consideration, apparently, of the question of any prejudice to the respondent if a 42 days extension was granted to validate the application.
9. The decision is totally silent about whether that entered the considerations of the tribunal or not, despite the fact that it is a fundamental matter when the question of the exercise of this particular discretion is at stake.
10. Since these two errors of law quite plainly happened, it seems to us that Mr Ciumei description of this tribunal's proceedings as a totally unsatisfactory one, is amply justified.
11. We therefore direct that the matter be remitted for rehearing before a totally differently constituted Employment Tribunal. We trust that the union, on behalf of the applicant, will instruct solicitors and counsel of competence, not only on this occasion, but on any other occasion when they take proceedings on behalf of their members.