[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Pattni v. Skylord Travel & Tours Ltd [2001] UKEAT 0127_01_1506 (15 June 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2001/0127_01_1506.html Cite as: [2001] UKEAT 127_1_1506, [2001] UKEAT 0127_01_1506

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


JUDGE ALTMAN

1. This is an appeal from the decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting at London Central on 19 June and 21 August 2000. It comes before us by way of preliminary hearing to decide if there is an issue of law capable of being argued in full before the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
2. The Appellant claimed before the Employment Tribunal that he was both unfairly and wrongfully dismissed and the Employment Tribunal found that there was in fact no dismissal but a resignation and it is from that finding that the Appellant appeals.
3. He asserts that he did not resign and furthermore, that in so far as there is some suggestion by the Respondents that his resignation followed their complaint that he was working during his working hours for the Respondents on behalf of his son in his business, he rejects that.
4. Secondly, the Appellant points out that that complaint must have been incorrect because the business had already closed at the time in February when discussions took place.
5. Thirdly, the Appellant says, in effect, how could he want to resign at a time he had no job to go to and it took him some 3½ months to get a job? Furthermore, he had just paid for his daughter's wedding and would hardly want to render himself without any income at that particular time.
6. No, says the Appellant, he was dismissed and the reason was that he had asked for an airline ticket in connection with his need to travel for the wedding. Against those complaints we have examined with care the decision of the Employment Tribunal.
7. In paragraph 5 of their decision, the Employment Tribunal identified the following issue amongst others:

"Was the (Appellant) dismissed on 21 February 2000 by Mr Sehgal, the Managing Director, or did he resign following that meeting with Mr Sehgal, in the course of a telephone conversation the following day?"

In section 8 of their decision they examine the facts of this matter and recorded their findings over some 4 pages.

8. In paragraph 8(g) the Employment Tribunal said this:

(g) "On 21 February 2000 in the Respondents' offices in Eastcote, the (Appellant) was asked about the getting in of outstanding debts by Mr Sehgal. An argument developed as to the (Appellant's) work performance. In the course of the argument the (Appellant) said words to the effect: "If you don't trust me why don't you sack me." Mr Sehgal told the (Appellant) that he just wished him to do his work rather than the work of Joint R Travel. Mr Sehgal had particular concerns at that time because in the absence of the (Appellant) in Dubai he had personally taken large numbers of calls from customers of Joint R Travel who wished to speak to the (Appellant) regarding enquiries for tickets from the business of Joint R Travel.

(h) The (Appellant) was told by Mr Sehgal to think about his position overnight in discussion with his family and to return to the office on the following day for further discussion with Mr Sehgal.

(i) On 22 February 2000 the (Appellant) informed Mr Sehgal by telephone that he did not wish to continue working for the Respondents and that he intended to develop his son's business…."

9. In purported confirmation of their case the Respondents produced a copy letter which they said had been sent on 22 February 2000 to the Appellant setting out the position, as they saw it to be, and if that letter was true, it supported the Respondent's case and defeated that of the Appellant.
10. It was the Appellant's case before the Employment Tribunal that that letter was never received by him and indeed that it is a false document and was never sent to him and that, in effect, it was concocted in order to support the Respondent's case.
11. The Employment Tribunal considered that letter and they rejected what the Appellant said and accepted what the Respondent said and they attributed considerable importance to that letter as being confirmation of the Respondent's evidence in the case.
12. The Employment Tribunal came to the conclusion, therefore, that the Respondent's account of what took place was to be preferred to that of the Appellant, and that was the essential finding of fact by the Employment Tribunal, namely that they rejected the Appellant's case and they accepted what the Respondents said.
13. In section 11 of their decision the Employment Tribunal identified the conflict of evidence, to which we have referred and they found as follows in sub-section (d):

"In all the circumstances we find that the (Appellant) was not dismissed and his claim for unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal must fail."

14. The way in which the Employment Tribunals are established result in the evidence being taken by them. They see the witnesses, they hear the witnesses and they collect the evidence. They are in the best possible position to judge where the truth lies in a particular case. It is for the Employment Tribunal to find the facts on the evidence they hear and see and come to a judgement upon those facts.
15. It is only if the Employment Tribunal makes a mistake of law, that goes to their decision, that there is any appeal from that decision. For after all, the Employment Appeal Tribunal does not hear the witnesses, does not hear fresh evidence, does not judge the case for itself. Our task has therefore been to consider whether the Employment Tribunal made an error of law.
16. The Appellant raises 7 grounds of appeal. The first ground is a statement that the Employment Tribunal was wrong in its decision. That, on the face of it of course, does not raise an issue of law. It expresses the, no doubt sincerely held, conviction by the Appellant that there was an error. It does not in itself give rise to an obviously arguable particular point that we can talk of as an error of law.
17. We are indebted to the Appellant because he has put forward what he sees as being wrong with the decision and understandably of course, as he is not a lawyer, it is a matter for us to decide whether the grievances and complaints that he has about the decision are in fact errors of law that we can hear in the Employment Appeal Tribunal or not.
18. The second matter is that the Appellant states that he disagrees with the evidence of the Respondents. That in itself cannot give rise to an error of law. The Employment Tribunal itself said there was a conflict in evidence and they preferred the evidence of the Respondent. They were entitled to do so and therefore we do not see there any error of law.
19. The same applies for Ground 3 which is that the Appellant does not agree with what the Respondent has stated. That was apparent before the Employment Tribunal and again the Tribunal had the difficult task of trying to decide who was right and who was wrong.
20. We do not know and probably the Employment Tribunal does not know, at the end of the day, if it is not possible that they may have made a mistake in their decision. But that is different from making a mistake which is an error of law.
21. Fourthly, the Appellant sets out his account of what took place, namely that he reported for work on 21 February, that Mr Sehgal personally dismissed him and took away his office keys and safe key and a cheque for £1,432.00 and asked the Appellant to leave the office.
22. He says that as he was leaving Mr Sehgal actually threw a hole punch device at him which led him to sustain injuries to his right wrist and the Appellant says he reported the matter to the police and he says that what happened was that after that he was dismissed. He says that he would say that it is plain that he was dismissed for what took place and that he did not resign.
23. The Employment Tribunal evaluated that evidence but they rejected it. Of course if they had accepted what the Appellant said then they would have made a finding of dismissal. But they said there was no dismissal because they preferred the evidence of the Respondents.
24. In paragraph 5 the Appellant alludes to the letter of 22 February and his not having received it, to which we have already referred. It was within the discretion of the Tribunal to consider that as being a genuine letter.
25. In Ground 6, again, the Appellant expresses disagreement with the Respondent's evidence, this time as to the terms of his contract and the various benefits that he was to receive. Again we are driven to conclude that that was a matter before the Employment Tribunal and they preferred the evidence of the Respondents, which they were entitled to do.
26. They rejected the evidence of the Appellant and in so doing it seems to us that there was evidence before them which entitled them to reach the decision they did and so there is no arguable error of law on that ground either.
27. Finally, the Appellant complains that the Respondents have failed, or declined to produce, or to make discovery of numerous documents, all of which the Appellant says he had requested and he records some 8 categories of documents in his appeal. But the absence of documentary evidence was a matter to take before the Tribunal. It was a procedural matter and the rules of procedure of the Employment Tribunals make it clear that the conduct of the procedure of the Tribunal is within the discretion of the Tribunal.
28. Whilst the Appellant considers that all these documents would have supported his case, it seems to us that this was not an issue which the Employment Tribunal were called upon to deal with, and dealt with against the Appellant. It cannot be said that they committed any arguable error of law in so doing. Unless the Appellant can demonstrate that we cannot entertain any appeal on that ground.
29. We have a very narrow and restricted task. We have to consider whether there is any arguable error of law on the face of the Tribunal decision. We cannot, because of the way our system operates, simply say that because an Appellant disagrees with a decision, he has a right to a re-hearing, or a new hearing, or an appeal. That is not the way our system works.
30. As we indicated earlier, because it is the Tribunal that has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the evidence, it is they that are left to evaluate it. We do not know where the truth lies, but we do know that the Employment Tribunal were entitled to reach the conclusion they did.
31. We are indebted to the Appellant for pointing out all the matters he would wish to argue but we have to find that none of them disclose any arguable error of law and for that reason the appeal cannot proceed and must be dismissed at this preliminary stage.