Appeal No.	 EAT/0491/01

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 13 June 2001

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J ALTMAN
MR R N STRAKER
MR G H WRIGHT MBE

MRS D E WILLIAMSON	APPELLANT

KARL SUSS (GB) LTD	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MRS D E WILLIAMSON
(The Appellant in person)	

HIS HONOUR JUDGE J ALTMAN

1	This is an appeal from the Employment Tribunal sitting at Reading on 21 and 22 February 2001 when the Appellant’s application was dismissed.  The Appellant complained that she had been unfairly dismissed for having made a protected disclosure.  The Appellant has a very large number of very wide-ranging and deep concerns arising from a number of her experiences whilst an employee of the Respondents.  However, our task is, at this Preliminary Hearing, to determine if her appeal contains a point of law that is arguable in full before the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

2	The Appellant has prepared a Notice of Appeal which contains three main grounds of appeal and she makes reference to a large body of documentary material a large part of which was before the Employment Tribunal.  In addition she has prepared a substantial bundle which she has presented to the Employment Appeal Tribunal today, including her own analysis of the situation and a number of documents supporting her appeal.  This includes a letter from the Employment Appeal Tribunal of 29 May, the Appellant’s reply written on her copy of the 7 June, a chronology, a letter to the solicitors for the Respondents with some detailed analysis of a number of matters, the Respondents Notice of Appearance, a letter to the Appellant from Mr Winifred Suss, who was, we were told, the major shareholder in the Respondents, and the person whom the Appellant holds in high esteem.  The letter was sent to the Appellant upon his resignation from the management as CEO of the Respondent as he was moving to the board of directors and the law forbade him from holding both positions.  There is a further letter from the Employment Appeal Tribunal of 9 May with an appended reply of 24 May, a further letter which appears to be undated from the Employment Appeal Tribunal, a copy of the Public Interest Disclosure Act insofar as it is relevant to this appeal and an associated document, some detailed lists of materials and company documents, a reply on behalf of the Lord Chancellor to a letter written to him by the Appellant, a follow up letter after a further reply, a letter to the County Court at Reading for the attention of Debbie Burgess dealing with a number of cases and with associated pleadings, a document sent to the Prime Minister setting out an alternative manifesto but really containing in its satirical nature the Appellant’s criticisms, and a number of subsequent lists.  Finally there is a letter to Brigadier Palmer of the Arborfield Garrison sending him documentation for his consideration regarding the concerns that the Appellant has.

3	The Employment Tribunal heard evidence and in their decision they came to the conclusion that the application of this Appellant failed on each of a number of grounds.  The first ground was that there was no protected disclosure and secondly, even if there was there was no dismissal on that ground.  Thirdly, they held that the material put before them did not constitute in any event a protected disclosure.  

4	We turn now to the three specific grounds of appeal.  The first one is the complaint that the Chairman refused applications for witness orders.  The determination of whether or not to grant a witness order requires a Tribunal to balance a number of factors, but the Chairman or the Tribunal as a whole has the discretion to determine whether or not in a particular case it is appropriate to grant a witness order and unless they show an error of law in so doing it is a decision with which this Tribunal cannot interfere.  We have not seen any arguable error of law in relation to that ground of appeal.  

5	Secondly, it is alleged that the Tribunal ignored the fact that the Appellant had made a public interest disclosure on 4 February 2000 and suffered many a detriment because of it.  The Employment Tribunal recited the evidence of the Appellant in paragraph 12 of their decision in which they made reference to the letters and faxes that she had sent and her suggestion to Dr Richter that some managers including him were corrupt and that there were criminal activities involving the sabotage of the micro electronics industry and an attack on the British economy.  The Appellant alleged in her evidence that this was part of their membership of the Nazi party and that Dr Richter was unable to answer questions that she put to him which could only confirm her suspicion.  The Employment Tribunal considered that evidence and other material before them and came to the conclusion that this was not a public interest disclosure and that it was not the reason for the dismissal.  It is therefore incorrect, it seems to us, to complain that the Tribunal ignored what was said.  It is correct to say that they appear to have rejected it. That was a decision on the facts before them and one which they were entitled to reach; they had competing evidence and they preferred the evidence of the Respondents.  We find no error of law in that approach.

6	The third matter that is raised is the assertion that the Respondents claimed that the dismissal was on medical grounds.  The Appellant correctly points out that where there is a dismissal on medical grounds the employer must be reasonably sure of the facts before dismissal.  However, we do not read the decision of the Employment Tribunal as being that dismissal was on medical grounds.  In paragraph 16 of the decision they refer to Dr Richter as having formed the view that there might be a health problem.  They expressly state that they do not interpret his evidence in going so far as to say that he had concluded that the Applicant was mentally ill but just that he feared that there might be a problem.  It appears that there were a series of meetings planned by the Respondents which the Appellant did not attend and she was unprepared for the Respondents to have disclosed to them her medical records, as the Tribunal recorded, in accordance with her right to refuse, which was the Appellant’s entitlement.  In the Notice of Appearance the ground for dismissal was set out as being conduct.  In the decision of the Employment Tribunal reference was made to a number of allegations made by the Respondents as to the way in which they said that the Appellant had been communicating with parties and themselves.  It is not for this Tribunal to evaluate the truth or otherwise of those allegations.  However, it is apparent to us, that it was never contended in their documentary response to the Appellant’s Originating Application or in the evidence as found by the Employment Tribunal that the Appellant was dismissed on health grounds.  Therefore, whilst the Appellant’s statement as to the requirement of a reasonable belief in the illness as a prerequisite for a dismissal on ill health grounds, that simply did not arise in this case.  There is therefore no arguable error of law in the Tribunal’s failing to find that it was not a proper ill health dismissal.  

7	Accordingly, we have concluded that on the very narrow question that we have to decide and the only question that we are permitted to decide we must decide against the Appellant.  That is, there is no arguable point of law capable of being argued in full before the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

8	The Appellant has expressed carefully and fully the very wide ranging concerns that she has for this country and the welfare of the British people.  She says that she is ashamed and disgusted of the lack of response that this country and nation has demonstrated for her concerns to such an extent that she now feels that she may have to go abroad to speak to Mr Suss in order to be properly heard.  She would be ashamed if she were unable to get a fair hearing in a British Court for her concerns.  She feels that she is being ignored and that there seems to be a preference for the support of corrupt people.  She has reiterated that in these proceedings and possibly elsewhere in contacting other public figures she wishes to have an opportunity to make her public interest disclosure.  But we are not in a position to authorise, by allowing an appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal or the ordinary Tribunals, to be simply the place to make such disclosures or to help the British people or anything of that kind.  We have to decide if the Employment Tribunal can be seen arguably to have made an error of law in their decision in what appears to us to have been a very careful and guardedly expressed decision.  We have discerned no arguable error of law and therefore this appeal must be dismissed at this stage.

The Appellant has made application for leave to appeal.  In order for us to grant such leave we must be satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of success.  It must follow from the fact that we have dismissed this appeal at a Preliminary Hearing that we do not consider there is and that therefore we refuse to give leave to appeal.  That concludes the decision.  
If you wish therefore to still appeal, the advice I would give you is that your next port of call must be the Court of Appeal itself to ask them for leave, but the time for doing that does not begin to run until you receive the report of the decision in writing.

How long will that be?

It is difficult to say, it has got to be typed, it may take a few weeks.