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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> McMullen's of Hertford v. Sweetman [2001] UKEAT 0506_00_0210 (2 October 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2001/0506_00_0210.html Cite as: [2001] UKEAT 506__210, [2001] UKEAT 0506_00_0210 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR A D TUFFIN CBE
PROFESSOR P D WICKENS OBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellant | MR NIGEL MAHONEY Solicitor Instructed by Messrs McLellans Solicitors Old Cross House Old Cross Hertford Hertfordshire SG14 1RB |
For the Respondent |
THE RESPONDENT NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED |
JUDGE PETER CLARK
The facts
"At previous meetings, you have made it clear to myself that you can no longer work together. You confirmed that there had been a breakdown in your marriage which you now considered to be irretrievable.
You stated that you were both aware of the implications for your continued employment with the Company, and recognised that as a result of your marital breakdown, you are in breach of your contract of employment.
The following actions were agreed:
1 Your joint contract is terminated from the 14th July 1999. You are both therefore given your full entitlement notice period of 12 weeks for termination of your employment.
2 The Robin Hood is one of McMullen's premier houses. The current situation and relationship between the two of you is potentially putting the business at risk for the future, which you both recognised. However you wished to give assurance that business would not suffer as result of your personal difficulties.
During this notice period, you are both welcome to apply for the Robin Hood and other pub vacancies within the Company as may be suitable for a single appointment.
I would like applications for the Robin Hood by the 23rd July 1999, should you wish to be considered.
3 In order for either of you to apply for the pub, I will require a business plan, including new staffing plans and swot analysis. The staffing plan should show how the pub can be operated as a single manager.
If one of you are appointed to the pub then the other will be paid in lieu of the remainder of the notice period and will be required to vacate the living accommodation at the Robin Hood immediately, if an alternative position within the Company has not been found.
I will ensure that any other pub vacancies are sent separately to each of you."
The Employment Tribunal decision
(1) the whole disciplinary procedure was entirely unfair. The Respondent had treated the matter as if the Applicant was guilty of some act of gross misconduct rather than the unfortunate breakdown of his marriage.
(2) there was no proper consultation with Mr & Mrs Sweetman about their future in the light of their marriage breakdown, and particularly in light of their long service. There was no prior written indication that their matrimonial dispute could lead to the loss of their jobs.
(3) the meeting of 14 July was procedurally unfair in that:(a) there was no prior warning that their jobs were at risk(b) they were not advised to bring along a representative and
(c) they were not told of their right of appeal.
(4) the Respondent's decision to dismiss the Applicant was inconsistent with his having managed the Robin Hood alone whilst his wife was estranged in 1996-1998.
(5) it was unfair to require the Applicant to vacate the Public House whilst allowing his wife to continue working there and in time to take over the managership.
The Appeal
(1) It was, we are told, submitted on behalf of the Respondent below that at the meeting held on 14 July there was no dismissal of the Applicant, but a consensual termination of the joint management contract issued on 1 July 1996. That issue was not resolved by the Employment Tribunal. It ought to have been. Further, the secondary issue as to which were the relevant terms of the contract (see reasons, paragraph 2(i)) was not, but ought to have been resolved.
(2) if there was a dismissal on 14 July, what was the reason for that dismissal and was the dismissal fair? It seems to us that the Employment Tribunal may have found that there was a dismissal for some other substantial reason on that date and that the dismissal was unfair for the reasons set out at paragraph 8.
(3) if so, the Employment Tribunal failed to consider whether the effective dismissal in fact took place on 28 July, as appeared to be common ground on the pleadings. In our judgment that was the effective date of dismissal. See Albini v Ind Coope Retail Ltd (1998) IRLR 131.
(4) if that was the effective dismissal, what was the reason for that dismissal? It may be different from the reason for dismissal, if there was a dismissal, on 14 July. The first dismissal being for some other substantial reason, the second by reason of conduct. In any event it was necessary for the Employment Tribunal to determine the principal reason for dismissal on that date. That they failed to do.
(5) having determined the principal reason for dismissal on 28 July, was dismissal for that reason fair or unfair? That requires consideration of the substantive reason for dismissal and the procedure, or lack of procedure on that occasion. This question again simply has not been addressed by the Employment Tribunal. The findings of unfairness all relate to the 14 July meeting, save for one, the appointment of Mrs Sweetman to the post of manager of the Robin Hood after the 28 July. That is, in our judgment, an irrelevant factor in considering the reasonableness of the dismissal on 28 July.
(6) the Employment Tribunal considered the question of contribution as at the 28 July (reasons paragraph 10) on the basis that the dismissal was unfair. They were correct to do so. Both under s122(2) (basic award) and 123(6) (compensatory award) Employment Rights Act 1996 Mr Mahoney accepted in argument that the contributory conduct must precede the effective date of termination of the contract of employment. It follows that the Applicant's subsequent drink drive conviction was not conduct contributing to the dismissal.
(7) However, the Employment Tribunal did not consider, either at the liability hearing or at the remedies hearing, the question under s123(1) of the Employment Rights Act as to what compensation was just and equitable applying the principles in Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1988] ICR 142. In particular:
(a) did the fact of the Applicant's second drink-drive conviction in August 1999 render him unemployable as a pub manager, such that his loss of earnings for the purposes of calculating the compensatory award was limited to a date at which his employment could have been fairly terminated by reason of that conviction. Alternatively, what was the chance that he would have been fairly dismissed at that stage, expressed as a percentage?
(b) further or alternatively, whether the employment would have ended on 6 October 1999 as a result of a mutual termination agreed on 14 July (see under (1) above).