Appeal No.	 EAT/1510/00

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 25 July 2001

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS BROWN
MR J R CROSBY
MR P R A JACQUES CBE

MR R FRANCIS	APPELLANT

LONDON UNDERGROUND LTD	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING EX PARTE

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR R FRANCIS
(The Appellant in person)	

MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS BROWN

1	This is the Preliminary Hearing of an appeal by Mr R Francis from the decision of the Employment Tribunal London Central, the Extended Reasons being sent on 16 October 2000.  The Tribunal with Mr I H Walker as Chairman decided that at Preliminary Hearing the case number 2202968/00 should be struck out as frivolous with no prospect of success.  This draconian step was taken in the light of an unusual and protracted history of litigation involving Mr Francis and the Respondents, London Underground Ltd.  The finding of the Tribunal was that the claim for unfair dismissal, constructive dismissal and racial discrimination were duplicates of claims 46697/97 and 23022257/97, both of which, whether independently or whether they were consolidated, were struck out in 1997.  There was no application by Mr Francis, who at all times has been acting for himself, for a review and there was no appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

2	Reading the Extended Reasons, there were two reasons for dismissing these fresh proceedings.  First, as his employment had ended in 1997, the application was out of time and time would not be extended under Section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.  Secondly, because it was based on previously struck out applications, the application was frivolous with no prospect of success.

3	Mr Francis, who clearly feels very strongly as to how London Underground Ltd treated him during and at the end of his employment, has submitted voluminous grounds and documentation.  They are obviously the product of a good deal of research.  Mr Francis told us that he was now a law student and his written representation bear all the signs of that.  Unfortunately, it does seem that he is unable to concentrate all the time on Section 111 and on the history of the litigation as the Employment Tribunal described it.  A good deal of his submissions to us have been in the form of complaints as to the conduct of his former employers.  Section 111 provides a three-month time limit for the presentation of proceedings to a Tribunal.  Subsection 2 says this:

“Subject to subsection (3), an [employment tribunal] shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal –
(a)	before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or
(b)	within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.”

That was the statutory frame work behind the first part of the decision of the Employment Tribunal.  We have to say that, with all respect to the Appellant and the zeal with which he put forward his case, he has not begun to make any inroads on that decision or shown that the Tribunal were in any way in error as a matter of law in their approach.  The time table is a strict one with an easily understandable exception to it based on the words ‘reasonably practicable’.  The reason is that, though Appellants or Applicants have rights, Respondents have rights as well.  It is very difficult for an employer to keep records for a lengthy period of time, to get together evidence from witnesses who may have retired and dispersed or even died, and defend a claim made very long after the event.  In this particular case, well over three years after the dismissal.  

4	It is perfectly true that Mr Francis has material in the form of a tape recording between himself and two employees of London Underground which he says supports him in a claim of constructive dismissal and it was in ignorance of the implications of that conversation that he did not bring his proceedings any earlier.  The fact remains however that he has demonstrated that he has a full knowledge of the procedure and of the time limits involved because he was successful in the earlier proceedings in persuading an Industrial Tribunal to extend the time for those proceedings, which in the end were struck out.  So his task in showing that it was not reasonably practicable for these complaints to be presented before the end of three months from the date of termination of his employment is not only uphill it is completely impossible.  In all those circumstances, there is, we regret to say no arguable case to proceed to a Full Hearing and this appeal is dismissed.

Mr Francis, I regret that we would refuse permission to go to the Court of Appeal.  There is no arguable point of law and no real prospect of success.  That does not mean that you cannot apply now to the Court of Appeal, but so far as we are concerned, you do not have permission to appeal.