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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Harris v. Concept Automotive Services Ltd (t/a Carland) [2001] UKEAT 552_01_1211 (12 November 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2001/552_01_1211.html Cite as: [2001] UKEAT 552_1_1211, [2001] UKEAT 552_01_1211

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JUDGE D PUGSLEY

1. By a Decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at Manchester which heard this case on 15 November, 11 December 2000 and then on 22 January 2001, the Tribunal dismissed the complaints made by the Appellants.
2. The Tribunal, initially, gave Summary Reasons which it thereafter amplified to Extended Reasons. The Tribunal considered the claim by Mr Harris that he had been dismissed and that that dismissal infringed a right, namely the statutory rights in the meaning of section 104 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and/or that he had brought to the Respondent's attention circumstances connected with his work, which he really believed were harmful, or potentially harmful to health and safety within the meaning of the provisions of section 100 of the Act.
3. As far as Mr Byrne was concerned, he too brought an action that he had been dismissed for reasons that contravened section 104 of the Act, though it seems from the Decision that that aspect of his claim was not pursued.
4. Mr Harris did not have sufficient continuity of service for his claim for unfair dismissal to be considered. Mr Byrne did, and the Tribunal, in a brief Decision came to the view that dismissal was fair in that even if the Respondents did not carry out a thorough investigation to the allegation, Mr Byrne admitted to the dismissing officer he had arranged for a third party to clock him out, and that the disciplinary and appeal hearings was not conducted in a normal procedural manner, nevertheless, left the Respondents with a genuine relief based on reasonable grounds, that Mr Byrne had arranged for the third party to clock him out.
5. The Tribunal concluded that the Respondents reasonably concluded that there existed no extenuating or mitigating circumstances justifying what was an essentially dishonest act, and in the circumstances of the case, they decided that Mr Byrne's dismissal was a sufficient reason to dismiss him and was within the band of reasonable responses for an employer.
6. We are bound to say that the Extended Reasons could have been amplified with profit, but at the end of the day, anyone reading that Decision would, in homely terms, know why they had won, or in the case of these Applicants, why they had lost.
7. The allegation made in the case of Mr Harris was that the Decision was perverse and one to which no reasonable Tribunal could have come have come on to with the facts presented. It therefore sets out, in extenuated form, why it says that the reasoning is perverse.
8. As far as Mr Byrne is concerned, the same grounds are cited and it seems that to a large extent that it seeks to incorporate the grounds set out in Mr Harris's grounds of appeal.
9. The position is that we are now, at three o'clock, and we have heard nothing from any of the parties as to their non appearance, though it is fair to say that as far as Mr Harris is concerned, he has indicated that he does not intend to be present.
10. On the basis of what we have before us, we do not consider that we can identify any area of law which we can say amounts to misdirection. We have, as we have said, noted that the Decision could have been more comprehensive, but in our view, there is nothing we can identify as an area of law which would enable this Tribunal to give leave for a hearing at a full Tribunal. We therefore dismiss these appeals.