Appeal No. EAT/0848/01

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 30 January 2002

Before
MR RECORDER LANGSTAFF
MR D CHADWICK
MR S M SPRINGER MBE

DR A ABEGAZE	APPELLANT

CROYDON COLLEGE AND OTHERS	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	Dr A Abegaze
(In Person)	

MR RECORDER LANGSTAFF
1.	This is a Preliminary Hearing from the Employment Tribunal at London (South).  Because we propose to give permission for the matter to proceed to a hearing at which the Respondents will be represented in a case in which the subject is the exercise of a discretion by the Chairman of the Employment Tribunal, and because we recognise that as an unusual course, we should say something about our reasoning.  

2.	The question is whether or not the Chairman’s exercise of the discretion may have involved misdirection or may not sufficiently have appreciated the factual basis upon which it was to be exercised.  At paragraph 23, it is arguable (we say no more about it), that the Chairman indicated that she was taking into account a failure to comply with an order in respect of a time limit.  The orders which are included in the bundle are those dated 9th April 2001, which orders Dr Abegaze 0to send (I emphasise that word) particulars on or before a given date and secondly, a letter perhaps varying that order of 24th April which merely says, 

“You must therefore particularise your claim without further delay and at the latest by 4th May 2001”

3.	It is arguable that the obligation upon the Appellant was in respect of the date of sending, and was not in respect the date of receipt.  It is however the date of receipt upon which the Chairman appears to have fixed in order to conclude that there was a breach of the time limit.  

4.	Secondly, we think it is arguable that primacy in reasoning is required by article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights to be accorded to whether or not the defaults of the Appellant were such to render a fair trial, difficult or impossible.  It may be that the Chairman has paid sufficient regard to that in paragraph 27, it may be that she did not do so.  We consider the issue at least merits further inter-partes argument.  

5.	Dr Abegaze has asked us also to consider whether or not his response to the order for further and better particulars was sufficient in the context of a claim for racial discrimination.  Because we are giving leave to argue the appeal on the other two bases and because it seems to us that the issues raised are short and are inter-linked with those upon which we are giving permission, we shall allow him to raise this issue too, although we have no confidence that he will necessarily succeed upon it.  

6.	For those reasons, we are going to permit this case to proceed to a Full Hearing, It will be category B.  It will need, we think, one hour to argue fully.  Skeleton arguments must be supplied no later than seven days prior to the hearing.  Those arguments should address the three points which we have mentioned, that is the time point, the question of whether prejudice to a fair trial was properly considered to the extent that it should have been under the applicable law and thirdly, whether the response to the request for particulars was in the context arguably adequate.  Any authorities that are to be relied upon should be photocopied and attached to the skeleton arguments at the same time that they are delivered.