Appeal No.	EAT/1121/01

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 25 February 2002

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE WILKIE QC
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MR J HOUGHAM CBE

MR P HARRIS	APPELLANT

THOMPSON GARSIDE & CO	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR
REPRESENTATION
BY OR ON BEHALF OF
THE APPELANT	

JUDGE WILKIE QC:

1	This is an appeal by Mr Harris against the decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at Leeds on 12 July 2001, which dismissed his complaint of constructive unfair dismissal.  The decision of the tribunal sets out the history of the matter in a number of sub-paragraphs and focuses on the meeting which took place on 1 December 2000, namely a meeting between the applicant and Mr Garside, a partner in a firm of solicitors with whom Mr Harris was then employed.

2	The decision of the tribunal can be summarised by what they said in paragraph 3 of the decision.  

“The final meeting on 1 December was a time when both Mr Garside and the Applicant were frank with each other.  Mr Garside had realised that the Applicant was not happy.  The Applicant had lost interest in his work.  Quite properly, Mr Garside advised the Applicant to take legal advice and that proposal resulted in the Applicant resigning and claiming constructive dismissal.  The Tribunal cannot identify any serious breach by the employer of the conditions of the Applicant’s service.  It rather takes the view that, in a rather bumbling way, Mr Garside tried to please.  The dismissal complaints therefore fail.  There was no action on the part of the Respondent which could be said to cause a breakdown in the relationship between employer and employee or unreasonable behaviour going to the root of their relationship.”

3	In his grounds of appeal against that finding the appellant says that the tribunal erred in law in that, first, the tribunal made findings of fact that matters had been agreed, when the evidence was that they had not been agreed.  Second, the tribunal erred in failing to analyse in its decision the chronology of events and in consequence made findings of fact which were central to its decision which could not be substantiated by the evidence adduced by either party and, third, the tribunal’s extended reasons failed to provide an analysis of their decision which no reasonable tribunal could have reached on the basis of the evidence adduced.

4	It is important for the appellant to understand (and we are sure he does) that this tribunal has very limited jurisdiction.  It can only intervene where there is an error of law in the decision of the Employment Tribunal.  The question of what evidence it accepts and what findings of fact it comes to are matters for the tribunal, as long as they do not act in a way which can be categorised as perverse.  

5	It seems to us, having read the reasons for the decision and having looked at the grounds of appeal, that there is manifestly no point of law raised by Mr Harris under any of the three headings and that, further, the statement of reasons of the tribunal for its decision are manifestly adequate to enable Mr Harris to know what the findings of fact were and why it was that he did not succeed in his complaint.  

6	We conclude that there is no reasonable basis for an arguable appeal in the Notice of Appeal and, therefore, we dismiss it at this stage without requiring it to go to a full inter partes hearing.