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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Deveney v. Inland Revenue [2003] UKEAT 0004_03_1403 (14 March 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2003/0004_03_1403.html Cite as: [2003] UKEAT 4_3_1403, [2003] UKEAT 0004_03_1403 |
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At the Tribunal | |
On 7 March 2003 | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
(SITTING ALONE)
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
(RULE 3(10) APPEAL)
For the Appellant | THE APPELLANT NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED |
JUDGE PETER CLARK
(1) A direction made on 10 October 2002 and contained at paragraph 3 of a written order dated 21 October that there be a hearing of a preliminary issue as to whether or not the Applicant was dismissed by the Respondent, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, for the purposes of his complaint of unfair dismissal; that hearing to take place on 22-23 January 2003, and
(2) The Chairman's refusal, following a telephone directions hearing held on 13 December 2002 to allow the Applicant to amend his Originating Application to add a complaint under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA).
(1) The Chairman has a wide discretion to order a preliminary hearing under Rule 6 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2001.
I am unable to discern any challenge in law to that exercise of discretion.
(2) The Originating Application was presented on about 12 February 2002, alleging unfair dismissal only in box 1. The application to add a claim under DDA was made by letter dated 28 November 2002, well out of time. The issue for the Chairman was whether the proposed amendment added a new cause of action or whether it simply attached a new label to facts already pleaded in the Originating Application. He decided that it was the former and refused the amendment. He was plainly entitled to reach that conclusion on the face of the Originating Application. I see nothing in the grounds of appeal or the Applicant's letter of 31 January which remotely amounts to a legal challenge to that ruling.